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LITERARY CRITICISM IN CANADA

DESMOND PACEY

LET me begin by defining the scope of this article. It will be concerned not with all literary criticism produced in this country, but with Canadian criticism of Canadian literature. It is not intended to be a formal analysis and evaluation of contemporary critics, still less a history of the development of our criticism; it is an attempt to discover certain basic tendencies of Canadian literary criticism and to suggest possible explanations for them.

Perhaps the most striking thing about our criticism is that there is so little of it. The critical bibliography for almost every Canadian author—Carman is a conspicuous exception—is so small that it can be covered in a single evening. A series of full-scale monographs on the best Canadian writers is badly needed. A start was made, a couple of decades ago, with the "Makers of Canadian Literature" series, but the project was allowed to lapse, after a few volumes had appeared, because public support was lacking. In any case, it is doubtful whether the plan of this series was adequate, since it conceived of the publication of a biography, an anthology of selections, and a critical estimate, all in the space of a very small volume. More comprehensive studies have appeared sporadically—Chittick's study of Haliburton, for example, and Klinck's study of Wilfred Campbell—but there are many gaps, gaps which in a more critically conscious country would be incredible. There is, for example, no satisfactory book-length study of Lampman, nor of Duncan Campbell Scott, nor of Charles Heavysege, nor of John Richardson.

There is an almost equal dearth of general volumes. The only true history of Canadian literature, that by R. P. Baker, stops at Confederation. There are a number of handbooks on the subject, but most of them have defects which seriously impair their value. That by MacMechan is, and was only intended to be, a highly selective sketch, as is Lionel Stevenson's *Appraisals of Canadian Literature;* that by Logan and French is careless in style, over-enthusiastic in tone, and clumsy in construction. The most satisfactory volume of a comprehensive nature, Professor Rhodenizer's *Handbook of Canadian Literature,* is now obviously dated and in need of revision: it includes authors who, from our present perspective, can be seen to be without significance, and it omits authors who deserve a place. There are two good books on Canadian poetry, those by Professors W. E. Collin and E. K. Brown; but Professor Collin's book deals with only a few of

our poets, and with none prior to Confederation, and Dr. Brown's is a very brief and necessarily somewhat superficial study for all its acuteness of insight. There is at present no book on the novel in Canada, though, according to the report of the Canadian Humanities Research Council, two are in preparation.

When we turn to periodical criticism, the situation is not much better. There is, to the best of my knowledge, no full-length article in our magazines on the first Canadian novelist, John Richardson; there is only a handful of articles on such an outstanding poet as Duncan Campbell Scott; there are only two articles, and a few review-articles, on Frederick Philip Grove.

Quantity, of course, is less significant than quality; but I think that in this case the two are inseparable, that before the quality of our criticism improves its quantity must increase. No one person can or should determine the stature of a poet or novelist. As Dr. Johnson said, fame is a shuttlecock and must be batted back and forth a good deal before it finds a permanent resting place. The play of ideas between several critics concerned with the same author is mutually stimulating. Each critic is challenged by his rivals to find new beauties or new flaws, to uncover new layers of meaning or new subtleties of technique. In Canada this kind of challenge is almost unknown; for all the response there is to one's appraisals, one's words might never have been read.

The second fact which strikes one about Canadian criticism is its preponderantly academic origin. The best critics of the older generation were professors such as Edgar at Toronto, Cappon at Queen's, Rhodenizer at Acadia, MacMechan at Dalhousie; in this generation they are again professors—Brown, Smith, Collin, Frye, Daniells, Mackay. Non-academic critics such as Lorne Pierce and John Sutherland are conspicuous by their rarity.

This academicism explains many of the peculiar tendencies of our criticism. There is, for example, our addiction to politeness and fence-sitting. It is rare indeed to see a piece of Canadian criticism which either roundly damns or enthusiastically praises a writer; instead, in true pedagogic fashion, we carefully weigh his merits and defects, tentatively relate him to similar English, American, or European writers, and timidly express the hope that the public will see fit to read him. Now this, of course, is a legitimate and praiseworthy part of the critical process; but it is not the only part. In Canada, however, it has tended to be almost the only kind of criticism. It seems to me a very good thing that we have had the un-academic enthusiasm of Lorne Pierce and that we now have the equally un-academic blunt-

ness of John Sutherland to ruffle the placid waters of our critical literature. We need more such critics, not to supersede but to supplement the work of our academic critics.

Another characteristic of academic criticism is its *penchant* for labels and pigeon-holes. The most recent example of this tendency was the first edition of A. J. M. Smith's *The Book of Canadian Poetry*. There was considerable controversy about his classification of our more recent poets into the native and the cosmopolitan traditions, and some curious anomalies resulted. It was disturbing to find F. R. Scott, whose verse is very decidedly inspired by and rooted in the Canadian milieu, classed with Finch and Smith rather than with Livesay and Birney. It is significant that in the recently published second edition of the anthology, Smith has dropped these classifications. It was, however, possible to find justification for his rather arbitrary divisions in the fact that recent Canadian poetry was, when his anthology first appeared, a largely unexplored wilderness. His signposts, if occasionally misleading, were on the whole helpful, and they were reasonably few in number.

But if Smith's divisions could be justified, we have only to look at Logan and French's *Highways of Canadian Literature* to see the excesses into which this classifying mania can run. To read that book, one would think that there were more "schools" of Canadian literature than of porpoises in the sea. Even R. P. Baker's *English-Canadian Literature to the Confederation,* a much better book, carries this tendency too far, with its talk of the non-existent "schools" of Goldsmith, Byron, and Burns. We should have been much further ahead if the time wasted in the invention and elaboration of these schools had been employed in the close analysis of individual poems. Close line by line analyses, such as that accorded to Birney's "David" by Roy Daniells in the Spring, 1946 number of *Gants du ciel,* have been far too rare in our critical history.

In noting these defects in academic criticism I do not wish to associate myself with those who seek to belittle the contribution of our universities to the development of Canadian literature. On the contrary, I believe that the universities have done more than any other agency to stimulate the production of good writing in this country. As we have seen, almost all our critics have been university professors, and almost all our writers have been university trained. If it had not been for the pioneer critical explorations of men like Baker, MacMechan, Smith, and Brown, Mr. Sutherland's clever sallies would have been meaningless if not impossible. Most important of all, the academicians have, by their influence on their students, done much to create an

audience for Canadian writers, and it is in the universities that little magazines such as *Northern Review* and *Here and Now* find their most eager readers.

For if academic criticism has its limitations, it also has its special strengths. The academic critic is a man trained in more than one literature, and is therefore specially fitted to apply one of the tests which any national literature must be prepared to withstand: the test of comparative criticism. He is trained also to sift evidence thoroughly and impartially, and is therefore less prone to fall into the excesses of enthusiastic over-valuation and cynical under-valuation. He has a sense of the past, an awareness of tradition, and can therefore employ the historical method to good advantage. As a teacher, he is experienced in the orderly and clear exposition of ideas, and is thus fitted to present the public with an intelligible picture of our literary development.

There are, however, two respects in which the universities have fallen short of their maximum potential service to our literature: they have been too reluctant to accord it a significant place in the formal undergraduate and postgraduate curriculum, and they have not performed adequately the function which they alone are fitted to perform, namely the scholarly investigation of our literary history.

That the study of Canadian literature should not supplant the study of English literature in our universities is eminently reasonable; but it should supplement it. It should occupy a small part of the freshman English course which, in most of our colleges, is given to students in all faculties; and it should have a place—a small place, possibly one term out of the usual eight—in the curriculum of those students who are specializing in English. This is not the proper context in which fully to argue the case for the undergraduate study of Canadian literature. To confine the argument to the relevant, it is clear that if we are to have more critics of our literature in the future they must first become aware of the existence of this literature, and that one sure place to receive this awareness is in the lecture-room.

Postgraduate study of Canadian literature is, of course, closely related to the task of the scholarly interpretation and investigation of our literary history. It is in the graduate schools that a start should be made on this essential job. And it is essential: to convince oneself of the service which the scholar renders to the critic it is only necessary to attempt to write a critical study of almost any Canadian writer of the nineteenth century. If, for example, one proposes to write a critical study of John Richardson's novels, he finds that he must first do all the scholar's spadework: biographical details have not been fully explored

and verified; the various editions have not been sorted out and compared; there is no complete list of his publications. Surely in performing such tasks Canadian graduate students could get training in research methods as valuable as that which they receive by adding their mite to the store collected on some English or American author?

So much for the academic factor. There are two other factors the influence of which I should like to consider: the relative smallness of our literary community, and the lack of any pre-eminent author.

The number of people who write books and articles in Canada is quite small, and the number of those who write anything which either is or aspires to be "literature" is smaller still. So small is the latter group, that almost all the members are known to each other either directly or indirectly. As Matthew Arnold pointed out, it is always difficult, in judging contemporary or recent productions, to avoid the personal estimate. In Canada it is doubly difficult. To choose an obvious example, almost every literary critic in Canada is familiar with the buoyant and warm personality of Dr. E. J. Pratt. Knowing him, it is well-nigh impossible to be a coldly impartial critic of his poetry. One can never be sure whether it is the verse itself one admires, or the glimpse it reveals of the man. And even if one did detect a weakness in the work of a man so universally admired, the temptation to slur over it would be very great indeed.

The result is that the great bulk of our criticism is characterized by what might be called "tender-heartedness." Very rarely is the work of a living writer attacked, almost never if the quality of his previous work has made him a well-known figure. If the critic is in an aggressive mood, he directs his attack against the dead. This has led, in the recent past, to an under-valuation of the worth of the poetry of Carman, Lampman, Roberts, and Scott, and an over-valuation of the worth of many of our contemporary poets. It is true that the reputations of the members of the Group of the Sixties needed a certain amount of deflation, but when all their defects have been noted it remains true to say of their work that it is nearer to perfection *of its kind* than is that of any more recent poet or group of poets. Where is the modern metaphysical lyric to match the near-perfection of Carman's late romantic lyric, "Low Tide on Grand Pré"?

But if "Low Tide on Grand Pré" is a convenient touchstone of excellence—and many critics would indignantly deny this—it would be rash to maintain that Carman's work as a whole makes him the pre-eminent figure in our literary history. The fact is that there is no single pre-eminent Canadian writer, no one even remotely approaching the stature of Milton or Fielding. This is an obvious statement, but I

do not think that its consequences for our criticism have been noted. In the first place, it deprives the critics and literary historians of a centre about which their observations and comparisons may revolve. To see the advantages of possessing such a central point of reference, we have only to look at the criticism of English drama. In that field, Shakespeare is a landmark by which almost all the necessary measurements may be made, and his existence both simplifies and vivifies the critic's task. For standards of measurement, the Canadian critic must invariably look outside the borders of his own country. He must relate the subject of his study to a tradition which is in at least some degree alien.

A second consequence for our criticism of this lack of an outstanding writer is further proof of his potential value: I refer to our constant and rather pathetic search for him. An author of great merit but not of transcendent excellence is chosen by the critic; his strengths are magnified and his weaknesses ignored or excused until the critic finally persuades himself that he has found the master he seeks. If no writer of established reputation can be found suitable for such a build-up, then some new figure on the literary horizon is selected as the coming genius of the age. Hence the perpetual hopefulness of our criticism, the oft-disappointed but never discarded belief that Canadian literary greatness is just around the corner.

But the most destructive consequence has been the apathy this lack has bred in the young, eager potential critics of our literature. Criticism of Canadian literature is not, on the surface at least, a very challenging or exciting endeavour. The keen young critic, eager to prove his mettle, is much more likely to tackle an English or American writer whose stature is beyond question. When there are the complexities of Donne or Melville to decipher, why waste one's time on the misty transcendentalism of Carman or the rough-hewn pessimism of Frederick Philip Grove?

Well, why? It is a question which cannot be dodged if this article is to have any positive value. In the first place, I should argue that the best critical writing is not always done on the best authors: it is perfectly possible to do first-rate research and first-rate criticism on a second-rate author. Some of the finest of Johnson's *Lives of the Poets* are concerned with second-rate versifiers who are now scarcely remembered. I should say that it is at least as strenuous a critical exercise to detect the precise nature of the flaws in Carman's verse as to reveal the metaphysical brilliance of a song by Donne.

In the second place, there is so much to be done in the field of Canadian literary criticism. The labours of countless doctoral candi-

dates have cultivated the English and American fields to the point where it is difficult to find a fresh area of investigation; but in Canada scarcely the first sod has been turned. Surely this should arouse the instincts of the pioneer which may be assumed to slumber in us all?

Finally, and most important, I feel that as Canadians we have a special right and responsibility to investigate our own literary history. Our social, political, and economic historians have long shown us the way, and they have achieved impressive results. Our American neighbours have come increasingly, in the past two decades, to make their own literary tradition a major subject of study. How long must we wait for our Parringtons and Brookses and Lewisohns to appear? If they do not appear soon, we may find that the Americans know more about our literature than we know ourselves. Already, as I learn from correspondence with the instructors concerned, several American universities are offering undergraduate and graduate courses in Canadian literature, and it is of course well known that some of the best collections of Canadian books and manuscripts are housed in American libraries.

In thus pleading for Canadian study of Canadian literature I am not, let me repeat, arguing that we should ignore or discourage the study of Milton and Shakespeare and all the other great writers of the English-speaking world. They too are part of our tradition, and it is one of our responsibilities as members of a Western civilized community to keep that tradition alive. But we should be willing to devote part of our time to the tracing and fostering of our own special tradition, the tradition of British North America.

I look forward to the day when, from academic and non-academic sources alike, there will flow a steady stream of clear, direct, and vigorous criticism upon our literature of the past and present. It should be criticism which brings to bear upon the work of our writers the finest insights of the best critical minds. It should be criticism which is unafraid and uninhibited, which refuses to make compromises with or concessions to our prudery, our conventions, and our too-tender susceptibilities. The emergence of such criticism will be perhaps the most certain sign that "our day of dependence is over," that our cultural immaturity is on the wane.

"ALL PASSION SPENT": A REVALUATION OF *JANE EYRE*

M. H. Scargill

FROM the day of its first appearance *Jane Eyre* has been credited with adding something new to the tradition of the English novel, though just what this is, and whether it is desirable, continues to puzzle the critics. To some the new quality is the voice of a woman who speaks with perfect frankness about herself; to others it is "passion," though the nature of this "passion" is left undefined.[1] To all, *Jane Eyre* is remarkable for its intensity, and this intensity is usually taken as sufficient to counteract what critics regard as a sensational and poorly constructed plot.[2] The cause of this intensity remains uncertain. Some have suggested that it is love;[3] some even go so far as to suggest that it is the memory of a real love which Charlotte Brontë herself had experienced, that is that the novel is some kind of autobiography[4] and, if we take this view to its logical conclusion, not a novel at all.

If we trace the development of the English novel up to the middle of the nineteenth century, we see that it had concerned itself mainly with the external and had tried to secure belief by a faithful representation of that external through probability of events and convincing characters. The art, if it be an art, of imposing belief (instead of securing it) in those things which are not the product or facsimile of external life, had been confined to the poets and to those dramatists who are also poets. No one can call *King Lear* probable: no one can deny that it imposes upon us the necessity of belief by its intensity, expressed in language and in imagery that is far from normal.

With the publication of *Jane Eyre,* the English novel, which had already absorbed elements from the essay, the "character," and the drama, turned away from the external towards the expression of an

[1] "The Brontës had fire and passion . . . but were limited in range to the exceptional, the eccentric, the outrageous. . . ." Gerald Bullet in *George Eliot* (London, 1947), 161.

[2] "Clumsiness and glaring improbabilities in the plot, blunders and absurdities in the picturing of a society to which Charlotte Brontë was a complete stranger, were as nothing beside the fierce sincerity with which she depicted life as it had imprinted itself upon her quivering sensibilities, from childhood to womanhood." E. A. Baker, *The History of the Novel* (London, 1937), VIII, 36.

[3] "It is in the depiction of the growth of love . . . that *Jane Eyre* is perhaps most notably different from earlier English fiction." B. McCullough, *Representative English Novelists* (New York, 1946), 183.

[4] "With all its faults, its narrowness of range, its occasional extravagances, *Jane Eyre* will long be remembered . . . among the most vivid masterpieces in the rare order of literary 'confessions.'" F. Harrison, *Studies in Early Victorian Literature* (London, 1906), 162.

experience exclusively personal. This experience is not necessarily factual, but it is none the less real, and it is important, as much poetry is important, for the intensity of its feeling and the adequacy of its expression. It is intensity of feeling which has attracted readers to *Jane Eyre;* it is the origin and nature of this feeling and its means of expression, adequate or inadequate, that have puzzled them.

To many readers passion is synonymous with love, and to these it is as a love story that *Jane Eyre* appeals, a love story told with great frankness by a woman who, as Cross would put it, is "a realist of the feelings."[5] To others passion is an admirable but indescribable feeling, which appeals simply because it is a feeling—by no means a foolish value to attract one to a book and infinitely superior to that which leads to admiration of *Jane Eyre* as a kind of real "confession." Intensity of feeling *Jane Eyre* has, but it is not centred exclusively upon love; in fact, in the total impact of *Jane Eyre* religious ecstasy plays a part as important as love for a person.

The greatness of a work of art is commensurate with the greatness of its inspiration and the adequacy of its means of communication. Now, the story of a woman in love would be interesting but not necessarily great; the story of a woman's fight to express her own personality in love would be even more interesting but yet not necessarily great. *Jane Eyre* is great because it is these things and also something more. It is a love story; it is a fight for the free expression of personality in love; but it is also a record of the eternal conflict between the flesh and the spirit, a conflict which is solved satisfactorily when all passion is spent. *Jane Eyre* may speak for many women, but it speaks also for all humanity, and it speaks in unmistakable terms. *Jane Eyre* is the record of an intense spiritual experience, as powerful in its way as King Lear's ordeal of purgation, and it ends nobly on a note of calm.

The expression of such an experience in terms of the novel creates considerable difficulty. The poet, for an identical purpose, takes the means of communication which is to hand, the language of his day, and has permission to put new life into it. The closer he can fashion it to his purpose, the more he is admired:

> But at my back I always hear
> Time's winged chariot hurrying near;
> And yonder all before us lie
> Deserts of vast eternity.

[5]"We have in Charlotte Brontë a realist of the feelings, trailing, however, the bright colours of romanticism." W. L. Cross, *The Development of the English Novel* (London, 1919), 233. E. A. Baker also has a further reference to the effect of the intense feeling in *Jane Eyre*. He says: ". . . it is a rendering, not of life as it is observed, but of life as it is felt, as it is known in its elements" (*The History of the Novel,* VIII, 37).

> Love's not Time's fool, though rosy lips and cheeks
> Within his bending sickle's compass come;
> Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,
> But bears it out even to the edge of doom.

We make no demands of probability on the poet. All we ask is that he shall symbolize his experience, recreate it for us, by whatever means he thinks best. But of the novelist we seem inclined to demand probability, a reproduction of life, regardless of the novelist's purpose. Charlotte Brontë had experienced an emotion which one would expect her to express through the medium of poetry. But she used the conventional elements of the novel, the medium she understood best. It seems logical to suppose that such a use, conscious or unconscious, of the elements of fiction would produce a new type of novel. And this is precisely the case with *Jane Eyre*. The conventions have become symbols: the fictional lover has become The Lover; the mad woman of the Gothic novel has been put to an allegorical use. *Jane Eyre* contains the elements of fiction used as a poet employs language and imagery—to impose belief, even though it be by irrational means.

When Jane Eyre leaves Lowood School, she is but a novice in the world, in spite of her contact with the spiritual in the saintly Helen Burns and with the fleshly in Mrs. Reed and Mr. Brocklehurst. Indeed, to Jane the greatest thing in life is to be loved by a person. And we need not be surprised, for love of any kind has been so far denied to the child throughout her short life. But, as Helen Burns says, love of a person is not all: "Hush, Jane! You think too much of the love of human beings; you are too impulsive, too vehement: the sovereign Hand that created your frame, and put life into it, has provided you with other resources than your feeble self, or than creatures feeble as you."[6]

Before such a novice, to whom the yearnings of the flesh and the spirit are at best indistinguishable, is placed the specious temptation of love, love imaged in its most stirring form, impetuous and violent—Mr. Rochester. To such a love Jane Eyre responds, and she responds in the manner we expect of the girl described by Helen Burns: "My future husband was becoming to me my whole world; and more than the world; almost my hope of heaven. He stood between me and every thought of religion, as an eclipse intervenes between man and the broad sun. I could not, in those days, see God for His creature, of whom I had made an idol."[7]

But behind Mr. Rochester, nay, a very part of him, is Bertha Mason, the mad wife. Rochester symbolizes uncontrolled physical

[6] *Jane Eyre*, chap. VIII. [7] *Ibid.*, chap. XXIV.

passion, and with uncontrolled passion there is always the menacing figure of complete degeneracy and madness. For what is madness but loss of control?

At first Jane Eyre is unaware of the presence of this danger. How was she to know about it? But as she yields more and more to Rochester's importuning, the danger that comes from loss of control begins to threaten her, as it threatens Rochester all the time. Bertha Mason tears Jane's wedding veil in two, and after the broken marriage ceremony the mad woman and all she represents stand as a barrier between the lovers.

Jane's struggle is a hard one; she is unwilling to leave Rochester, although she has seen the danger: "I wrestled with my own resolution: I wanted to be weak that I might avoid the awful passage of further suffering I saw laid out for me; and Conscience, turned tyrant, held Passion by the throat, told her tauntingly she had yet but dipped her dainty feet in the slough, and swore that with an arm of iron he would thrust her down to unsounded depths of agony."[8]

But at last Jane flies from unrestrained physical passion with all its grossness, as many another has fled before and since, and she is guided in her resolve by a vision:

> That night I never thought to sleep; but a slumber fell on me as soon as I lay down in bed. I was transported in thought to the scenes of childhood: I dreamt I lay in the red room at Gateshead; that the night was dark, and my mind impressed with strange fears. . . . I lifted up my head to look: the roof resolved to clouds, high and dim; the gleam was such as the moon imparts to vapours she is about to sever. . . . She broke forth as never moon yet burst from cloud: a hand first penetrated the sable folds and waved them away; then, not a moon, but a white human form shone in the azure; inclining a glorious brow earthward. . . . It spoke to my spirit: immeasurably distant was the tone, yet so near, it whispered in my heart: "My daughter, flee temptation."[9]

To Jane, now, is offered another choice—the rejection of life, the journey into asceticism with St. John Rivers. It is an episode surrounded with improbabilities; it is as unlikely as King Lear's division of his kingdom, but like that it serves its purpose. The symbol is the thing, no matter how it be achieved. And was there ever a more powerful symbol of the ascetic than St. John Rivers? Tennyson's Simeon Stylites pales into insignificance beside him. Shall Jane Eyre, bewildered and hurt by her experience with Rochester, deny the world and all that it has to offer? Shall she leave the physical completely, without trying to control it, and enter a loveless marriage?

[8] *Ibid.*, chap. XXVII.
[9] *Ibid.*

The struggle is long and hard, and it is no less intense than that symbolized by her life at Thornfield. St. John Rivers prays for Jane that she may be guided into the right way, and the exaltation which accompanies his prayer communicates itself in no uncertain manner to her. She feels that here is the answer—to die to life and to live again in God: "I stood motionless under my hierophant's touch. My refusals were forgotten—my fears overcome—my wrestlings paralyzed. . . . Religion called—angels beckoned—God commanded—life rolled together like a scroll—death's gates opening showed eternity beyond: it seemed, that for safety and bliss there, all here might be sacrificed in a second."[10]

But, in an oft-criticized passage, guidance comes, and it comes in the voice of Rochester. The world and the flesh have to be reckoned with, their defeat cannot come through a plain denial of their existence. The probability of this voice has often been denied, but its effectiveness is certain. How else should Jane Eyre be called back to the world she was rejecting if not by its own voice and the voice of its Creator? "I broke from St. John who had followed, and would have detained me. It was my time to assume ascendancy. . . . I mounted to my chamber; locked myself in; and fell on my knees; and prayed in my way—a different way to St. John's, but effective in its own fashion. I seemed to penetrate very near a Mighty Spirit; and my soul rushed out in gratitude at His feet."[11]

Jane returns to Mr. Rochester and finds that he has passed through his ordeal by fire, both spiritual and physical. It is a new Rochester who can speak these words: "I thank my Maker, that, in the midst of judgment, He has remembered mercy. I humbly entreat my Redeemer to give me strength to lead henceforth a purer life than I have done hitherto."[12]

This whole episode of the fire has also been criticized as trite and improbable, and the criticism would be valid if the novel were to be regarded as a realistic record of events. But there is a distinction between factual truth and poetic truth, and when we read *Jane Eyre* as a poetic work, the episode is artistically appropriate. Bertha Mason has destroyed herself, the madness that can accompany unrestrained passion has burned itself out, though it has left Rochester, who gave way to it, disfigured and blinded.

They marry, not in that first violent, physical anguish in which we saw them, but in a calmer, nobler mood, "all passion spent." Neither the flesh, nor the spirit, will tear Jane Eyre again, for from her double ordeal she has emerged unscathed, neither a profligate nor

[10] *Ibid.*, chap. xxxv. [11] *Ibid.* [12] *Ibid.*, chap. xxxvii.

an ascetic, but a woman who has found an equable solution to the age-old problem which troubled others besides the Victorians but which troubled them intensely.

> Ah love, could thou and I with Him conspire
> To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire,
> Would we not shatter it to bits—and then
> Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire!

That is *Jane Eyre* as it appears to me, a new contribution to English fiction, a novel which must not be criticized in the spirit in which we criticize *Vanity Fair* or *Tom Jones*.

The Ingram episode—a further example of wrongful criticism—is decried as "artificial." People never spoke as Blanche Ingram speaks, say the critics. But the episode is not meant to be a faithful picture of a drawing-room; it is worldliness, pride, stripped of all pretensions, and it appears as an ugly symbol. But then, what shall we say of Lear's curse?

> Suspend thy purpose if thou didst intend
> To make this creature fruitful.
> Into her womb convey sterility;
> Dry up in her the organs of increase. . . .

Neither passage is very polite, but each one is very clear.

If *Jane Eyre* is to be blamed, because it doesn't do what *Tom Jones* and *Vanity Fair* do, then literary criticism is at fault. We must be willing to accept *Jane Eyre* as a profound, spiritual experience, expressed in the most adequate symbolism, a symbolism which, if divorced from its emotion, is as improbable as all poetic symbols. That way lies a truer appreciation of *Jane Eyre*. We have felt its greatness: we have often excused its means of expression. Let us now admit that in *Jane Eyre* fiction has become poetry,[13] and let us enlarge our idea of fiction accordingly.

[13]Similar recognition has been granted to *Wuthering Heights* by such critics as E. A. Baker (*The History of the Novel,* VIII, 37).

UNSUBSTANTIAL FATHER: A STUDY OF THE *HAMLET* SYMBOLISM IN JOYCE'S *ULYSSES*

EDWARD DUNCAN

"THE aunt is going to call on your unsubstantial father." Thus jeered Buck Mulligan, ridiculing Stephen Dedalus' chief obsession, the theme of paternity, which in all its various ramifications continued to haunt Stephen throughout the whole of *Ulysses*. Commentators have long recognized the importance of this father-son relationship for a proper understanding of Joyce's symbolism; indeed, *Ulysses* is largely the saga of Stephen's search for a father. In spite of this, I feel that it has never been adequately treated. It is true that Stuart Gilbert devotes a whole chapter of his book on *Ulysses* to a discussion of the paternity theme, but since he uses theosophy as a Procrustean bed on which to fit Joyce's text, his treatment is necessarily somewhat limited. It is in the *Scylla and Charybdis* episode, somewhat neglected by commentators, that we may hope to find an answer to the following questions: "Why was Stephen Dedalus not satisfied with ordinary fatherhood, the relationship with Simon, his consubstantial father; and what was the particular relation for which he quested?" The *Scylla and Charybdis* episode, usually known as the Library scene, so called because it takes place in the National Library in Kildare Street, is significant because of the light which it throws on Stephen's relations with his father and mother. Here Stephen expounds a theory concerning Shakespeare's family, based principally on a study of *Hamlet,* and, under cover of this exposition, propounds a theory of fatherhood and rids his soul of some of the bitterness caused by his relations with his own family.

I

T. S. Eliot states in his essay on *Hamlet* that this play was probably written by Shakespeare under the stress of some tremendous emotion, so that it became the "objective correlative" for this emotion. He defines "objective correlative" as "a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events, which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in a sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked." He feels, however, that the emotion which Shakespeare was trying to communicate in *Hamlet* was too great for the play to express completely,

that it overflows and spoils the artistic form. He makes no guess as to what this emotion might be and, indeed, the known biographical facts would not warrant any such guess. Stephen, however, proceeding mainly on the internal evidences supplied by the plays and the sonnets, thinks that he has the answer to this riddle and expounds his theory of *Hamlet* for the benefit of his sceptical hearers.

Whatever Shakespearean critics may think of the validity of Stephen's theory (and none seem to have taken it seriously) is of no concern to us here. Its interest to us lies in the light which it throws on Stephen himself and his relations with his family. As Edmund Wilson says, it is "a lecture which has little to do with Shakespeare, but a good deal to do with Stephen himself." I believe, however, that Mr. Wilson is guilty of error when he states that the lecture concerns the relations between Shakespeare and his father. Most other Joycean critics make a similar mistake in concentrating on the father-son relationship which is largely incidental to the main theme, the relationships between Hamlet and his mother, between Shakespeare and Ann Hathaway, and between Stephen and his mother. This is not to minimize the importance of the paternity motif. Nonetheless, Stephen's relations with his mother are the focal point of the discussion and form a matrix from which arise, later on, the problems concerning paternity. Since Stephen's exposition is rather difficult to follow, rambling a great deal and bringing in much irrelevant material, I shall give the main outline in so far as it concerns my particular theory.

Shakespeare, while still a boy, was seduced by Ann Hathaway, a strapping wench and his senior by eight years. Stephen finds the evidences for this seduction in *Venus and Adonis,* Ann being Venus and the young Shakespeare the reluctant Adonis. The relationship thus begun was continued until the impending birth of the child, later known as Susanna, forced Shakespeare to marry Ann. This marriage occurred when Shakespeare was eighteen and Ann was twenty-six. Soon after the birth of the twins, Hamnet and Judith, Shakespeare, for reasons economic and otherwise (rumour said deer-stealing) was forced to leave Stratford and try his fortunes in London. Against Eglinton's contention that the marriage was an unhappy one, Ann being a shrew, Stephen maintains that at least Ann was beautiful and that Shakespeare carried her memory with him in his heart when he went to London. In London he led the life of a veritable Don Juan, trying to recapture the belief in his manhood which the earlier seduction had taken away. He could not succeed in this since he had received a psychological castration, symbolized by

the wound in the thigh which Adonis received from the boar. To quote Stephen: "Belief in himself has been untimely killed. He was overborne in a cornfield first (ryefield, I should say) and he will never be a victor in his own eyes after nor play victoriously the game of laugh and lie down. Assumed Dongiovannism will not save him. No later undoing will undo the first undoing. The tusk of the boar has wounded him there where love lies ableeding." This lack of confidence in his sexual powers caused him, when wooing the "Dark Lady of the Sonnets," to send a lordling, the Earl of Pembroke, to woo for him, although, as Stephen points out, he was himself a "lord of language" and a "Coistrel gentleman," having obtained a coat of arms for which he "toadied." The result of sending Pembroke to woo for him was that the lady (whom Stephen identifies with Mistress Fitton) promptly transferred her affections to the Earl and later bore him a child. Stephen draws his evidence from the sonnets and identifies the Mr. W. H., to whom they were dedicated, with William Herbert, the aforesaid Earl.

About this time he came to the conclusion, on what grounds it is impossible to say (and Stephen's argument supplies no clue) that he had been cuckolded by one or both of his brothers, Edmund and Richard. Stephen's reasons for picking on Edmund and Richard are the slightest. They depend on the fact that in the play Gertrude was guilty of incest with her brother-in-law, Claudius. Regarding this Stephen remarks: "If you deny that in the fifth scene of *Hamlet* he has branded her with infamy tell me why there is no mention of her during the thirty-four years between the day she married him and the day she buried him." Stephen means that Shakespeare, in the character of the ghost, accuses Ann, as Gertrude, of incest (sexual relations between a woman and her brother-in-law being regarded by the Church as incestuous). As additional proofs that the brothers were the guilty ones, he points out that Shakespeare grafted a second legend on to the original Lear story in order to have a villain named Edmund. For his case against Richard, he depends on Shakespeare's characterization of King Richard III, whom he maintains is the only king left unshielded by Shakespeare's reverence, "the angel of the world." This is an allusion to Belarius' speech from *Cymbeline* at the burial of Cloten, "Yet reverence—that angel of the world—doth make distinction of place 'tween high and low." He also points out that Richard III had made love to a widowed Ann. Finally, he refers to the fact that *The Tragedy of King Richard III* was written while Shakespeare's brother Richard lay dying.

This second blow, the discovery of Ann's infidelity, coming as it

did immediately after the defection of his mistress, the "Dark Lady," quite overwhelmed Shakespeare. As Stephen says: "The two rages commingle in a whirlpool of bitterness." He now passed through a period of terrible stress during which he wrote the great tragedies, *Hamlet, King Lear, Troilus and Cressida,* and also that most unromantic of comedies, *All's Well That Ends Well.* According to Stephen's characterization, Shakespeare was a born cuckold, with the over-romantic and gyneolatrous notions of a boy, like Othello or the Don Jose of *Carmen,* "lover of an ideal or a perversion," while his intellect was the "hornmad Iago" seeing woman as she really is, and ever, as Stephen says, "willing that the Moor in him shall suffer."

Although Stephen adds much more to his biography of Shakespeare, speaking of a partial reconciliation brought about by the birth of his granddaughter, Elizabeth, it is his theory of Ann's unfaithfulness that concerns us here. It is chiefly in *Hamlet* that he seems to find evidence to support this theory. In this drama, according to Stephen, Shakespeare not only plays the ghost (for is he not a ghost to his family, a ghost through absence?) but recreates himself as Hamlet *père.* He makes his own dead son Hamnet to live again in Prince Hamlet. In the character of the wicked Claudius, he damns one or both of his brothers. In the person of Gertrude, particularly in Act I, Scene v, he paints a portrait of Ann and brands her with infamy.

II

As an aid to understanding this extraordinary scene in which Stephen expounds Shakespeare (a scene interspersed with allusions to early Church heresies concerning the substance of Christ, to the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, and to William Blake), it may be useful to separate it into some of the various levels or strata from which Joyce has built it up. These levels, which are many, and vary between a naturalistic treatment of the subject and a highly esoteric symbolism, are completely correlated with each other by a set of identifications and allusions; each level, moreover, poses its own particular problem and proceeds logically to the next highest level. The web of identifications and cross references which go to make up these strata has been woven by Joyce into such a close texture that it is difficult to disentangle the threads. However, I shall try to deal with two strands of meaning, and these I shall term psychological and theological.

The first of these is psychological, since it poses a psychological problem, one arising even at the purely naturalistic level of the text. The problem is to find a cause for Stephen's peculiar Hamlet-like

attitude, his extreme self-hatred and cynicism, an attitude which caused Professor MacHugh to remark: "You remind me of Antisthenes, a pupil of Gorgias the Sophist. It was said of him that none could tell if he were bitterer against others or against himself." It can be urged at this point that Stephen's attitude is merely the result of remorse for having refused to obey his mother's dying wish. I feel, however, that such an explanation is not adequate. Not only does he identify himself with Hamlet in various ways (which I hope to show later), but he actually feels guilty of his mother's death. "They say I killed you, mother," he exclaims to his mother's image in the hallucinatory *Circe* episode, thus proving that he, a second Orestes, had harboured a death-wish against his mother, however deeply buried in his unconscious it may have been. A similar death-wish arose in Hamlet's mind, but since it reached consciousness, he was able to thrust it firmly aside: "Let not ever the soul of Nero enter this firm bosom." Furthermore, I shall hope to show that just as Shakespeare used Hamlet as an "objective correlative" for his emotions, so Stephen, in his turn, uses his exposition of Hamlet as an "objective correlative" for his own bitterness. That this exposition forms an outlet for Stephen's emotions in the strict sense of "objective correlative" is proved by the fact that his feelings take complete control and force him to continue in spite of the sceptical attitude of his hearers; he is powerless to stop himself, although he meditates, "Are you condemned to do this?" and answers himself thus, "Sufflaminandus Sum" ("I should be stopped," an adaptation of Ben Jonson's famous remark about Shakespeare).

Stephen feels that he has been betrayed by his mother, just as King Hamlet was betrayed by Gertrude and Shakespeare had been betrayed by Ann. The nature of this betrayal is hard to find, and hence Joycean critics have seen in this whole Shakesperean discussion merely an excuse for Stephen to give a dissertation on the nature of paternity. One difficulty arises from the fact that Stephen's exposition of the Hamlet problem stresses the betrayal of a husband by his wife. It is obvious that, to a certain extent, Stephen is covering up the trail which would lead to an understanding of his relations with his mother. Nevertheless, he provides two clues. First, he stresses the fact that Ann was older than Shakespeare, and secondly, he points out the nature of the psychological trauma brought about by his relationship with her, symbolized by the wound in the thigh and resulting in a psychological semi-impotence from which "assumed Dongiovannism will not save him." Thus he seems to be thinking in Freudian terms and indirectly suggests that Shakespeare had unconsciously taken Ann

for a mother-substitute. This would cause an incest barrier and the ensuing castration complex would bring about the psychological trauma which resulted in Shakespeare's lack of confidence in his sexual powers.

Although it is true that Stephen definitely identifies Shakespeare with the ghost of King Hamlet, nevertheless, he modifies this later in response to Eglinton's affirmation that the truth is midway, and that Shakespeare is both the prince and the ghost. To this Stephen replies: "He is. The boy of act one is the mature man of act five." He says this, not, as Frank Budgen would have it, to blow his own theory sky-high (the theory that Shakespeare identifies himself with the ghost), but in order to stress the fact that there were two Prince Hamlets, an older and a younger. It is with the older Hamlet that Shakespeare had identified himself, and in a sense, he spoke through his lips. At the same time, he modelled the younger Hamlet on an image of the man into whom his son Hamnet might have grown, had he lived.

It is necessary to make it clear that Shakespeare identified himself not only with the ghost, but with the older Prince Hamlet as well, in order to make Joyce's symbolism consistent, since we shall find that Stephen identifies himself with Shakespeare also. Examples of this identification are to be found chiefly in a similarity of situation between Stephen and Shakespeare, a similarity which Stephen often stresses. Stephen constantly refers to the theme of banishment which runs not only throughout Shakespeare's life but through his plays as well. Thus they are both exiles from virgin cities (Dublin and Stratford), to haunts of vice (Paris, the "fleshpots of Egypt," and London, with "scortatory love and its foul pleasures"). In describing Shakespeare's entry on the stage, playing the part of the ghost in *Hamlet,* Stephen has Shakespeare assume the cast-off doublet of a court buck, an allusion to his own wearing of Buck Mulligan's cast-off clothes. Again, in the *Proteus* episode, he sees himself as the ghost of Hamlet's father, "in the moon's midwatches I pace the path above the rocks, in sable silvered, hearing Elsinore's tempting flood."

The methods used to identify Stephen with Hamlet are many and fall into different types. There is a similarity of environment between Hamlet and Stephen, since both live in a world of usurpers, symbolized for Hamlet by Claudius, and for Stephen by Mulligan and the Saxon Haines. There are also similarities of character. Both are characterized by excessive bitterness and self-hatred. In Stephen's case this bitterness has occasioned Professor MacHugh to compare him with Antisthenes. Again, they are both fond of soliloquizing. Mallarmé's remark about

Hamlet, "Il se promène, lisant au livre de lui-même," is also applicable to Stephen. For instance, Stephen's soliloquy about the drowned man closely parallels Hamlet's thoughts about that "quintessence of dust." Both Stephen and Hamlet wear black, and although they are both officially in mourning, this type of dress is really the expression of an inner attitude. Stephen also refers to his "Hamlet hat." Finally, there are direct identifications. For instance, Stephen interlards his speech and meditations with Hamlet quotations. In the *Circe* episode, he describes himself as "*Le distrait* or absent minded beggar" (echoing a French title for *Hamlet*), and in the *Proteus* episode he identifies himself with Ophelia's lover when he meditates, "My cockle hat and staff and his my sandal shoon" (a reference to his wearing of Mulligan's cast-off shoes).

In spite of Stephen's identification with Hamlet, when we wish to extend the parallel to his family, we are faced with the problem of unlikelihood. How is it possible to identify Simon Dedalus, representative of the consubstantial paternity which Stephen repudiates, with King Hamlet's ghost and with Shakespeare, or Stephen's devout mother with the infamous Gertrude and the lusty Ann? The thread of connection lies so deeply buried in Joyce's symbolism that Joycean critics seem to have missed it completely. The search for the lost correlative must take place from a different angle, presenting a new problem, the problem of Stephen as artist.

We shall, therefore, investigate Stephen's opinions on the status and functions of an artist. In *The Portrait* there is a scene in which the rector of Belvedere urges Stephen to consider the calling of a priest and points out to him the high nature of this office. Stephen is tempted for a moment; he tells the rector that he will think it over, but he knows in his heart that the priesthood is not for him. A few days later he experiences a revelation, one might almost call it a theophany, in which the name he bears, the name of Dedalus, the divine artificer, seems to him like a prophecy of his future, and imagining that he sees the form of the hawklike man flying through the air, he feels that he is destined to be an artist, one who will forge "anew in his workshop out of the sluggish matter of the earth a new soaring impalpable imperishable being." He is to be the high priest of this god whom he identifies with Thoth, the god of writers, describing himself as "a priest of the eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of experience into the radiant body of everlasting life." He takes from Aquinas the means for the contemplation and recognition of the beautiful, expounding to Lynch the meaning, as he understands them, of the three terms, *integritas, consonantia,* and *claritas*. Accord-

ing to him, the artist, when contemplating the beautiful, not only can feel the rhythm of its structure, but in the intense instant of the imagination feels its *quidditas,* its whatness, its essential fulness of being. The *quidditas* shines forth and becomes identical with *claritas.* Moreover, in the sense of *integritas,* he can draw a line around the object, separating it from the rest of the universe, and transfer it to a universe of his own creating. This is expressed quite clearly in *Stephen Hero,*

> The artist, he imagined standing in the position of mediator between the world of his experience and the world of his dreams—a mediator, consequently endowed with twin faculties, a selective faculty and a reproductive faculty. To equate these faculties was the secret of artistic success: the artist who could *disentangle the subtle soul of the image from its mesh of defining circumstances most exactly and re-embody it in artistic circumstances chosen as the most exact for it in the new office,* he was the supreme artist. [Italics mine.]

The artist is thus, in a sense, the post-creator, rescuing the image of the beautiful from the contingencies of time and transferring it into the eternal world of symbols. He does not create *ex nihilo* and is dependent on the natural world for his material; thus, for Stephen, the distinction between art and nature is a purely irrelevant one. This is further borne out by Stephen's quotation from Blake's letter to Hayley in the *Oxen of the Sun* episode. "Know all men, he said, time's ruins build eternity's mansions." Thus it is from the ruins of Time's creations that the artist salvages material for the building of Golgozoona, the eternal city of art. "This," says Stephen somewhat later, "is the postcreation."

Stephen's artist is, thus, very similar to Blake's Los. Professor Northrop Frye, the author of the excellent and, I feel, definitive work on Blake, *Fearful Symmetry,* mentions this also. He says, "This identification [that of Albion with Icarus] implies another between Dedalus and Los which will remind the modern reader of the artist-hero with whom the author of *Ulysses* identifies himself." Again he writes: "In each day, Blake says, there is a moment which Satan cannot find, a moment of eternal life which no death principle can touch, a moment of absolute imagination. In that moment the mystery of the Incarnation, the uniting of God and man, the attaining of eternity in time, the work of Los, the Word becoming flesh, is re-created, and thereby ceases to be a mystery." The significance of this quotation will be still more apparent if we recall Stephen's "intense instant of the imagination" and his description of the artist as "a priest of the eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of experience into the radiant body of everlasting life." Mr. Frye has also identified

for us the artist's great opponent, Satan, the death-principle. This principle is personified by Blake as Urizen, and the earlier Blake identified him with the Demiurge. He is thus identified by Stephen both as the creator of the universe and also as the death-principle. Stephen, therefore, regards him as the hammer hurler, the thundering god of Vico and the Jehovah of the Old Testament, the Ancient of Days. His other side, the death-principle, is stressed by Stephen with such titles as "Ghoul! Chewer of corpses!" and "Dio Boia, hangman god." Stephen finds him embodied in his twin foes, nationalism and religion, symbolized by the priest and the king. As Stephen says in the *Circe* episode (tapping his brow): "But in here it is I must kill the priest and the king." The earlier Blake also makes Urizen the instrument of cruelty and oppression; for instance, in "The Brothels of Paris are Open," Urizen speaks:

> I love hanging and drawing and quartering
> Every bit as well as war and slaughtering.
> Damn praying and singing,
> Unless they will bring in
> The blood of ten thousand by fighting and swinging.

This murdering deity is a good model for Hamlet's wicked stepfather Claudius who is his prototype in the Hamlet triangle. That Stephen thus identifies him is shown in the episode of the *Wandering Rocks* when Stephen insults and hurls defiance at the Demiurge in his thoughts. "Shatter me you who can. Bawd and butcher, were the words. I say!" Fearing that his blasphemies may have been overheard and may be punished by the terrible thunderer, Stephen uses the same formula which Hamlet used to deceive Claudius' spy, Polonius, at the same time throwing in a compliment about the running of the universe which he likens to a huge clock. "Yes, quite true. Very large and wonderful and keeps famous time. You say right, sir. A Monday morning, 'twas so, indeed."

Stephen had escaped to Paris from the web or nets of religion which Urizen spreads. It is these nets of which he speaks in *The Portrait* when he says: "The soul is born first in those moments I told you of. It has a slow and dark birth, more mysterious than the birth of the body. When the soul of man is born in this country there are nets flung to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets." The illness of Stephen's mother which brought him back from Paris was regarded by him, irrationally enough, as a betrayal, a betrayal completed by her death-bed request to kneel down and pray. She had brought him back within reach of those nets once more. Even her death was a betrayal

since Stephen identified her God with Death, so that in the *Proteus* episode he thinks of Death coming to her as a lover, "his bat sails bloodying the sea. Mouth to her mouth's kiss." Stephen's unsuccessful attempt to escape from these nets to Paris reminds him of that other son of Dedalus, the unfortunate Icarus, whose attempt to escape had only resulted in his falling into the sea. Thus he meditates as follows: "Fabulous artificer, the hawklike man. You flew. Whereto? Newhaven-Dieppe. Steerage passenger. Paris and back. Lapwing. Icarus. Pater. Ait. Seabedabbled. Fallen. Weltering. Lapwing you are. Lapwing he." The lapwing metaphor in this meditation is probably inspired by Blake.

> O lapwing, thou fliest around the heath,
> Nor seest the net that is spread beneath.
> Why canst thou not fly among the cornfields?
> They cannot spread nets where a harvest yields.

Although as the unsuccessful artist vainly trying to escape his environment, Stephen is the unfortunate Icarus, he is, nevertheless, the spiritual son of Dedalus. Thus we can now identify the three persons in the Hamlet triangle. Stephen's mother is Gertrude, the betrayed King Hamlet is Stephen's spiritual father, Dedalus, and the wicked Claudius is Urizen.

III

We may now approach the theological level, where we shall deal with the problem of paternity. Just as at the end of *Jerusalem* Blake's Los becomes Christ, the Divine Imagination, so Stephen sees the artist as symbolizing Christ, the Logos, the creative Word. Hence Stephen identifies himself again, this time with Christ. This identification with Christ is not so much direct as implicit in the text. A few of the more direct identifications are as follows: The clouding over in the *Proteus* episode reminds him of the darkness which covered the land during the Crucifixion and gives him a momentary vision of himself as Christ on the cross. Thus he meditates, "Come" and "I thirst." He also experiences Christ's vision of Satan as lightning falling from Heaven, "Allbright he falls, proud lightning of the intellect." In one passage he enmeshes Hamlet, Shakespeare, Christ, and himself in a net of correlation, "Christfox in leather trews, hiding, a runaway in blighted treeforks from hue and cry. Knowing no vixen, walking lonely in the chase." The fox is Christ but he is also Shakespeare who, during the deer-stealing episode, was probably a fugitive from justice. Stephen is drawn into the net as the fox who buried his grandmother

and who sees himself hunted in the *Circe* episode, and Hamlet, after the killing of Polonius, exclaims, "Hide, fox, and all after."

Much of the proof of Stephen's identity with Christ depends, however, on certain correspondences to be found in the final episodes of *Ulysses*. In the *Oxen of the Sun* episode, for instance, we find Stephen blasphemously parodying the Last Supper, "Now drink we, quod he, of this mazer and quaffy this mead which is not indeed parcel of my body but my soul's bodiment. Leave ye fraction of bread to them that live by bread alone." (Later on, in response to a teasing remark from his companions concerning his "besmirching the lily virtue of a confiding female," Stephen replies that "it was clean contrary to their suppose for he was the eternal son and ever virgin.") In the *Circe* episode, in a series of similar correspondences which I cannot discuss in detail, he is identified with the Paschal lamb, recapitulates Christ's temptation in the desert, and finally suffers a symbolic death at the hands of the soldiers.[1]

Since Stephen is Christ, he formulates his relationship with his three fathers in theological terms. These fathers are the old mythological inventor, Dedalus, whom Stephen addresses in *The Portrait* ("Old Father, old artificer, stand me now and ever in good stead"); the consubstantial father, Simon; and finally, Bloom. The three stand to Stephen in the system of relationships posited at various times between the First and Second Persons of the Trinity. The first relationship, that of spiritual identity, as put forward by the Sabellians or modal monarchists, is between Stephen and Dedalus, the bird-god Thoth, with whom Stephen dreams of soaring above the vulgar crowd, like Baudelaire's poet Albatross, "Qui hante la tempête et se rit de l'archer." The Sabellians were sometimes called Patripassians in mockery because they considered the Three Persons of the Trinity as merely modes of the one God and thus were open to the criticism that, therefore, God the Father must have died on the cross. Stephen makes several references to Sabellius and characteristically, composes a mocking creed which might have been written to ridicule his teachings:

> He who Himself begot, middler the Holy Ghost, and Himself sent Himself, Agenbuyer, between Himself and others. Who, put upon by His fiends, stripped and shipped, was nailed like bat to barndoor, starved on crosstree. Who let Him bury, stood up, harrowed hell, fared into Heaven and there these nineteen hundred years sitteth on the right hand of His Own Self but yet shall come in the latter day to doom the quick and dead when all the quick shall be dead already.

This creed contains two rather obscure references to Stephen in the role of Christ. Frank Budgen tells us that he informed Joyce that

[1] J. Campbell and H. M. Robinson, *A Skeleton Key to Finnegan's Wake* (New York, 1944), 190-1.

the sentence in the *Proteus* episode which refers to the crosstrees of a ship was technically incorrect. Joyce was unable to change it, however, as he needed the term for his symbolism. Probably, therefore, "starved on crosstree," is intended to refer to Stephen's exile when he starved in Paris, the ship being the symbol of exile. The preceding phrase "stripped and shipped" also bears this out. "Nailed like bat to barndoor" may refer to Stephen's myopic vision.

The second, the consubstantial relationship (not identical but of one substance), which was adopted by the Church, is that which exists between Stephen and his actual father, Simon, a relationship which Stephen denies, since, as he points out, the Church which is founded upon this relationship is founded upon the void, upon incertitude, upon unlikelihood. "Fatherhood, in the sense of conscious begetting, is unknown to man." "Paternity may be a legal fiction." "Who is the father of any son that any son should love him or he any son?" "What links them in nature? An instant of blind rut."

The third relationship is that which is fated to exist between Stephen and Bloom, that which is represented by the Arian heresy, the relationship of adoption, of like (but not of the same) substance. "Fatherhood is a mystical estate, an apostolic succession." "When Rutlandbaconsouthamptonshakespeare or another poet of the same name in the comedy of errors wrote *Hamlet* he was not the father of his own son merely, but being no more a son, he was and felt himself to be the father of all his race, the father of his own grandfather, the father of his unborn grandson who, by the same token, never was born for nature, as Mr. Magee understands her, abhors perfection." "Wombed in sin darkness I was too, made not begotten."

Since Stephen identifies himself with Hamlet, in order to keep the symbolism consistent, it should be possible to apply these relationships to Shakespeare and Hamlet also. We shall find that we can, but with two important differences, for the Shakespeare and Hamlet triangles are treated as one, and the symbolism has been inverted. Whereas Stephen as Christ or the Logos, the Eternal Son, exhibits a relationship with three different fathers in theological terms, Shakespeare, as God the Father, has these relations with three different sons. Joyce symbolizes Shakespeare as God the Father in various ways. A *rapprochement* between Shakespeare and God as Creator is brought about by stressing the creative side of Shakespeare's art; for instance, Eglinton is made to say, "After God Shakespeare has created most." On the other hand, God is characterized by Stephen as a playwright, thus:

> The playwright who wrote the folio of this world and wrote it badly (He gave us light first and the sun two days later), the lord of things as they are whom the most Roman of catholics call dio boia, hangman god, is

doubtless all in all in all of us, ostler and butcher, and would be bawd and cuckold too but that in the economy of heaven, foretold by Hamlet, there are no more marriages, glorified man, an androgynous angel, being a wife unto himself.

Here, to make the identification more complete, we may note (in the role of God as dramatist) a side glance at Shakespeare's various errors as to time and place, these being specifically referred to in this episode. "He puts Bohemia on the seacoast and makes Ulysses quote Aristotle." Again, we must note the reference to God as bawd, butcher, and cuckold. Stephen stresses these roles in his biography of Shakespeare. Thus he says: "Not for nothing was he a butcher's son wielding the sledded poleaxe and spitting in his palm." It is in the sonnets that he finds his evidence for Shakespeare as bawd, since in the sonnets Shakespeare almost unnaturally urges his friend, Mr. W. H., to beget a son. "It seems so," Stephen says, "when he wants to do for him, and for all other singular and *uneared wombs,* the holy office an ostler does for the stallion." This is a reference to Sonnet III in particular where we read,

> For where is she so fair whose *unear'd womb*
> Disdains the tillage of thy husbandry?

Since, according to Stephen, Mistress Fitton was Shakespeare's "Dark Lady" and the Mr. W. H. was William Herbert, to whom she afterwards bore a child, the characterization of bawd seems particularly fitting. That Stephen regarded Shakespeare as cuckold is, of course, obvious in the light of his *Hamlet* theory. Thus Shakespeare as God the Father combines both the creative and destroying aspects of the Demiurge. As artist, he is Dedalus, the true father, but as ostler, bawd, butcher, and cuckold, he is Urizen, identified with his own creation, Claudius.

The three theological relationships are expressed in terms of the relations between Shakespeare and his son Hamnet, between Shakespeare as the ghost and the older Prince Hamlet and between Shakespeare as creator and the younger Hamlet. The Sabellian relationship exists between Shakespeare and the older Prince Hamlet, whose bitterness, like the bitterness of the betrayed cuckold, makes them spiritually identical. "I have heard of your paintings too, well enough; God hath given you one face, and you make yourselves another; you jig, you amble, and you lisp, and nickname God's creatures, and make your wantonness your ignorance. Go to, I'll no more on't; it hath made me mad."

Then there is the consubstantial relationship, between Shakespeare and the dead Hamnet, "who has died in Stratford, that his namesake

may live forever." (The Christ identification is shown here, "who had died for us on the cross that we may live forever.") There is a certain identification between Hamnet Shakespeare and Rudy Bloom also, since he died that Stephen might take his place. It is interesting to note also that Hamnet Shakespeare was eleven years old when he died, and Rudy Bloom was eleven days.

Finally, there is the relationship between the younger Hamlet and Shakespeare who are neither identical nor of the same substance. This is opposed by Eglinton who contends "if you want to shake my belief that Shakespeare is Hamlet you have a stern task before you." Stephen replies: "If you hold that he, a greying man with two marriageable daughters, with thirty-five years of life, with fifty of experience is the beardless graduate from Wittenberg then you must hold that his seventy year old mother is the lustful queen."

The most important of the three types of paternity which we have just discussed is the relationship with Bloom, since the meeting between Stephen and Bloom is the culmination to which the whole of *Ulysses* moves. But who is Bloom and whom or what does he symbolize? Joycean critics have given many answers to this question, varying from *l'homme moyen sensuel* to Harry Levin's and Foster Damon's Christ. In a sense, both these answers are partly correct.

Joyce pointed out to Padraic Colum that in giving his name as Noman to the Cyclops, Ulysses had denied the divine part of his nature, since his name Odysseus was made up from two roots Noman-Zeus. "Man is a nothingness capable of God," wrote the mystic Tauler. Separated from Stephen, who symbolizes Christ or the Divine Imagination, Bloom is Noman, fallen and suffering humanity, the impotent Fisher King of *The Waste Land,* the dying god of Frazer. In Blakean mythology he corresponds to Luvah, thus enabling both Harry Levin and Foster Damon to identify him with Christ, since the suffering and dying Christ has put on the red robes of Luvah. Stephen, as I have previously pointed out, corresponds to Blake's Los who, in the final part of *Jerusalem,* is identified with Christ. The union of these two will give us the glorified Christ, the Divine Body of Humanity, that is, "Everyman."

In the *Ithaca* episode, Joyce touches upon the Noman-Everyman question. He writes regarding Bloom, "What universal binomial denominations would be his as entity and nonentity?" He writes the answer, "Assumed by any or known to none. Everyman or Noman."

Actually Arianism does not cover this final relationship between Bloom and Stephen, and Joyce is really seeking for a relationship which would subsume all three. This new relation might be termed

a complementary one and resembles somewhat the relationship between God and man in the Incarnation. Whether it was consummated in that strange episode of scientific question and answer is something which I cannot discuss here. Joycean critics are generally agreed that it was not. This does not mean, however, as so many critics seem to assume, that Joyce was either a pessimist or a nihilist. He merely avoids the error which Blake made in *Vala* of bringing about a premature apocalypse. The time for union between God and humanity, between the common man and the artist, has not yet come. Whether it will ever come is another question. Joyce is not numbered among the prophets.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TENDENCIES OF FRENCH CANADA

ESDRAS MINVILLE

ECONOMIC and social life, in strict dependence one on the other, are functions of the collective life. As such, they are facts of civilization, and hence the manifestation of a certain general philosophy of life. Without some knowledge of the thought of French Canada, there cannot be any full explanation of the tendencies of its economic and social life; for if the latter differs in form from that of the Anglo-Canadians, this is owing first and foremost to the fact that the everyday activity of the two groups proceeds from different conceptions of life, from different national cultures.

For 175 years, the French Canadians have been struggling for the preservation of their own identity in the framework of the Canadian state, and these struggles have been directed against the Anglo-Canadian influence. The conflict was first made evident in the political field, because it was here that the two conceptions of life most directly clashed. Today, that stage has been passed, and recent efforts are being directed to the economic and social sphere. Why is this so? Quite simply because French Canadians know that as long as they do not manage their economic and social life by themselves and according to their own way of thinking, their political freedom cannot be completely assured. Now, when they thus proclaim their desire to preserve their particular way of life, to protect themselves as an ethnic group, what in the long run are they wanting to safeguard, if not their cultural origin from which spring those values of civilization which are their own—creed, language, manners, traditions, ways of life? And herein may be seen plainly outlined the main links between the matter under study and the dominant historic thought of French Canadians. However, the analysis must be continued even further.

If the notion of French culture be examined in some detail, a culture of which French Canadians claim to be the heirs in Canada and America, four principal factors will be discovered in close interdependence—factors themselves arising from the relationship of ancient France with the old Greek and Latin civilizations. First, there is the sense of man, of his specific vocation, of his high dignity of being, endowed with intelligence and free will. Second, there is the aspiration toward personal improvement in terms of an hierarchic order, that is to say, according to an order of values integrated in the human personality, and discovering in itself the highest satisfaction. Third,

there is the sense of liberty, which is considered one of the attributes of the human person, and essential for the enhancement of personality. Finally, there is the sense of tradition, especially of family tradition, the family being regarded under its two main aspects as a social institution and a cultural community. Christianity, embracing these various notions, has placed them along the very path of the absolute, thus communicating to them their plenary significance.

From the practice in common of this philosophy of life, there was bound to arise through the centuries, in the psychological and moral order, a human type; in the social order, usages, customs, and traditions; in the juridical order, laws and institutions. One might recognize generally in the French type, of which we claim to be a replica, certain distinctive characteristics: a sense of honour, a devotion to good work and constant care as to its quality, a politeness of manners and sense of hospitality, together with the cult of personal independence. Among the most typical social institutions of our civilization, we may mention two: a mode of appropriation of material goods which allows the individual to meet his responsibilities towards himself and towards those dependent on him (that is, the autonomous establishment), and a liberal education, that is to say the training of a man for the enhancement of his own personality and for the conquest of the truth. As to the juridical institutions, our civil laws provide the synthesis of them. They all spring from this idea that the rights of the human person are not conferred upon him by the state, but have their roots deep in his moral value.

The ancient social system of French Canada was built on the general conception of life which I have outlined. The autonomous establishment was the common economico-social institution. It centred in the individual or the family—especially the family. In agriculture, ownership was, in a manner, synonymous with the family, forming with it an economic unit. The family provided the labour and drew its subsistence from the direct exploitation of the soil. There were two tendencies: first, to avoid, as much as possible, dependence on outside sources by producing the highest possible proportion of things necessary for everyday existence; and second, to enlarge constantly the family domain, so as to improve the conditions of family life and to provide for the economic establishment of children, so that the latter might be free to begin again, each on his own account, the cycle of the original family. As for the children who could not be settled in the immediate neighbourhood of the parent family, in the borders of the same parish, they took over new districts and there set to work building parish communities planned on the same model.

This was the work of colonization which has always held, and still holds, so great a place in the economico-social preoccupation of French Canadians.

The agricultural establishment thus conceived did not look in any way towards acquiring wealth, but simply towards putting the head of the family in a position to meet his responsibilities towards himself and towards his people while preserving the maximum of independence in relation to the social body. Agriculture was not an industry, not even an economic enterprise: it was a way of life. But that was the very essence of a culture less concerned with economic power than it was with the development of the human personality.

The autonomous establishment was, likewise, the general rule in industry and commerce, with this difference, however, that the trader and industrialist, while looking to the family for the greatest supply of labour, released their products to the market. Industry and commerce, therefore, preserved the personal and family character of agriculture itself. No more indeed than the farmer, did the trader and the industrialist entertain ambitions for those great conquests and grand developments which today are their principal object. They planned quite simply to assure the subsistence of an individual or of a family, and the setting up of necessary reserves for the support of the enterprise and for the establishment of later generations. The autonomous establishment indicated two basic dispositions of mind: moderation in wants and the spirit of saving.

Education in the family and in the school was from the first humanistic, that is to say, devoted above everything else to the culture of spiritual and mental values. We mention this to indicate its object, not to pass judgment on its efficacy: for various reasons, it has perhaps not always fully achieved the aim set for these institutions. Initiation into technical methods in agriculture, in the crafts, and in trade was entrusted to apprenticeship; technical and professional schools are a somewhat more recent creation. Briefly, education was to teach how to live, apprenticeship how to gain one's living.

As for those young people who were sufficiently talented and who aspired to the higher functions of social life—the priesthood, medicine, law, notaryship, secondary or advanced teaching—they attended the only type of secondary school then known, the classical college, of which the aim has always been, and still is, the recruitment of the clergy and the education of a lay élite; then they sought from the university, or sometimes from apprenticeship, their professional training.

Private charity, individual or organized, took over the complete

burden of assistance. The care of the poor, of the crippled and sick, was regarded as the duty of the individual and family and, in default of these, of the nearest social unit. Hence every family took care of its crippled, of its old people and orphans of close relationship, and indeed of those of the district; each parish looked after its poor—there even existed, according to one of the first French-Canadian sociologists, Léon Gérin, a certain rivalry among the parishes as to which would treat its poor the best. The hospitals, the orphanages, the refuges, founded and managed by the religious congregations, drew their resources from private charity, and welcomed, with remuneration fixed in accordance with the means of those assisted (the service was often gratis), the sick, the orphans, the cripples, and the old people without family.

In short, the social system rested entirely on private initiative. There was little relationship in the field of labour, each person living in almost complete independence. Social relationships were established especially on the idea of neighbourliness, with the minimum collective organization demanded for the maintenance of institutions inevitably of a public character—municipal, religious, educational.

Such a system gives a strange impression, it must be admitted, to present-day minds. We are inclined, if not to debate its virtues, at least to judge it as something rudimentary and static, and to ask ourselves if it would be possible for us to become adjusted to it. Nevertheless, it was not without real advantages. It was conceived for man and as something adjusted to his stature. Economics no doubt entered into it as a necessary though not a preponderating factor: it was regarded as dependent on the individual first of all, and then on society. It was enough that the social framework allowed each to provide by his labour for his needs, including the economic establishment of his children, and that it assured for him, in case of misfortune, the charitable assistance of his fellow-citizens. The standard of life was not the kind of political slogan we have since made of it. Hence, there was nothing of the mentality of economic conquest and domination which communicates to our system its dynamism, but at the same time exacerbates suspicion and envy which are our canker-worms. Man lived to accomplish his destiny, not to acquire a fortune. There were no repeated strikes, no ill-feeling about economic mediocrity, no undue pressures on the public powers, for, by definition, their responsibilities were restricted to looking after the common welfare, that is to say, the most general and indeed the higher interests of society. In brief, there was little *éclat* but more stability and harmony, little comfort but more calmness of mind, and in all ranks of society there was a moral

elevation to which we could hardly compare our situation today without regret.

This old régime, centred on non-economic values, was unable to resist the forces of economic origin which, unloosed from outside French Canada, damaged one of the principal parts of the social mechanism so that it did not function, or functioned badly. I have referred above to colonization as one of the dominant preoccupations of the French-Canadian people. As a result of the agrarian reform at the end of the eighteenth century and the mass alienation of public lands, both agricultural and forest, older parishes became over-populated and there was no region open for colonization within several hundred miles. The colonial policy, carried out in the spirit of the times, far from favouring industrial and commercial expansion, discouraged it—with the result that the towns progressed at too feeble a rate to absorb the annual excess of the people coming in from the country. The situation would have quickly degenerated into a public disaster if another social evil, emigration, had not to some extent served as a safety-valve. In effect, the United States, at the beginning of its overwhelming industrial and commercial career, constituted a permanent magnetic pole for labour. Our surplus population rushed there at the rate of several thousands each year. At the end of the nineteenth century, the industrialization of the province and the renovation of its economic life were essential for the solution of a social evil which itself was the consequence of an economic policy conceived for other ends than the well-being of the people.

The spectacle of mass emigration was, indeed, profoundly disturbing to a people desirous of making its own way of life. Economics, and its relations with the provincial life, soon began to engross the minds of sundry persons. The first French-Canadian journalist, Etienne Parent, as early as 1840 was urging his fellow-citizens to take a larger and more varied part in the economic life of the country. Joseph Bouchette, who, about the same time, was busy with vast works of exploration and surveying, gave the same advice. It is the same story even with Errol Bouchette, an economist who was writing at the end of the last century and at the beginning of this, and who spoke of the economic independence of French Canada in the framework of confederation. Edouard Montpetit, today Secretary-General of the University of Montreal, was to take up the same theme and for thirty years make it the purpose of his teaching, of his lectures, and of his books. And the economists of the present day are busy demonstrating that this autonomy, necessary for the survival of the French-Canadian group and for the flowering of its civilization, can and must be realized

without the least harm to the legitimate interests of the rest of the people of Canada. On the contrary, this autonomy can be of service to them, if the desire for it is understood to be not simply a disposition to satisfy all the needs of French Canada, but rather a disposition to make full use of the supply of labour, counting for the rest on exchange with neighbouring peoples.

The idea of economic renewal, therefore, is one of the national preoccupations of the French Canadians today. For the indifference of former generations there has been substituted a keen sense of economics as a factor in the national life. And the renewal to which we aspire will be a victory; not however—and it is here that the economic thought of today remains in harmony with the demands of the traditional culture—a triumph of economic power for its own sake, but one directed to the ends of civilization, in so far as material security is necessary for its maintenance and progress.

Anglo-Canadians, struck by the campaigns of economic propaganda in French Canada, may be thereby disturbed in mind, seeing in them the indication of a hidden desire for separatism. However, if they take the trouble to get precise information, they will quickly note that such anxieties are in no way justified. The economic aspirations of French Canadians, though more precise and more ambitious than in former times, do not deviate thus far from the broadly human concerns which are of first importance for their culture.

Such then is the primary economic aim of French Canadians: to win for themselves a measure of autonomy which will strengthen their national position while serving the general interests of the country. Now, it is intended that such aspirations will be realized by the usual means of all reform of this kind, and first by the training of men. But according to what formula will reform find realization? For it is a question of reform, not of revolution—a reinterpretation of the traditional thought in relation to the demands of a new age. This is of capital importance, for we touch here the centre of the problem which is today engaging not only French Canada, but the whole world. It is the problem of determining whether henceforth every form of spiritual, personal, and qualitative civilization, of French nuance, of Anglo-Saxon distinction, or of any other national way of thinking, should be banished from the earth and replaced by a materialist, collective, and quantitative civilization. On the one hand, we have communism which is throwing overboard everything which hitherto has constituted human civilization, from religious thought, which has been and still is the active principle, to the elementary institutions of the collective life, which have been and still are both its expression and

its support. With communism, there is no room for argument: it has to be taken or rejected as a whole, but it will be the death of our civilization if it triumphs. On the other hand, within our own economy, we have socializing and centralizing tendencies which, on the pretext of improving the material conditions of our life, are ceaselessly restricting the field of initiative and personal responsibility. They proceed from a way of thinking similar to that of the British Labour party: safeguard individual liberty and throw on to the state the charges which the individual can no longer directly assume. This is a kind of abdication of man in the face of his responsibilities which will end by making him so dependent on the state that it will be no longer lawful for him to think freely and to live according to his conscience; for individual liberty is not to be conceived without its corresponding responsibilities, and the one cannot be saved if we flee from the others. Such tendencies are leading our own civilization, by way of internal disintegration, to its downfall.

Of these two threats, that from without is not perhaps the more dangerous, for it offers itself at once in its true light and with all its characteristics. The other, on the contrary, is presented under the guise of compassion, of pity, of generous impulses, and thus masks its noxious power. If we wish to meet it, we shall have to recognize the permanent exigencies of human life and, without closing our hearts to pity, treat the evils from which man and society are suffering so as to relate them to human dignity and the simplicities of existence. The individual must not flee his responsibilities, but must wholeheartedly accept them, creating as required the collective agencies and the institutions which will take on the burden when it has become too heavy for his shoulders alone. This is what French Canada, by feeling her way perhaps rather than by obeying a clear vision of things, is endeavouring to realize, and her effort may be of some use to others. The charge that she entertains fascist ideas, that she aspires to be an authoritarian social order, if not a dictatorial one, is a mere proof of ignorance, of inability to analyse a human phenomenon and to understand the thought behind it.

Under the pressure of outside forces, industrial and commercial, the framework of the old-time peasant agriculture has been shaken. Since the beginning of the century, agriculture has had to come out of its isolation to see that its products reached the market, and hence it has had to take the rest of the world into account. It has been forced to undertake at the same time the improvement of its production techniques and to create a sales organization. But the habits of a people who, for centuries, have lived to themselves alone, cannot

be changed in the same way as one renews a patch on one's clothing. An interest in new techniques had to be aroused among them, and then they had to be persuaded to practise them, all of which has taken time. Even after the programme was under way and during long years, agriculture was content to find an outlet for its products through the agency of local dealers—the least suitable method of assuring for it the fair share of the consumer's price.

The necessity of a certain amount of collective action soon became evident. But what form this was to take was another matter—for early in this century recourse to the state did not present itself so spontaneously to the mind as it does today. Accordingly, there began the idea of co-operation, as much from the standpoint of production as from that of sales. In 1905, an act passed by the Quebec Legislature set up the legal framework for co-operative action. But co-operatism is a matter of education, and it was not possible in a short time to initiate into it a population bred for centuries in individualism. The beginnings were therefore slow—so slow that after several years people were wondering if the movement would ever succeed.

In 1924, two agronomists, working as journalists and closely in touch with the many problems the farmer has to deal with, launched the idea of an agricultural convention. The intention was to profit from this first attempt at contact with French-Canadian farmers to found an association whose mission would be to promote the restoration of the general interests of the farmers, first and foremost by the expansion of agricultural education in all its aspects. This was the starting point of the *Union Catholique des Cultivateurs* (Catholic Farmers' Union). The organization was not substituted for the co-operatives already in existence: it was made rather the auxiliary, the recruiting centre, through the agency of its study clubs, its correspondence courses, its magazine, and its radio programmes—all of which today assure for the *U.C.C.* a wide field of publicity.

The crisis of 1930 drew attention to the basic problems of the farmers. They had to exert every effort to complete the improvements already under way and to face up to the difficulties of the moment. Since that time, the farmers' association and the co-operatives have experienced an extremely rapid and vigorous expansion. The *U.C.C.* today includes more than one-third of the farmers of the province and extends its influence over the whole field of agriculture—for its authority is nowhere in question. It could include many more members, but, conscious of the service it has already been able to render, it desires to make all future expansion with prudence, only accepting new groups when it is sure that they have attained a degree of edu-

cation which makes their permanence no longer questionable. In addition, it has set about organizing the security of its members, and for this purpose created auxiliary services; mutual life and general assurance societies have already been established, and other services of the same kind are in process of being elaborated. It is co-operating closely with the *caisses populaires* (people's banks) and by means of its study circles and its publicity has encouraged increased numbers of these in rural districts.

The co-operative movement has experienced a similar expansion: its undertakings have been multiplied and varied according to need and the progress of education. There are in existence today hundreds of *caisses populaires* with more than 200,000 members and representing assets of more than 50 millions. The buying-selling farmers' co-operatives, federated since 1924, nowadays form a powerful organization, *La Coopérative Fédérée,* which had a turnover of more than 40 million dollars in 1947. Fishing and forest co-operatives, co-operatives for consumers, co-operatives for public utilities have been formed and are spreading. The *Conseil Supérieur de la Coopération* stimulates and co-ordinates the whole movement and establishes the bond of contact with the co-operative movement in the rest of the country. If it continues to grow at the rate it has shown in recent years, the co-operative movement, strongly bolstered by the *U.C.C.,* will before long direct the entire economy of rural districts.

What has been done in the older settled centres will be repeated in the newly opened areas, for the Province of Quebec is the only one to have a permanent colonization policy. The rural economy of the Abitibi-Temiscamingue rests on the two supports: the *U.C.C.* and the co-operative. There are even to be met there co-operatives of a new type: the labour syndicate (whose objects are the building of roads, the clearing of the bush, and even the construction of houses and other buildings) and the co-operative lumberyard which, by its exploitation of the forest, serves as a substitute for the jobber. The policy of colonization is henceforth to rely on this form of organization and to make use of it to renovate completely its own methods.

Statistics do not concern us here: the above indications already give us a sufficient idea of the economico-social renewal of the rural centres of the Province of Quebec. What does interest us is the thought which inspires this renewal. As you have noted, French-Canadian country people, while bravely launching forth into collective action, remain faithful to the idea of personal liberty and responsibility integrated with their general conception of life and to the autonomous establishment which is one of its main concrete manifestations. They

remain faithful likewise to the traditional associations of the family, and of rural exploitation in all its forms (agriculture, fishing, forest operations), for they demand always from the family the utmost of labour supply, having recourse only in default of such to the wage-earner. They have improved their techniques, mechanized their equipment, but always in accordance with the exigencies and limits of the family domain. Modern theories of great farms, specialized and industrialized, particularly of collective farms, never enter their heads. Their agriculture has become commercial, not industrial; it has been modernized, but has not ceased to be a way of life. They expect from it a reasonable comfort for the family, but especially, and perhaps by preference, a feeling of security, a tranquillity of mind, a moral standard, and in short, humane blessings which the possession of riches alone could never provide.

But if the rural worker clings always to personal autonomy, he continues to accept with it the corresponding responsibilities. When it became obvious that the almost surly individualism of the old-time generations, the splendid isolationism of former days, had grown incompatible with the demands of the new age, there was no thought of asking the government to make up what was lacking. The rural worker himself organized the necessary collective action, and adjusted it to his traditional conception of work and of order. State intervention is instinctively repugnant to him (increasingly so, one would venture to say), and to the extent that, thanks to the organization created by his own mind and hands, he feels himself the master of his occupation. He accepts state intervention temporarily to meet urgent situations, but he does not look upon it as a permanent policy, for he is aware that any control by the state carries with it an equivalent loss of that personal liberty which he holds as an irreplaceable asset. He prefers to supply the necessary effort himself for the reorganization and readaptation of his life according to circumstances.

In short, in the economico-social renewal of the rural classes, there are shown both an enthusiastic desire for progress and a fidelity towards the past, a steadfast attachment to all the standards of a personalized civilization. This renovation looks to the creation of more wealth, more well-being, more security, but in such a manner that by his own efforts man may go forward enlarged and not diminished. And it is this, in our view, which makes it both wholesome and fertile.

If we have strongly insisted on the economico-social work of the country-side, it is because it clearly illustrates the purpose of French Canada. In trade and industry the road to be travelled in order to realize the autonomy of which we have spoken is much more consider-

able. Notable progress has been made in recent years; it is, however, only a modest beginning. We may note that it is not so much a question here of a conquest as it is of a reconquest—in good part at least. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, French Canadians occupied in the industry and commerce of the province an undoubtedly inferior place to that of Anglo-Canadians, but all in all they then had a proportionally larger place than they have today. Several great enterprises which are important for the economic structure of the province at the present time were founded by them. Individual or family enterprise has remained the general rule. But the powerful movement of financial and geographical concentration originating in the United States at the end of the last century, and soon apparent in Canada, has forced French Canadians out of important positions; in fact they have been eliminated almost entirely from whole sectors of industry and commerce. The recovery has begun, but it goes slowly, and this is because of the want of sufficient capital, or of the effective mobilization of capital, for if one judges by the extremely rapid progress of the *caisses populaires,* the spirit of saving has not ceased to animate the population. There is also a lack of well-established industrial and commercial traditions. If, among French Canadians, the peasant tradition is powerful, the attraction of commercial and industrial careers is inevitably much weaker. For the last thirty years, however, a serious effort has been made, with growing success, to direct to business careers a certain proportion of the young people.

This revival is influenced by the same social conception as agriculture. In the first place, in addition to the goals of subsistence and the enrichment of individuals, it looks towards the consolidation of a certain order of things, itself the expression, in the order of facts, of the national group culture; secondly, it is attached to the autonomous establishment, to private enterprise, not only because it considers it technically and economically the most efficient, but particularly because it sees therein one of the concrete forms—both the expression and the support—of French-Canadian civilization, as indeed of any individualist civilization. Finally, to make up for the social insufficiency of private enterprise and to prevent its breaking down into *étatisme,* it is organizing collective action by means of professional association. Our business men, dreading the increasing interference of the state, have developed a system of their own, based on free initiative, but adjusted to the various and indeed changing exigencies of a society in full evolution.

The *chambres de commerce* have shown in recent years a remarkable expansion. More than a hundred of them are in operation in the

province; those of the big centres have doubled, tripled, and even quadrupled their membership, the Montreal *Chambre de Commerce* in this respect ranking first in the country. All these *chambres* collaborate with each other within a federation known as the *Chambre de Commerce de la Province de Québec,* through which are established relationships with similar organizations throughout the rest of the country. The larger *chambres* have carried their technical organization to a very high degree of perfection, comparable to that of the principal chambers of the continent. There are three overriding considerations: to protect the interests of free trade, to raise the professional standard of members, and to co-operate with the public authorities and other organizations of social life for the general welfare. Instead of limiting themselves to a single section of business, they have embraced a wider outlook on all fields of the collective life, in a spirit of confident collaboration. Other more specialized professional organizations function independently of the *chambres de commerce,* but usually on good terms with them, such as associations of merchants, industrialists, brokers, proprietors, etc. The basic idea is the same in all cases.

It could not, however, be said that all our business men have come to a full understanding of their social role and of its current demands. The ancient individualism of former generations persists in the minds of many of them, and others are getting rid of it only with timidity and hesitation. Here they do not differ from business men elsewhere in Canada. As a member of the executive of the *Chambre de Commerce de Montréal,* I have had the opportunity in recent years of attending meetings of business men, and every time I have come away with the impression that the majority of them were quite without any realization of their own problems. Certainly, as specialists in administration, finance, industrial techniques, they are accomplishing some wonderful things, but as soon as a problem can no longer be solved by resorting to a technique, but is a matter for thought itself, they appear to be unable to exert themselves to cope with it, for they seem incapable of seeing their own action in its social and human context. It is this which makes for the tragedy of the moment; for if the system of free enterprise is to be maintained, it will have to be adapted to the needs of our epoch, to protect it from the dangers with which it is, nowadays, being threatened everywhere.

Let us acknowledge, nevertheless, that our business men are more disposed than they were to listen to talk on the social aspect of business. The lamentable state of the world and the cataclysms which it contains in embryo have compelled them to reflect. Some steps have been taken which, in my view, are promising. I should like particularly to speak

of the *Association professionnelle des Industriels* founded five years ago in Montreal, which has already won recruits in most industrial centres of the province and whose prestige is constantly growing.

Without neglecting the technical demands of their business, these industrialists are paying special attention to managerial questions, that is to say, to their social responsibilities as leaders of business, most particularly in regard to their workers. They are seeking the means to integrate the latter in the enterprise according to standards which pay full respect to their personalities as men. Wages, working conditions, physical, moral, and economic security, vacations, recreations, personal and social service, profit-sharing—perhaps eventually some share in the management—all these aspects of the labour problem have become the object of study, with some results already. The *Association professionnelle des Industriels* is, furthermore, working in close collaboration with similar organizations in Europe, notably in France and Belgium. Those industrialists are, we believe, on the right road. But, let us take note, the motivation is always the same, to secure the autonomy of persons and of the enterprise. The professional association is used to adapt personal activities to the social exigencies.

This same idea is again met in the Catholic labour movement of the province of Quebec, from its beginnings in 1907. Here, however, the problem is still more complex, for the industrial worker presents a case, not only to the conscience of French-Canadian employers, but to that of all employers, whatever their national or political affinities. The problem confronts Christian civilization itself, in such a way as to force either its renewal within its concrete forms, or its suppression if that rejuvenation does not take place; and in this respect, Anglo-Canadian civilization is being threatened in the same way as French-Canadian. Unfortunately, we have not the time to analyse here the labour case. Let us, however, note that if national and Catholic syndicalism has not spread very rapidly in the province of Quebec, that is owing (1) to the worker himself who, in many cases, under the depersonalizing influence of the industrial system, has become, as it were, a stranger to the principal exigencies of every personalized civilization —industry has fashioned for him a personality and a situation which are no longer in harmony with the traditions and the social milieu from which his life has developed; (2) to the gains which the labour unions inspired with a different doctrine had already won in the field of labour organization, and to the competition which they were in a position to offer to the new movement; (3) to the employers, who have taken a long time to admit the union idea, and more time still to be convinced that labour unions have come to stay; (4) to trade

unionism itself which has not yet taken the full view of its own problem which alone will allow it effective action.

However, the initiators of the movement have not let the grass grow under their feet, and today the *Confédération des Syndicats catholiques et nationaux,* with its 70,000 members, has the largest number of union workers in the province; it is solidly entrenched and is even in a commanding position in most industrial centres, with the exception of Montreal.

The French-Canadian unions have contributed more than any others to the elaboration of the labour legislation of the Province of Quebec. This legislation has been inspired by the same general ideas as the whole social movement of the province. In concrete terms, it has provided, first, for a union organization free within the framework of the law—that is, it formally recognizes the right of association and it gives legal existence to unions. To produce its best results, freedom has to be disciplined: it is not conceivable without the acceptance of corresponding responsibilities. The only means of assuring the efficient operation of free unions is to place them within a legal framework which both protects them and compels them to carry out fully their responsibilities. Unfortunately, if the French-Canadian unions of the province have always shown themselves to be in favour of the legal constitution of unions, others have shown themselves hostile, with the result that the labour laws, in order not to do violence to an important section of labour, have been interpreted in a way which cannot be considered as entirely satisfactory for either group. In the second place, the law has provided a recognized method of settling labour relations, in the collective labour agreement and the legal extension of the work contract to a whole branch of industry when the majority of the workers have adhered to it. Thirdly, there is a permanent organization of conciliation and arbitration. The French-Canadian unions are, however, going farther and demanding a labour court which would handle all labour litigation, and whose decisions would be binding. Desirable as this may be in principle, such a step does not appear to be immediately realizable, especially because other branches in labour unionism are holding strictly to the right to strike, and because sundry employers are hardly more advanced in their viewpoint.

Nevertheless, trade unionism, even the best intentioned, is powerless to solve by itself the labour question, for this problem is much more than an economic one or a question of relations to be regulated by laws. It is a human problem as diverse in implications as the manifestations of life itself. The workman of today enjoys political prerogatives unknown to previous generations, but he has lost the only

liberties capable of assuring him their full exercise, namely, occupational and social liberties. It is this fact which makes both the basis and the danger of his demands. Now it is the labouring masses (especially those who belong to unions whose way of thinking, economically and socially, is foreign to French Canadians), who, by their attitudes on labour questions and on social security, give the impression that French Canada is on the way to abandoning its traditional positions. If that be true of certain sections of the labouring classes, it is not so of all of them; it is especially not so of that part of the population which is not immediately dependent on industry. This part of the population is renewing its thinking in accordance with present-day demands, without, however, abandoning its basic ideas. And what is going on among certain of our labour groups is going on, in the same way, among the workers of other nationalities and other origins. All forms of spiritual and national civilization are being threatened today by the industrial phenomenon and its human corollary, labour.

We have unfortunately no time to consider thoroughly the tendencies of education and social assistance. Our schools are maintaining their traditional position, namely, the precedence of a liberal training over technical and professional instruction—a precedence which they deem indispensable for the full effectiveness of technical education itself. Great efforts, just the same, have been made to adapt the syllabus to the demands of our day. Primary teaching has developed somewhat along the lines of the Anglo-Canadian system up to the end of the twelfth year—with schools of that type existing in the main centres of the province. These give access to higher education in engineering, science, agriculture, and commerce.

The classical colleges have recast their programmes, giving a more important place to mathematics and science. Scientific secondary education is organized on similar lines, thus offering to those young people not interested in the Graeco-Latin humanities a means of entry to the universities. The universities, for their part, are in full expansion. New faculties and schools have been created in accordance with the needs of the population, and the older ones have enlarged their premises, improved their equipment, and raised the standard of their instruction.

So, for twenty years, there has been a powerful effort of renewal in education, impelled by a spirit of progress, though we sometimes speculate as to whether it has retained a sufficient sense of proportion. But on the elementary level, as much as on the secondary and university levels, the idea in modernizing educational formulas remains always the same: to assure, first and foremost, the highest and most

complete development of the man while creating the technician whom social progress is demanding. No doubt, all this is still a long way from perfection, and the achievements of recent years make only a beginning. But the impetus is there. What is essential is that this same impetus should not deviate from the pathways of real human progress, for nothing would be gained by multiplying professional types if the effort of the educators were not directed, above everything, to a more complete flowering of civilization.

Social assistance, like each of the matters touched upon previously, would deserve a separate paper, and even more than one. It has had in practice to modify its formulas without departing from an idea which arises from the whole system of the province, namely, the personal responsibility of each individual in regard to the everyday risks of life, and the personal duty of each citizen to contribute according to his means to the relief of misery and suffering. But, since the industrialization at the beginning of the century, the problem of assistance has changed. The needs have become more numerous and of such a kind that private charity, individual or organized, can no longer meet them. Furthermore, these fresh problems have arisen to a great extent from the inequalities inherent in the social structure and they must await their solution in a straightening out of the economy itself. As such a thorough reform appeared to be unrealizable for long years to come, it was no longer for private charity but for the state to act. Hence the mixed system, which the Province of Quebec is the only one in Canada to possess: private charitable institutions—in practice, the religious congregations—are subsidized by the state according to a scale adjusted to the quality of their services. The intervention of the state, in virtue of its role as subsidizer, has allowed the system to be adapted to the exigencies of the new age without sacrificing the essentials of its first inspiration. Quite clearly, the laws of federal origin—old-age pensions, pensions for the blind and for needy mothers, unemployment insurance, and family allowances—are applied in the Province of Quebec in the same way as in the other provinces. But precisely because they have not been conceived for the needs of the people of Quebec, they operate imperfectly there. For example, the payments of unemployment insurance are far from meeting the needs of a worker with a big family; similarly, family allowances, in which there is a decrease in the rates beginning with the fifth child, cause an evident injustice to the head of a family who has the most need of help.

I have examined the tendencies which seem to me characteristic of French Canada, ignoring, or almost ignoring, parts of the population

which are simply following the general tendencies of the Canadian milieu, or even of a continental one, without questioning whether they are in harmony with the traditional thought of their own environment. Two main tendencies seem to us to characterize the French-Canadian economico-social world. First, there has been an effort of economic restoration looking to the consolidation of the national situation of the group, without any desire for isolation, still less for domination, but on the contrary in a spirit of collaboration with the rest of the people of Canada, and even with the rest of the world. This effort is made as a contribution to the progress both of French-Canadian civilization and of human civilization in general. Second, there has been an organization of economico-social forces in order to preserve the autonomy of persons and of enterprises and to face the need of collective action in our epoch without drifting into *étatisme* or into any form of collectivism. This second tendency arises from the same spirit as the first.

Both tendencies, indeed, are in the American direction, but are to be distinguished in this, that they look to the preservation of the autonomy of persons and of enterprises not only because they consider autonomy necessary for economic progress, but because they view it as one of the main features of human civilization. They are to be distinguished in that they are opposed to *étatisme* as a menace to the civilization of the group and to every form of individualistic civilization. While admitting the necessity of collective action, they look to its realization in accordance with formulas which preserve the indispensable liberty of the human being in the accomplishment of his destiny. In general it may be said that the Anglo-Canadian economico-social milieu is evolving along the path of labourism, towards a kind of practical socialism which seeks to reconcile two objects which are contradictory, the preservation of individual freedom and the extension of the prerogatives of the state. The French-Canadian milieu also holds to individual freedom, but it believes this is best safeguarded by the individual assuming corresponding responsibilities. And it is in this way that it remains faithful to the inspiring thought of its civilization. While proceeding in the direction of new times, it is none the less conservative. Its experience, we believe, deserves serious attention.

HIPPOLYTE, PHÈDRE, AND THE "RÉCIT DE THÉRAMÈNE"

JOHN C. LAPP

TRADITIONAL objections to the "Récit de Théramène"—the peroration on Hippolyte's death in the final act of *Phèdre*—tend to group themselves under three main headings: its dramatic superfluity, its ornateness, and its extreme length. Perhaps the best-known statement of these objections is Fénelon's: "Théramène ought to say only these few words, and even then he should lack the strength to pronounce them distinctly: 'Hippolyte is dead. A monster sent from the depths of the sea by the wrath of the gods caused his death. I saw it.' Can such a man, stricken, bewildered, out of breath, amuse himself by making the most pompous and flowery description of the dragon's appearance?"[1] The basic idea here, that persons under great stress would be incapable of making eloquent declarations, and that it is artificial for a dramatist to make them do so, is a result of Fénelon's rationalistic desire for realism at the expense of other poetic considerations, and could of course be applied to such passages of dramatic narration as Oreste's description of Pyrrhus' murder, or monologues like Phèdre's address to the sun; its modern culmination is perhaps J.-J. Bernard's "Theatre of Silence." The modern critic will find this approach irrelevant, preferring to consider both *récit* and monologue as dramatic conventions within the cultural and aesthetic framework of French classic tragedy. But granting that the *récit* in general may be an acceptable device, and leaving aside the question of *vraisemblance*, the first objection to the speech of Théramène (and the one on which the others hinge) may still be voiced: is this particular *récit* superfluous? We may go on to ask, should not the play have ended with Act IV? Does the dramatic interest flag after the announcement of Hippolyte's death?

As far as the actual decision to retain the *récit* is concerned, remembering Racine's insistence on following the "fable," we must recognize that tradition plays an important role. All earlier versions, Greek, Roman, and French, included it, in even lengthier form than Racine's. But the mathematical precision of the play itself (the announcement of Thésée's return occurs at almost the exact middle; Act I = Act II, and Act IV = Act V) suggests that Racine may also have been influenced by the plain necessity of avoiding too short a

[1]Fénelon, "Lettre à Mme Dacier sur les occupations de l'Académie," *Œuvres* (Versailles, 1820-30), XXI, 214, 215.

final act. Once he had decided for various reasons to use the *récit,* it remained for him to fit it to the rest of the play, to make it a part of the dramatic whole. To determine whether he succeeded, and how, is to deal with the first objection mentioned above.

It has recently been suggested that Racine intended the *récit,* by the impact of its beauty and harmony, to prevent the audience from condemning Phèdre for causing the death of a blameless youth. By this view, the passage becomes a dramatic expedient designed to check transference of pity from the central figure to the victim of her passion.[2] Another study finds the *récit* "a reduction *in nuce* of the general aesthetics of Racine," which brings home the collapse of the world order to one character, Thésée. This interpretation would subordinate the effect of the passage on the audience to its effect on the king: "It is Thésée's reaction that is all-important here—and the public watches *this!*"[3] The spectator would thus first realize the final bewilderment and despair of the king, thereby becoming gradually aware of the tragic fate of mankind.

These interpretations, however, ignore what I believe are essential points in any "defence" or judgment of the *récit,* Racine's special preoccupation with the character of Hippolyte and what seems clearly to have been his attempt to make the passage develop logically from the foregoing action through its appeal to the audience's memory of the "fils de l'Amazone." For Hippolyte is the subject of Théramène's account, and although it is addressed to Thésée, we cannot logically assume that words concerning a prominent character are intended to strike only indirectly at the audience's heart. Thésée, though not negligible, is scarcely as tragic a figure as Hippolyte, or even Aricie, since we must agree, I think, that a really tragic character should become intimately known to the spectators, who through their knowledge must be convinced of his essential humanity before they can watch in fascination as he goes to his doom. It is by compassion for a victim, not by awareness of a survivor's disillusionment, however great, that an onlooker comes grimly and forcefully to realize the crushing power of destiny.

Racine specifically states in the Preface that he took special pains to stir compassion for Hippolyte, and that he conceived of him as a person possessed of tragic weaknesses, citing in this regard his love for Aricie in disobedience to his father's decree that she must never marry. Of course the mere enumeration of specific "tragic faults" in a kind

[2]Carlos Lynes, "A Defense of the Récit de Théramène" (*Modern Language Notes,* LIX, 1944, 387-91).

[3]Leo Spitzer, *Linguistics and Literary History* (Princeton University Press, 1948), 87-125.

of Aristotelian equation does not prove Hippolyte a tragic character, although it might easily have satisfied pedantic critics of Racine's time. Certainly for us the fact that Hippolyte disobeys Thésée's order is of little importance. Thésée is absent when his ruling is discussed; it is represented as unfeeling and illogical, and our admiration for Hippolyte is increased by his decision to disobey it and declare his love for Aricie. The public of Racine's time must have approved his action; the triumph of love over filial duty would delight an audience nourished on the *Grand Cyrus* and *Clélie*. Punishment for disobedience is certainly not a Racinian theme, and probably the comment in the Preface is no more than a rather elaborate justification after the fact.

As for any tragic hero, our sympathy for Hippolyte depends on our awareness of his essential humanity. If he has a "tragic fault," i.e., an error of action derived from character which helps us to accept his fate, it may well be his lack of sensitivity to the plight of Phèdre, best illustrated in the confession scene. His aloofness here results directly from his character, from his unsureness and lack of experience, and the lofty moral code he follows. These vestiges of the Euripidean Hippolytus could constitute Hippolyte's "tragic fault."

But however much we may question Racine's theorizing, we cannot dismiss his firm contention that Hippolyte is a tragic figure. He thought of him as such, and consciously or unconsciously formed his character to arouse, through its humanity, the feeling of sympathy that he felt to be so essential a part of tragic emotion. First of all, Hippolyte has a character quite different from that of his earlier counterparts. True, he remains athletic; he loves horses and the chase; but in Racine he is ambitious (to emulate his father), youthful and shy, noble and self-denying. The first scene stresses his "farouche" qualities by contrasting his stiffness and embarrassment with the knowing and paternal manner of his companion and tutor, who twits him slyly on yielding to Venus:

> Pourriez-vous n'être plus ce superbe Hippolyte,
> Implacable ennemi des amoureuses lois. . . .
> Aimeriez-vous, Seigneur?

We note the ironical force of the conditional tense, and the overemphatic adjective *implacable*. Théramène listens in silent amusement to the youth's lengthy and over-declamatory protest, and in reply speaks for the audience, those experts on love:

> Ah! Seigneur, si votre heure est une fois marquée,
> Le ciel de nos raisons ne sait point s'informer.

The important shift in the possessive pronouns, by suggesting that Hippolyte has now joined the generality of love's victims, helps to render him more human in the eyes of the audience. After Hippolyte's bombast, his mentor's words are matter-of-fact, even prosy; he is the older, experienced counsellor, nudging the shy youth, and saying in effect, "Where would you be today, my lad, if your mother and father hadn't . . .":

> Vous-même, où seriez-vous, vous qui la combattez,
> Si toujours Antiope à ses lois opposée,
> D'une pudique ardeur n'eût brûlé pour Thésée?

His kindly brusqueness ("Mais que sert d'affecter un superbe discours? Avouez-le, tout change"), his humorous indulgence, with which the spectators identify themselves, permit them to feel the paternal fondness of experience for youthful inexperience.

In Racine's hands, the "Récit de Théramène" constantly echoes the traits brought out earlier. In beginning his oration, Théramène tells how the faithful steeds reflected Hippolyte's sorrow, effectively reminding us of the bond we knew existed between master and animals and of their complete obedience to the every mood of one who was able easily "rendre docile au frein un coursier indompté." The tragic irony of his death by their agency (suggested by Euripides, ll. 1240, 1355-7) is more poignant because of our knowledge of Hippolyte's prowess, but more important still, we cannot fail to be moved by the final frustration of his brave attack on the sea-monster when we remember his desire to prove worthy of his father. We recall how his ardour "s'échauffait au récit de ses exploits," how impatiently he cried to Théramène of "aucuns monstres par moi domptés jusqu' aujourd'hui," how he told Thésée, before setting out for exile, of his resolve to dip his javelin in "un sang plus glorieux." Théramène's words, "digne fils d'un héros," as he begins his description of the battle with the monster, set our memory in motion, and the picture of Neptune himself goading the frightened horses to stampede (an addition of Racine's) emphasizes the futility of the contest. This portrayal of the skilled horseman trampled by his horses is indeed, as Professor Spitzer writes, an example of tragic paradox, but it should be noted that as such, it is a means of evoking pity through the spectacle of an ambitious youth's terrible frustration. Despite this critic's enlightening discussion of "monstre," he fails to point to the most ironic paradox of all, which derives from Hippolyte's character: the would-be slayer of monsters confronted with a monster who must inevitably bring about his end.

By such additions or skilful modifications of the *récit* as he found it in earlier versions,[4] Racine continually jogs the audience's memory of the hapless youth. The passage describing Aricie's grief recalls the earlier scene in which the lovers had chosen a rendezvous at the very spot where Hippolyte was to meet his death. His promise to meet Aricie (the irony that he should choose a cemetery!)

> Aux portes de Trézène et parmi ces tombeaux
> Des princes de ma race antiques sépultures,

echoes in the spectator's ears as Théramène describes the place to which the horses had dragged their master:

> Ils s'arrêtent, non loin de ces tombeaux antiques
> Où des rois ses aïeux sont les froides reliques.

The wheel has come full circle; the audience, through the *récit,* can watch the scene in which "la triste Aricie," hastening to meet her lover, finds him lying mangled and dying at the place destined for their marriage. His last thought is for Aricie, and his words "si mon père *un jour* désabusé," recall his desire to spare Thésée ignominy:

> Devais-je en lui faisant un récit trop sincère,
> D'une indigne rougeur couvrir le front d'un père.

The *récit* has thus been woven into the fabric of the play, and far from being superfluous, deepens and confirms the spectator's tragic experience. Moreover, once the dramatic necessity of the passage is established, its "ornateness" and length are more readily explained. What Fénelon called the *enflure* of Théramène's description of the sea-monster (which shows Seneca's influence) can now be seen as a further attempt to make the audience visualize Hippolyte's death; metaphor thus becomes an auxiliary of tragic pity. The waves recoiling in fright at the emerging monster, which so displeased Houdar de la Motte, appear to the modern critic as a remarkable figure that heightens the effect of horror.[5] The great length of the *récit* seems at

[4]The horses reflecting their master's mood, the appearance of Neptune, the arrival of Aricie on the scene, Hippolyte's dying concern for her safety, all are original with Racine. Of his predecessors, only Mathieu Bidar (*Hippolyte,* Lille, 1675) had Hippolyte attack the monster, but Racine sublimely increases the tragic irony by having the youth wound the monster gravely, whereas in Bidar,

> Il élance son dard sur cette horrible masse,
> Mais ce dard sur l'écaille et s'émousse et se casse.

There seems little doubt that Bidar's *récit* influenced Racine's. Cf. H. C. Lancaster, *A History of French Dramatic Literature in the Seventeenth Century* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1940), Part IV, I, 99, n. 2.

[5]See Spitzer's stimulating discussion, *Linguistics and Literary History,* 115-25, and cf. the pictorial effects in Phèdre's invocation of the Sun, Athalie's dream, and Andromaque's vision of Troy.

least partly due to Racine's emphasis of the very elements calculated to inspire pity: out of 93 lines, 8 are devoted to Hippolyte's sadness (1499-1506), 16 to the hopeless fight (1527-42), 18 to the death scene (1553-76), and 10 to Aricie's grief (1577-87).

It now remains to examine the suggestion that Théramène's account, by inspiring compassion for Hippolyte, could have the untoward result of inspiring hatred for Phèdre. It is of course possible, in a tragedy, to feel pity for more than one character, especially if the characters are victims; the viewpoint that pity for Hippolyte is undesirable is perhaps a result of the frequent opinion of critics that he is a lifeless personage, completely overshadowed by Phèdre, instead of a tragic figure. But to assume that we could hate Phèdre because of her stepson's death would be to sweep aside the deep impression the audience must now have of her remorse and despair, indeed the whole cognizance of the character as it is revealed by word and act. Racine makes no attempt to minimize her part in the death of Hippolyte.[6] The latter, in his interview with Aricie, represents her as an enemy who would deprive them of their rights to the throne. Aricie calls her a monster, and at the conclusion of his *récit,* Théramène gestures angrily towards his master's "mortelle ennemie." To Hippolyte and Aricie, to Théramène, and finally to Thésée, Phèdre is indeed the baleful instrument of disaster and death. To the audience, however, she is not, for the audience knows her better than they.

A most important element in the tragedy of her situation is that none of the other characters understands her plight. Her "enmity" for Hippolyte is misunderstood from beginning to end; even her companion Œnone, at first deeply puzzled by her mistress's erratic behaviour, never comprehends the enormity of Phèdre's passion-malady and remorse. At the news of Thésée's death, Œnone can announce with confidence: "Votre flamme devient une flamme ordinaire"—but the audience knows better. After Phèdre's disastrous confession and rebuff she declares with oblivious firmness: "Vous nourrissez un feu qu'il vous faudrait éteindre," and blandly suggests that her mistress bury herself in affairs of state. On Thésée's return from the dead, she blunders in with the words

> Il faut d'un vain amour étouffer la pensée,
> Madame. Rappelez votre vertu passée. . . .

She must ask if Phèdre still loves Hippolyte: "Vous est-il cher encore?" and her only comment on Phèdre's agonized outburst at

[6]This has been pointed out by Lancaster in his reply to Lynes (*Modern Language Notes,* LIX, 1944, 391).

Hippolyte's love for Aricie is to shrug: "Quel fruit recevront-ils de leurs vaines amours? Ils ne se verront plus." The depiction of Œnone as a primitive creature, fiercely loyal, but one for whom passion is a mere fleshly convenience, to be indulged as will and expediency permit, brings home the more forcibly to the audience the tragic frustration of the central figure. During the confession, Hippolyte too fails to understand, for fifty agonizing lines, and is made to declare courteously in the face of her passion, "Thésée est présent à vos yeux." When the truth is out, he is simply convinced that she lacks "virtue":

> Dieux qui la connaissez,
> Est-ce donc sa vertu que vous récompensez?

Thus Phèdre, ringed by uncomprehending stares, or cringing alone in the pitiless glare of an accusing Sun, is truly known only to the audience, who, in the Racinian as in the Sophoclean tragedy, is so often omniscient. Through our special knowledge we feel that "longue inquiétude" which Diderot considered an essential product of tragic drama.[7] In the final scene, when she comes slowly forward, flinching beneath the thundered accusations of Thésée, she is still the pitiable and noble figure we have watched with anxiety. Unlike Thésée and Théramène, unlike Hippolyte himself and the obtuse Œnone, the audience has seen into the tragic reaches of her heart. We see, in the death of Hippolyte, a higher instrumentality at work. The "Récit de Théramène," serving the purpose to which Racine fashioned it, has stirred pity for Hippolyte; it cannot dull our pity for the unwitting and unwilling instrument of his doom.

[7]For an excellent discussion of the omniscience of the audience, cf. Georges May, *Tragédie cornélienne, tragédie racinienne* (University of Illinois Press, 1948), 165-6, 197-201, where the author is particularly concerned with the audience's special knowledge of *events* relative to the main character, and unknown to the other protagonists. In Phèdre's case these would be the probability of Thésée's return and Hippolyte's love for Aricie; in Hippolyte's, the love of Phèdre and the curse of Thésée. We extend this omniscience to cover the audience's deeper knowledge of the heroine's innermost feelings, revealed by soliloquy or by her comments to Œnone. Pity for her is the greater, not only because of the audience's knowledge of the hopelessness of her situation, through events of which she is ignorant, but because of its intimate knowledge of her "perturb'd spirit."

RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN SCIENCE

H. L. STEWART

CONFLICT between religion and science is notorious. That there have been a great many conflicts between the two, in certain forms of their presentation, is a matter of plain record. Huxley summed it up in his remark about every new science having round its cradle the remains of slaughtered theologians, "like the strangled snakes round the infant Hercules." But it is not of theologians, it is of religion that I write in this article. My question is whether conflict belongs to the nature of religion *as such* and that of science *as such*. The blame is certainly not all on one side in this dispute, as the secularist press so glibly pretends. Scientists, like theologians, have sometimes made monstrous claims for an inquiry which was perfectly sound and valuable despite their exaggeration of what it meant. That the historic conflicts in this matter belong to the essential nature of the two, that the religious account means necessarily denial of the scientific, and *vice versa,* needs to be shown otherwise than by enumeration of particular cases of quarrel.

Religion has been described as arising in the effort to make experience coherent and intelligible, with due regard to that aspect of it (as genuine as any other) which is concerned with the *values* rather than with the *facts* of life. This view is very different from that of the Rationalist Press Association, which constantly ascribes to science a monopoly of intellectual coherence and stigmatizes religion as putting obstacles in its way. My argument here is that the secularist claim comes from confusing several matters. It comes especially from identifying all religion with some special religious form that happens to be familiar to the critic—also from a conception at once defective and exaggerated regarding the range of science.

II

Suppose a Hindu, brought up amid the sanctities and prohibitions of the caste system, taught in childhood the need to preserve sacred wells and temples from defilement by the presence of "Untouchables," warned against the awful sin of eating cow's flesh, and apprehensive lest he be doomed in his next incarnation to become some lowly animal (perhaps reptile) because he has failed in ritual exactness. To such a person, having no access to religion in any other form, these impious and cruel superstitions would be what it essentially means. Suppose such a Hindu emancipated from them by Western

science, but never introduced to religion in any form other than that of his naïve childhood. Would not a Western reader contemplate with amazement an article or a book by him called "The Conflict of Religion and Science," exposing with satiric wit the scruples and fears by which as a child he had been haunted, the rigour with which he had kept caste rules lest he should be so ceremonially polluted as to incur a degrading reincarnation, and the struggle he had felt compelled to wage for the vegetarianism essential to his salvation, against the example of influential foreigners? Grotesque as the picture must seem to us, many a publication in the Western world betrays a like provincialism of outlook. The articles, for example, once so familiar, about the six days of twenty-four hours each in which it was represented as vital to the Christian faith that one should believe the world to have been created, or about the intellectual necessity to become agnostic if one could not believe that devils had really entered into the swine of Gadara and driven them over a precipice—these articles indicate a provincialism like our Hindu's.

Disregarding, then, such mere follies of criticism, we have to ask whether religion as we have defined it, in its essence as contrasted with some accidental or local form of expression, is in conflict with science as also carefully defined. This effort so to conceive the universe and life as to harmonize ideals and facts—say by Kant's famous postulate of God, Freedom, and Immortality—is such effort forbidden by scientific principles? The impression that it is so forbidden seems to arise from its being judged "wishful thinking," in contrast with the disinterested character of science. One scientist has spoken of "the sin of faith"—that is, of allowing belief to arise otherwise than on evidence. It is urged that in the world's religions we have such constant infringement of intellectual honesty.

The apparent strength of this criticism arises, I think, from confusion between two very different claims for science. One is the claim for its doctrine of order in the universe; its reign of law as contrasted with chance; its "Principle of Sufficient Reason," declaring that whatever happens is explicable as an aspect of a world system to which we are increasingly finding clues, and about which we may be certain that the parts not yet interpreted are elements in the same harmony. If religion, or any other mental activity, violates this, it conflicts with science, for it denies the fundamental postulate of scientific procedure. Quite different, however, is it to say that it so conflicts when it points out limits to some method of scientific inquiry, and refuses to withdraw this objection merely because the method has been successful in arranging a particular field of experience so as to

enable one to foresee events there and to act advantageously on such foresight. Huxley once, in a mood of exceptional inspiration, warned his readers that practical success does not mean perfect knowledge, but only such knowledge as is adequate to give a useful rule for practice. He compared scientific inquiry to taking a hand in a great game of cards, some few rules for which the more acute have devised: "We call them laws of nature, and honour them because we find that, if we obey them, we win something for our pains. The cards are our theories and hypotheses, the tricks our experimental benefactions. But what sane man would endeavour to solve the problem 'Given the rules of the game and the winnings, to find whether the cards are made of pasteboard or of gold leaf'?"

A suggestive case is the Law of Mechanical Causation. It declares that whatever happens in the world of external nature is completely determined by what there preceded it in time. We are abundantly justified in proceeding on this as a rule of method, but the justification is by no means the same as that on which the Principle of Sufficient Reason rests. The latter is a principle which cannot be intelligently denied. It is not the outcome of experience, for it is the pre-condition of learning by experience at all. Since all inference begins there, inference cannot lead thither. But the Law of Mechanical Causation, which was unknown for many centuries during which mankind could not have been fitly called irrational, rests upon experience and must share the limitations of experience. It is the Principle of Sufficient Reason which forbids one to think of events as happening by chance. The Law of Mechanical Causation excludes what is called a "miracle"; that is to say, a rupture of the mechanical system by intervention of some divine or angelic power, what one scientist called angrily the "intrusion of super-nature"! If we say that miracles do not happen, this is not because we have any knowledge that they are impossible; it is because experience, wide and long continued, leads us to think they are not actual. But that things do not happen "by chance," apart from any reason at all (natural or supernatural) for their so happening and not otherwise, is a certitude without which, as has been well said, "thought would break in two."

III

To Bergson's *Time and Free Will* and to his *Creative Evolution* we owe a great debt for dispelling in this field some plausible scientific delusions, for example, the supposedly irrefutable case for determinism. It has been widely argued that freedom of choice, without which there can be no moral difference in conduct, is scientifically

impossible, and that to assert it—as the religious mind must—is to deny the Law of Universal Causation by finding human behaviour an exception to it. If everything I can ever do, every "choice" I suppose myself to make of my own "free will," was determined for me by my psycho-physical constitution together with my surroundings (for neither of which I can be held responsible, as I had no chance to make them), what becomes of the conception of "sin"? And how, it is asked, can we escape the very shocking inference, suggested by Hardy in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles,* that for the emancipated scientist the alleged blemish of character by sin amounts to no more than the irregularities of vale and mountain chain in the terrestrial curve? Insistently the determinist has pressed upon those still in trouble with misgivings of "conscience" that their concern is needless, though natural, for they could not have done otherwise than as they did. Is it not absurd to suppose that although everywhere else an event is to be explained as the outcome of what went before, the choice made by a human "will" in conduct is "free"?

The answer is that the Law of Universal Causation is quite misstated when it is said to explain an event anywhere as completely determined by antecedent events. There is no such law of nature, and the confusion by which we assume that there is can be readily indicated. It comes from attributing to the principle of mechanical causation (which is not more than a rule of method) the strength belonging to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which is a genuine axiom.

It is indeed axiomatic that what takes place anywhere—in human conduct no less than in the movement of material particles—does so as an element in a rational system. "Whatever begins to be, has some reason why it so begins and not otherwise": this cannot be doubted by any rational person who understands what the words mean. Moreover, if "human choice" were an exception, this—so far from serving as basis for morals and for the religion which involves a moral postulate—would be inconsistent with them both. We distinguish qualities of character by the motives which actuate one's will. The supposed act of choice where no motive operated would have no moral quality, because it would be simply unintelligible.

What, then, do we mean by saying that the cause of an event in the physical world is to be found in the events which preceded, if we may not similarly say that an act of human choice is completely determined by the agent's past together with the action upon him of his present surroundings? We mean, or should mean, just this—that in exploring the physical universe, dealing with a vast interrelated system of which we can observe only a fraction, we should concen-

trate in the first instance upon the uniformities which we can most easily observe and measure. These are the sequences of what we call "antecedent" and "consequent," especially those which we can define by units of measurement. Whether new things and new processes are arising or not, whether—as Bergson has argued—evolution is "creative," science provides us with no means of deciding, and hence with no right to deny that such innovation may occur. Its function is primarily practical, to furnish us with rules by which we may most safely or advantageously act upon the universe where we are in contact with it. These, based upon experience, are what we call laws of nature. As we seem to be rewarded in so far as we act upon them and to suffer in so far as we neglect or transgress them, we become surer and surer of what we call their "truth." But we have thus a right to increased confidence only in this: that there is here for us the most serviceable method of suiting our action to our surroundings. To suppose that we have thus penetrated what Ernst Haeckel called "the secret of the universe" is an assumption indicative of monstrous human vanity.

Yet it is just this assumption which is made every time the free will essential to the validity of moral and religious ideas is declared scientifically impossible. It can be so dismissed only if we can take the manifest success of mechanical causation (as a method of search for practical rules) to be proof that it has uncovered the ultimate meaning of things. Even those confident that science thus invalidates religion are commonly insistent that it does not similarly invalidate morals. Sometimes they declare that it has placed morals at length on a secure basis by dispensing with fictitious support in religion. But it is surely clear that the negative argument, whatever its value, applies equally to the two cases. If there is no real freedom of choice, if all the acts of a human being from the cradle to the grave are fixed for him by the constitution he has inherited and the surroundings in which he finds himself placed, all significance vanishes from the contrast of moral good and evil—except as a name for varying preferences with no objective quality. This outcome of his argument will, as a rule, alarm the negative scientist and he will construct an alternative foundation for the morals he feels it needful somehow to maintain. But why should he think it needful? However he may disguise it from himself, his argument involves appeal to that very spontaneity of choice which he has repudiated. The performance is one which does more credit to the scientist's heart than to his head. His religious critic of course sympathizes with the good man in this dialectical difficulty, but must point out that he has brought it upon himself.

FANNY BURNEY: PLAYWRIGHT

JOYCE HEMLOW

But we are different kind of folk.
We think not tragic fire & smoak
Equal to comic wit & Joke.
—ADMIRAL BURNEY's Prologue

MANY items about Fanny Burney's dramatic ventures may be excerpted from the printed diaries and letters, and most of her biographers have known about a tragedy *Edwy and Elgiva,* produced at Drury Lane in 1795; a comedy *Love and Fashion,* accepted by the manager of Covent Garden in 1800; and an earlier comedy *The Witlings,* written at the encouragement of Murphy and Sheridan, but condemned by Dr. Burney and Mr. Crisp. What is less generally known is that *Cerulia,* mentioned in the diary of 1797, refers to the five-act play *Hubert De Vere,* two manuscripts of which still exist; that besides the tragedies *Hubert De Vere* and *Edwy and Elgiva,* she completed the five-act blank-verse tragedy *The Siege of Pevensey* and had drafted out *Elberta;* and finally, that besides *The Witlings* and *Love and Fashion,* she had constructed two five-act comedies, *A Busy Day* and *The Woman-Hater,* and had begun another dramatic piece about Fanny Simper. None of these plays has been printed, but they survive in neat, perfectly legible holograph manuscripts, sometimes in one, often in two, drafts.[1] These, together with some 700 scraps of paper showing various stages of composition, throw a vivid light on Fanny Burney's methods of work, and on her mind, purposes, and abilities. The situations, characters, and plots are of absorbing interest as corollaries to her novels, though the first and most pertinent question must be, are they or are they not good plays? Would they have succeeded on the stage? Can they now be read in the study? In short, if edited and printed, would they augment the "gaiety of nations" and increase "the public stock of harmless pleasure"? Presently an affirmative answer will be given to some of these questions, though they suggest counter questions about the popular fare of the eighteenth-century stage. The people who went repeatedly to see *Jane Shore* and *The Clandestine Marriage* were the spectators Fanny Burney hoped to interest and please. Her biographers have longed to arbitrate on the *désaccords* among her advisers about the merits of her plays, yet

[1]In the Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of the New York Public Library. I am grateful to the Library for permission to read the plays, to describe them, and to make short quotations from them.

many critics must be disturbed to find that even Dr. Johnson hesitated to give a final verdict on Fanny Burney's first dramatic piece. "It would be well to make Murphy the last judge," he told Fanny, "for he knows the stage and I am quite ignorant of it."[2]

What readers of *Evelina* hoped and expected to see in Fanny Burney's comedies were scenes like those in which the Branghtons, Mr. Brown, the Holborn beau, or Mr. Lovel revealed, in rapid idiomatic dialogue, aberrations from the accepted norms of behaviour, thought, or speech, becoming thus comic figures in the comedy of manners. According to contemporary testimony, the manners thus delineated were faithful photographs of the *mores* of the time. The comic characters were transcripts from life. They are not *copies* from nature, but *"Impressions* or *Facsimiles,"* wrote Susan Burney.[3] Fanny Burney's books, said Mrs. Thrale, "are an exact and perfect Copy of those Manners which at this moment prevail in this Nation." "Her Novels . . . are the truest representations of the very commonest Life."[4] Finally, the pictures of existent incongruities in behaviour were satiric and, like all satire, corrective in purpose and in effect.[5] Fanny Burney was an attentive observer, and as she contemplated men, the Comic Spirit somewhere overhead looked, as Meredith described it, "humanely malign, and cast an oblique light on them, followed by volleys of silvery laughter."[6] Delineations of the ridiculous, characteristic of the writings of all the Burneys, did not fail to appear in Fanny's comedies. In *The Witlings,* however, there are fewer comic transcripts of life than readers of *Evelina* might have expected, for here Fanny Burney relied on a method quite different from the realistic procedure briefly described above. Hundreds of extant scraps of manuscript on which she had scribbled preliminary drafts of characters reveal her methods of composition. Many of these outlines are characters in the seventeenth-century sense, though in all probability her patterns were more immediately derived from the Imperias, Tom Puzzles, and Tom Touchies of *The Rambler* or *The Spectator,* papers in which she had

[2]Madame d'Arblay, *Diary and Letters of Madame d'Arblay,* ed. by Charlotte Barrett (London, 1893), I, 134. This work is cited hereafter as *Diary.*

[3]Susan Burney Phillips, *Journal* for 1792. The Berg Collection, the NYPL.

[4]*Thralania, the Diary of Mrs. Hester Lynch Thrale,* ed. by Katherine C. Balderston (Oxford, 1942), II, 695.

[5]For the function of laughter, see Henri Bergson, *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic,* trans. by C. Brereton and F. Rothwell (New York, 1924). Cf. Elizabeth P. Stein, *David Garrick, Dramatist* (New York, 1938), 199-200: "The function of comedy . . . in Garrick's opinion, is to paint the vices and foibles that flesh is heir to and to hold them up to ridicule with the hope that the audience will laugh at them and thus correct them."

[6]George Meredith, *An Essay on Comedy, and the Uses of the Comic Spirit* (New York, 1897), 82-8.

been thoroughly grounded as a child and which in her eighties she still read and praised. The holograph drafts, like their literary antecedents, are pictures of "generalized nature," and, before they could be put in action in a novel or a play, had to be supplied with a local habitation and a name. A holograph jotting will illustrate this preliminary stage in composition.

Jocoso
A perpetual Joker: saying good and amusing things, but never waiting for times and seasons; & therefore, though a man of good Intellect, more wearisome than a fool, by always seizing every occasion to say a *good thing* without attending to anxiety, without listening to facts, without weighing arguments, without consoling afflictions, without caring about reason, & without the smallest attention to the humour, character, or situation of his hearers. . . .[7]

There are similar sketches for a Mrs. Compliant and a Mrs. Cant; a Miss Fidget, a Miss Hoper, and a Miss Fretter; for a Mr. Objector, a Splenetic Man, and many more. A tentative list of *dramatis personae* includes a Mr. Furioso, a Mr. Literal, Lord Finelife, and Master Thickhead.[7] Thus, characters can be created from aggregates of qualities, foibles, or humours, and their thickness or thinness will depend on the number of such qualities attributed to them.

As the very names of the characters in *The Witlings*[8] suggest, they seem never to have passed this embryonic stage and remain aggregates of foibles, failings, humours, or pretensions, somewhat inadequately clothed with human flesh and spirit. Their "characters" are supplied in the first act of the play by Censor, the "splenetic" observer, critic, and monitor who appears consistently throughout Fanny Burney's works. Thus Censor anatomizes Mrs. Voluble as a "prating, intolerable Fool," who "will consume more Words in an Hour than Ten Men will in a Year."[9] Mrs. Sapient, he informs us, "is more weak & superficial even than Lady Smatter, yet she has the same facility in giving herself credit for wisdom; & there is a degree of assurance in her conceit that is equally wonderful & disgusting, for as Lady Smatter, from the shallowness of her knowledge, upon all subjects forms a *wrong* Judgement, Mrs. Sapient, from extreme weakness of parts, is incapable of forming *any;* but, to compensate for that deficiency, she retails all the opinions she hears, & confidently utters them as her

[7]Accompanying the manuscript of *Camilla* in the Berg Collection of the NYPL are 59 scraps of paper containing suggestions for *Camilla.* These include slips of paper relating to the plays, as do also *Miscellaneous: about 417 pieces of MS. 1772-1882.*

[8]The play survives in a meticulously copied manuscript in the Berg Collection, the NYPL.

[9]Act I (p. 10).

own."[10] Codger, stigmatized for his "humour of perpetual deliberation," is "always pondering, without knowing what he thinks of."[11] His son Jack, having determined to "avoid the censure of inactive meditation," goes to the opposite extreme, and is "always running without knowing what he pursues."[11]

The action of the play is largely concerned with the illustration of such foibles. Mr. Dabbler is the "Poet of Fashion." According to his landlady, Mrs. Voluble, he is "quite one of the great Geniuses" for study and has "never destroyed a Line he ever wrote in his life."[12] His sluggish and laborious assays at composition are much like those of Horace in *Satiro-mastix: "The pensive maid, with saddest sorrow sad,*—No, hang it, that won't do! *saddest sad* will never do! With—with—with *mildest,*—ay that's it! *The pensive maid with mildest sorrow sad. . . .*"[13] The villain of the piece is a stock villain of Fanny Burney's works, or indeed of the eighteenth-century comedy of manners, the haughty and insolent Lady ——, who, often supported by Lord ——, threatens to disinherit and disown the eldest son or nephew who insists on marrying (*a*) the young lady of rank inferior to his own, whatever her fortune and her modest worth, or (*b*) the penniless young lady, let her rank, charms, beauties, virtues, and excellencies be what they may. Cecilia is the modest and excellent young lady, who, in the second act of the play, loses her fortune. In the milliner's shop in Act I we had learned that she was soon to be married to Mr. Beaufort, the nephew of Mrs. Smatter.

The argument hangs upon Mrs. Smatter's reaction to this change of fortune. She speedily shows Cecilia the door, and the fallen heiress is presently discovered "walking apart" and soliloquizing on the "progress of Time,"—so swift in hope, so slow in misery.[14] When she realizes that the position of governess involves work to which she has not been accustomed, she bows to adversity: "Oh heavy Hour!—down, down, proud Heart! . . . I must submit to my fate, not chuse it; & should servility & dependence be my lot; I trust . . . that I shall not only find them . . . Heart-breaking & cruel—but short & expeditious."[14] This level of lamentation is sustained through the dark period of Beaufort's apparent defection. "I who to happiness have bid a long, a last farewell, must content myself with seeking Peace in retirement & solitude."[14]

The painful situation is retrieved and tragedy turned again to comedy through the machinations of Censor, who is able to muster the weapons of the witlings against Lady Smatter. Unless she will

[10]Act I (p. 14). [11]Act I (p. 23). [12]Act I (p. 17).
[13]Act III (pp. 11-14). [14]Act V (pp. 5, 12, 24).

revise her attitude toward the marriage, he threatens to have her publicly assailed with lampoons, squibs, epigrams, and ballads, larded with uncomplimentary allusions to her avarice, age, and literary pretensions. Finally, he says, they will represent her as a poppet in the Patagonian theatre. If, on the other hand, she should yield, "lampoons shall give place to panegyric, & libels, to songs of Triumph!" Her erudition and liberality will be "recorded by the Muses, & echoed by the whole Nation." Examples of lampoons and ballads provide a glimpse of contemporary literary practices and enliven the conclusion. The most humorous scene, perhaps, occurs in Act V, where the landlady, Mrs. Voluble, rapidly revises her shifting principles in accordance with what she conceives her genteel visitor would expect, and where her poor notions of what these should be coincide only too well with the practical ethics of her ostensible superiors.

The Witlings is a satire on pretences of many kinds, but chiefly on the affectation of wit and learning. The wit of the "Esprit Party" consists in hackneyed commonplaces, and their learning, in wrongly attributed citations of poetry. Pencilled deletions of vitriolic passages about the "Esprit Party" lend some credit to Mrs. Thrale's observation that Mr. Crisp feared the play might offend that "formidable body," the so-called *bas bleus*.[15] Even after this long interval the conversations between Cecilia and Mrs. Smatter irresistibly recall Fanny Burney's attitude to Mrs. Montagu as revealed in the diaries of these years. Though, as one may gather from sundry sources, neither Mr. Crisp nor Dr. Burney would have wept at an attack on the Queen of the Blues, they were reluctant to expose their one ewe lamb to such a perilous encounter. Thus Mr. Crisp suggests follies of a less precise nature as a more suitable subject for her next comedy. General follies, he wrote, will "furnish you with a profusion of what you want, to make out a most spirited, witty, moral, useful comedy, without descending to the invidious and cruel practice of pointing out individual characters, and holding them up to public ridicule."[15] Finally he asks her to read in *An Apology for the Life of Mr. Colley Cibber,* "how great an advantage a fable well planned must be," for here Mr. Crisp has found "the echo of [his] sentiments of the matter for these forty years."[16]

This somewhat beclouded dramatic activity next included the tragedies *Edwy and Elgiva, Hubert De Vere, The Siege of Pevensey,*

[15] *Diary,* I, 172-4, 211-16. Cf. *Thralania,* I, 381: "Murphy liked [*The Witlings*] very well, but her confidential friend Mr. Crisp advised her against bringing it on, for fear of displeasing the female Wits—a formidable Body." See also, I, 401 (August 18, 1779): "Fanny Burney has pleased me today—She resolves to give up a play likely to succeed; for fear it may bear hard upon some Respectable Characters."

[16] *Diary,* I, 216.

and *Elberta*. The first was begun "in mere desperation for employment" in October, 1788, at Kew, where the court was unexpectedly detained by the King's illness.[17] A second tragedy was begun at the completion of the rough draft of *Edwy* in August, 1790,[17] but much of the dreary work was done in June, 1791, when, still weak and depressed from a serious illness of the preceding winter, she was waiting in gloomy suspense for release from the duties from which she had resigned six months before.[17]

> So melancholy, indeed, was the state of my mind, from the weakness of my frame, that I was never alone but to form scenes of "foreign woe," when my own disturbance did not occupy me wholly. I began—almost whether I would or not—another tragedy! The other three all unfinished! not one read! and one of them, indeed, only generally sketched as to plan and character. . . . The power of composition has to me indeed proved a solace, a blessing! When incapable of all else, that unsolicited, unthought of, has presented itself to my solitary leisure, and beguiled me of myself, though it has not of late regaled me with gayer associates.[17]

Just previous to this time, when during the disorders of George III the court was immured at Windsor or Kew, Colonel Digby, the Queen's Vice Chamberlain, had filled the "sad period" by assiduously reading sermons and sentimental poems to the Second Keeper of the Robes. Her unhappy disappointment in his heart and character constituted perhaps her first hard lesson (though by no means her first unhappy love affair) in the tragedy of manners, namely, that a man may smile and smile and be a villain.[18] Psychologists might suggest that it was a healthful process by which she translated all this personal woe, all her acquaintance with royal grief gained for a time each morning as she brought reports about the mad King to the weeping Queen, and all her knowledge of the intrigues and caballing in the court at the time of the proposed regency, into stories of the kings and princesses and old unhappy far-off cabals and battlegrounds of the Anglo-Saxon Heptarchy. She may have found inspiration in the royal personages she saw daily in the Queen's dressing room, on the terrace, or in the draughty halls or royal gardens of Windsor or Kew, or she may have been influenced by the annalistic material of the contemporary theatre, from the adaptations of Shakespeare's tragedies to the works "attempted after the Manner of Shakespear" by Nicholas Rowe and his precursors and followers.

[17] *Ibid.*, III, 49-50, 284-5, 337.

[18] The unhappy progress of her friendship with Mr. George Cambridge and later with Colonel Digby is related at great length and with careful minuteness in journal-letters addressed jointly to Mrs. Phillips (Susan) and Mrs. Locke of Norbury Park.

This is not the place to write about sensibility, sentimentality or sententiousness, domestic drama, heroic tragedy, or the contribution of each to the development of the she-tragedy. Though all these themes are pertinent to the subject in hand, it is perhaps enough to remember that the basis of the she-tragedy was a pathetic tale about an unfortunate woman, sometimes a sinful woman (though often the "innocent fair"), but always most vilely sinned against; and that the poet in raising this material to heroic proportions seemed always in danger of missing the large effects of pathos and tenderness he hoped to evoke and of falling into mawkishness. As a corollary, the blank verse, alone deemed the medium sufficiently dignified for the high theme, was often inflated, or at least, may seem so to the modern critic, who, far from priding himself on "sensibility," may sometimes look for hollowness where hollowness is not. When we have said that Fanny Burney wrote three she-tragedies, but that as a poet, she was not so fortunate as to evade the dangers inherent in this species of composition, we shall, perhaps, have achieved an adequate summary of the matter. Yet students of eighteenth-century tragedy or of Fanny Burney may be interested in a few details about *Edwy and Elgiva* and the other tragedies which survive.[19]

The first tragedy is concerned with the conflict between the teenaged Edwy, King of the West Saxons, and the monastic reformer St. Dunstan, Abbot of Glastonbury—a story often remembered because of the dramatic scene at the coronation in 956, when the boy-king, having slipped away from the banqueting hall, is discovered by Dunstan in the company of two women (the younger of whom is by some accounts his wife; by others, his paramour) and hustled by the saint back to the council room. The incident admitted of many readings. Among the accretions to the story and the various interpretations of the misty figures of Ethelgiva, Elgyfa, and Eadwig, Fanny Burney seems to have followed closely those selected by Hume for the relevant section of his *History of England*.[20] We know that she had read Hume's history in her teens, and the reference made in 1791 to her researches on the character of Dunstan suggests that she may have

[19]The manuscript of *Edwy and Elgiva* comprises some 150 leaves about six inches by four, written on both sides, and sewed together in packets or acts. Extant also are two drafts of a prologue, an early version of parts of the story in rhyme, and about fifty pages of corrections in General d'Arblay's meticulous hand.

[20](Philadelphia, 6 vols., 1876), I, 88-90. Cf. Thomas Hodgkin, *The History of England* (New York, 1906), 344-52; F. M. Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England* (Oxford, 1943), 359-62; Sir Charles Oman, *England before the Norman Conquest* (London, 1938), 534-41; E. William Robertson, *Historical Essays* (Edinburgh, 1872), 189-200. For slighting references to Hume's "romantic" story, see John Lingard, "A Reply to the Observations of the Edinburgh Review on the Anglo-Saxon Antiquities" (*The Pamphleteer*, VII, March, 1816, 531-44).

re-read such accounts before she wrote the play.[21] Not only does she incorporate most of the incidents mentioned by Hume,[22] but apart from some telescoping for dramatic motivation and economy, she follows the order of his narrative. She relies on his interpretation of the somewhat ambiguous character of St. Dunstan as well as that of Edwy and of the princess Elgiva, whom the young king had recklessly married though she was "within the degree of affinity prohibited by canon law." Finally, she takes over Hume's phraseology even to his citation of opprobrious epithets. These and other verbal echoes suggest Hume's account as her point of departure, rather than the pertinent pages of the histories of Smollett, Rapin, or Robert Henry which she had also read.[23] Dramatic poems of her age on the subject of Edwy seem to have had less influence on the content than on the form of her tragic pieces.[24]

However, the vigour of Fanny Burney's mind is illustrated in her adjustment of Hume's story in the interests of dramatic motivation, unity, and effect. The edict of excommunication is moved ahead to account for Edwy's consent to the divorce. St. Dunstan's condemnation of the wives of the secular priests is transferred to "that fair assemblage of female excellence," the bride of the young king. Aldhelm, mentioned in Hume as Dunstan's uncle and tutor, here figures as tutor to Edwy; he is wisely and sorrowfully cognizant of the ways of erring youth. He is Spenser's Palmer or Prévost's Dean of Coleraine, the prudent adviser, monitor, or guardian, who in Fanny Burney's works so often points the moral. He is

> That Sage Experience, which defied surprise,
> That Heart Benign, which pitied ev'n in wrath;[25]

and he anatomizes Edwy as follows:

[21]*The Early Diary of Frances Burney, 1768-1778,* ed. by Annie Raine Ellis (London, 1913), I, 30; *Diary,* III, 365; and manuscript of the *Diary,* the Berg Collection, the NYPL, pp. 4397-8. See also MS. of the *Diary,* a letter of May 9, 1794, where Madame d'Arblay speaks of M. d'Arblay reading Hume. The work was apparently in their cottage at Bookham.

[22]Notably she suits the branding scene.

[23]Tobias Smollett, *A Complete History of England* (London, 10 vols., 1748); Paul de Rapin-Thoyras, *The History of England, As Well Ecclesiastical As Civil,* trans. by N. Tindal (London, 15 vols., 1726-32); Robert Henry, *The History of Great Britain* (London, 6 vols., 1771-93). History was a study much approved in the eighteenth century. Reading lists or curricula often included Rapin for English history, and Charles Rollin for ancient history. For Fanny Burney's reading in history see *Early Diary,* I, 30, 100; II, 203, 209. See also notebooks and extract books for the years 1802-12 in the Berg Collection, the NYPL.

[24]E.g., Thomas Warwick's dramatic poem *Edwy,* which appeared in 1784. *Edwy and Edilda* by Thomas Sedgwick Whalley, which Fanny Burney read with Mrs. Thrale at Brighton in 1779, is an imitation of Middle English Romance, and does not concern the historical Edwy of Wessex.

[25]Act IV, Scene xii.

Had years matur'd him ere he reached the Throne
His virtues might have rank'd him first of kings.
Form'd mildly to command, or nobly yield,
Fair his intent, his very wishes upright,
His soul the genuine seat of native honour;
But of a sensibility so ardent
His spirit impetuous owns no curb but feeling:
Reason it leaves behind, impell'd by impulse;
'Tis fiery, ev'n to fury, if incens'd,
'Tis tortur'd ev'n to madness if unhappy.[26]

Aldhelm presents Edwy's case to the churchmen, pleads the loneliness of kingship and the king's need of "bosom comfort," "heart-felt sympathy," and "sweet domestic peace"; for the loss of "life's alleviations," not less than the waste of life itself, is a prominent theme of this she-tragedy.[27] Domestic woe, the distraction of Edwy, and the sorrows of Elgiva constitute the tender and pathetic *Stoff*, which eclipses the affairs of church and state and haunts the action.

On May 21, 1795, Dr. Charles Burney, junior, arranged to have the play produced at Drury Lane. It ran one night, and on that night, as we read in *Thraliana*, it was "hooted off the Stage."[28] With the exception of the principal actors, who gave conscientious performances, the players, according to Mrs. Thrale, refused to get their parts and "dropt silently off, one by one," leaving Dr. Charles alone in the Green Room. Madame d'Arblay attributed the failure to "a thousand things" she wished to change and to the disadvantages under which the piece was represented. "The performers . . . made blunders I blush to have pass for mine—added to what belong to me. The most important character after the hero and heroine had but two lines of his part by heart! He made all the rest at random, and such nonsense as put all the other actors out as much as himself; so that a more wretched performance, except Mrs. Siddons, Mr. Kemble, and Mr. Bensley, could not be exhibited in a barn."[29] The fall of the curtain can, perhaps, be best described by Mrs. Siddons, who in the matter of she-tragedies must be listened to with respect.

Oh there never was so wretched a thing as Mrs. D'arblaye's Tragedy. . . . She was at the representation in spite of all I coud say of the ill effects so much agitation as she must necessarily feel woud have upon an invalide for she has been extremely ill it seems since her lying in . . . I was grieved

[26]Act IV, Scene v.
[27]Act I, Scenes v, ix, xi.
[28]*Thraliana*, II, 916.
[29]*Diary*, III, 545-7. In a letter to Mrs. Waddington (April, 1795), Madame d'Arblay tells of the night at the theatre, when with her sister Susan, her brother Dr. Charles, and her husband she sat "snug & retired & wrapt up in a Bonnet and immense Pelice, in Mr. Sheridan's Box, to see Mrs. Siddons & Mr. Kemble in Edwy and Elgiva." See the MS. of the *Diary and Letters*, p. 4811.

that a woman of so much merit must be so mortified. The Audience was quite angelic and only laughed when it was *impossible* to avoid it. . . . Her brother negotiated the whole business, I never saw herself, but she went to my brothers the next day and nobly said, she had been deceived by her friends that she saw it was a very bad thing, and withdrew it immediately—that was done like a woman of an exalted spirit. . . .[28]

More "wretched things" than *Edwy and Elgiva,* however, there were, namely the plays next to be considered, *Hubert De Vere, The Siege of Pevensey,* and, as far as fragments can be judged, *Elberta.* Though cast in dialogue, *Hubert De Vere* has a greater affinity to a romantic tale than to a play.[30] Hubert De Vere is a morose Byronic hero, who, for some dark reason, "Betray'd by her he lov'd, the false Geralda,"[31] suffers gloomy exile on the Isle of Wight. "The Landscape represents a Heath with a view of the Sea," and the hero "appears at a distance, his arms folded, his Eyes fixed on the Earth" as he

> Broods o'er wrongs & woes—in deadly wrath
> Unheard of Wrongs, unutterable woes![31]

The trouble seems to be that Geralda, "sunk in the low abyss of Avarice and Vanity," has wedded

> the potent Glanville,
> The Lord of Wealth, as Hubert is of Honour,[31]

though a darker design is betrayed by the villain De Mowbray, who appears on the heath to incite a shepherd's daughter Cerulia to greet De Vere with "smiles and blandishments." This artless, pure, and lovely maid, however, needed no such encouragement, as for a long time she had been trailing De Vere over the moors. Always he could see

> Between the Trees, beside some bush, or near
> Some stream meandering wild, her gentle Form:
> This delicate Maid would court the assailing storm
> Though trembling, tottering from its rude, bleak blast. . . .
> She cross'd me in the path,
> Or, fix't at distance, watch'd my wandering motions. . . .
> Her modest Eye
> If mine perchance it met, was quick averted;
> While the bright mantling on her roseate cheek,
> And swift-wing'd, eager flight afar, display'd
> Youthful confusion.[32]

[30]Two drafts of the play survive, the earlier of which, probably begun at court in 1791 and finished at Chelsea, is much corrected (black ink over brown) and much pinned and pasted over with revisions. Dates, at least the earliest possible dates of composition, are often indicated by the postmarks, addresses, or contents of letters, the backs of which Fanny Burney often used for scratch paper.

[31]Act I, Scene i (first draft). [32]Act IV (pp. 6-7).

De Vere, though "blameless in his life, severe in virtue," soon finds himself in the tragic dilemma of Macheath. "How happy might I prove with that fair Creature"[33] were the other charmer forgotten. To cut much painful matter short, he has no sooner in a "wavering wandering moment" offered Cerulia the remnant of his heart, when, "Flash, Lightnings, Flash!" Geralda darts forward (for Glanville is now dead and it soon appears that she had married him not out of "Avarice and Vanity" but to save the honour of her uncle, the villain De Mowbray, whom Glanville knew for a traitor). "Conjunction dire!" There is now nothing for the village maid but to die, and she dies, hoping she has injured none, and pardoning all. No longer "Airy and blyth, she rov'd the fragrant mead,"[33] but lurked by night in a ghoulish graveyard. All of Act V is concerned with grim portents of death, Gothic terrors, affecting madness, harrowing farewells, and finally with De Mowbray's intimation that he, her murderer, is her father! The village maidens weep and *"the curtain drops to the sound of the Church Death Bell."*

Whatever hopes Madame d'Arblay may have entertained for *Hubert De Vere* and *The Siege of Pevensey,* when around 1836 at the age of 84 or 85 she seems to have read over the plays and had them timed, she probably wrote them with little thought of publication or production. *Edwy and Elgiva,* she insisted in 1795, was written neither "for the stage, nor yet for the press."[34] *Hubert De Vere* is classified in its sub-title as "A Dramatic Tale." "Its first form," she tells us, was that of "a tale in dialogue." In all probability it was suggested by some narrative like Falconer's *Shipwreck,*[35] and meant as an experiment in the wild kind of romantic narrative so popular with the poets of the age.

The Siege of Pevensey is extant in a carefully written manuscript much resembling that of *Edwy and Elgiva.* It was begun at Windsor and probably completed in 1791 in Dr. Burney's study at Chelsea College. The dramatic action hinges on various conflicts between Love and Honour or between Private and Public Duty during the course of military manœuvres about the citadel of Pevensey in 1088.

[33]Act II (p. 11).

[34]See *Diary,* IV, 4: "I felt fixed never to assay it for representation. I shall therefore restore it to its first form, that of a tale in dialogue, and only revise and endeavour to make it readable for a fire-side." See *Diary,* III, 284 and MS. of the *Diary,* p. 4080. See also MS. of the *Diary,* p. 4273: "Three works which I have now in hand seize me capriciously; but I never reprove them; I give the play into their own direction, & am sufficiently thankful, in this wearing waste of existence [i.e. at court], for so being seized at all."

[35]A work read by Colonel Digby to Fanny Burney at court. Cf. also the ballad *Willy,* a romantic tale which she composed in 1787 and revised in 1791.

The conflict between Love and Honour, so long debated in heroic tragedy and represented in *The Rehearsal* by Prince Volscius and his boots, has here a new resolution in a happy ending in which even the villains are rewarded. This easy solution of the tragic dilemmas discourages any serious consideration of the piece as a tragedy; yet in its age, at least, the work had other claims. The requirement that a "good Moral" be "deduc'd from the whole" was amply fulfilled by the "sentiments" of filial duty expressed and exemplified by the heroine. When her father decides that she must go to a nunnery, she is content to

> pass her days in soft remembrance
> Of all his wondrous patience, sweetness,
> His mild indulgence to her early errour,
> His noble precepts for her rules of life. (V, xii)

Because of its recurrent theme and perhaps its purpose, *The Siege of Pevensey* may be characterized as a dissertation on filial piety.

Elberta, evidently begun at court about 1791, does not seem to have been carried beyond preliminary jottings, which include a list of *dramatis personae,* notions about a plot, short character sketches, and scraps of dialogue. The evolution of a she-tragedy may be seen in fragments:

> A Female is mentioned, who wild & unknown is seen roaming about—no one is informed whence she comes—woe is on her voice, terror in her aspect,—she never weeps, yet frequently wails— . . . Her fierce harangues, though wild when offended. Her gentle supplications to shadows.
>
> She asks how long the children may live without nourishment . . . She sees trembling her children fading,—she sighs—but submits to what must bring them to angels.

Among the 215 memoranda no scrap promises any brighter end than gnawing famine, violent deaths, and madness.

By 1795, therefore, Madame d'Arblay had proved herself in the three ingredients listed by Mrs. Thrale as requisite to eighteenth-century comedy. "You seem to have all the right and true talents for writing," Mrs. Thrale had said; "you would give us all the fun and humour we could wish, and you would give us a scene or two of the pathetic kind that would set all the rest off. . . . And in the grave parts, all your sentiments would be edifying, and such as would do good."[36] Allowing for some idea of decorum, balance, and proportion, Mrs. Thrale's itemization is probably representative of the predilec-

[36] *Diary,* I, 91. Cf. Mr. Crisp's reference (*Diary,* I, 174) to a "spirited, witty, moral, useful comedy"; and Garrick's stipulation (quoted by Elizabeth Stein, *Garrick,* 200) of a "good Moral deduc'd from the whole."

tions of the theatre-goers of her time. All three ingredients emerge in Fanny Burney's plays; and though, as Lord David Cecil observes, she was not a great artist,[37] in one (perhaps two) of the plays yet to be considered she happily combined her best powers and produced characters and situations which must have pleased the devotees of *Evelina* and *Cecilia*, and which may still provide a lively and (as far as realism is concerned) a genuine comedy of manners.

There is the temptation to consider *The Busy Day* first as being the less complicated in theme and plot and in its components nearest to *Evelina*.[38] In *Evelina* laughter arises from aberrations in behaviour, incongruities which become conspicuous when ranks of society differing in notions, ideas, and ideals are placed in juxtaposition. Though in this kind of *exposé* the vulgar suffer most, yet their shrewd (or sometimes uncomprehending) assessment of their betters serves to illuminate the sins, follies, and pretensions of the upper classes. Such are the oblique lights which play about *The Busy Day*. Its great merit is a merit applauded then as now; it is a transcript of life.

The "comic vulgarity" of *The Busy Day* is supplied by Mr. Watts, his family, and his friend Mr. Tibbs. Mr. Watts is described in a preliminary memorandum thus:

> Mr. Prospero
>
> An old citizen, who from a running errand Boy grows immensely rich, & brings up his Daughters to all modern accomplishments: he is persuaded to take a House in the W. end of the Town, where he leaves off business, & knows not how to fill up his Time. His daughters are always ashamed of him . . . He has no comfort of his life from inability to enjoy their set. . . . He meets at last an old friend, whom he shuns before . . . & relates his misery, by degrees, till at last it all bursts forth in torrtnts of lamentations at his acquirement of wealth he knows not how to manage or use or enjoy.[39]

Implicit in this sketch is the eighteenth-century regard for the Chain of Being expressed socially in the ideas about the *status quo,* and a reiteration of the lesson Fanny Burney had elaborated in the career of Belfield of *Cecilia*. The fun arises from his idiomatic speech, his

[37]"Fanny Burney's Novels," *Essays on the Eighteenth Century Presented to David Nichol Smith in Honour of His Seventieth Birthday* (Oxford, 1945), 212-24.

[38]*The Woman-Hater* (two drafts of which survive) and *The Busy Day* may have been written in the years 1800-1, when M. d'Arblay had returned to France in an attempt to retrieve his affairs, and Madame d'Arblay remained at West Hamble with her son. In her letters of these years there are veiled hints about some activities which may remedy their financial straits. Some scenes of *The Woman-Hater* written on scraps of letters postmarked 1800 or 1801 point to the same conclusion with respect to the dates of composition.

[39]Boxed with *59 scraps of paper containing suggestions for Camilla.* The Berg Collection, the NYPL.

commentary on his domestic life, and his shrewd appraisal of the manners of the upper classes and the motives underlying many of their actions. Mrs. Watts as the wife of the opulent tradesman behaves pretty much like her sisters in the Canterbury Pilgrimage, though provided with a later idiom in speech. She is disdainful of old acquaintances, obsequious with superiors, parsimonious, quarrelsome, ostentatious, and, according to her daughter, somewhat unlettered.

MISS WATTS. La, pa, don't give him the letter till I've looked at it. Why, what signifies you reading it, ma. You know you can't read writing hand.

MRS. WATTS. Dear, my dear, why I ha'n't made out hardly two words yet. . . . I might make out some of it; snatching away things so![40]

Miss Watts is the forward daughter, who, educated above her status at a boarding school, is now able to instruct her parents. Her conduct is stigmatized like that of Miss Dennel of *Camilla* and Miss Wilmot of *The Woman-Hater*. Much of the entertainment in the play arises from the altercations in this family group and from their relations with Mr. Tibbs, the cousin whom Mrs. Watts now refuses to recognize but whom Mr. Watts seizes upon as a confidant for his miseries.

The cultivated levels of society are exhibited in the family and connections of Sir Marmaduke Tilney. Sir Marmaduke is a familiar choleric personality from the comedy of humours, whose selfishness, pride, prejudice, and financial embarrassments obstruct the course of young love, and embroil the action. He finds a strong ally in Lady Wilhelmina, who, though lacking the admirable qualities of Mrs. Delvile of *Cecilia,* plays the part of that proud lady or that of Mrs. Smatter of *The Witlings*. The younger of Sir Marmaduke's nephews is a scheming, but not ill-natured, wastrel, who affords much less entertainment than his friend, the languid fop, Sir John Dervis. Thus he instructs Sir John to write a letter:

LORD JOHN. O the plague! how I hate writing! I wish it had never been invented, *young* what did you say?

FRANK. Friend, to be sure.

LORD JOHN. Do I spell it with an *i*, or an *e*?

FRANK. With both.

LORD JOHN. O the Deuce! I've only put an *e*; does it signify?

FRANK. Not much. Go on. Why now you've left out Francis.

LORD JOHN. I wish it was all at Jericho, with all my soul. Put it in yourself. I'm plaguey tired.[41]

The elder of Sir Marmaduke's nephews wishes to marry a daughter of the vulgar Watts family, whom he had met in India, where she had been well brought up by a guardian much like Mr. Crisp, one im-

[40]Act II (pp. 30-31). [41]Act II (pp. 44-8).

agines, or like Mr. Villars of *Evelina*. Eliza and the young man have just returned from India, and all the comedy occurs on the day of their arrival in London.

Obstacles to the marriage arise not only from the attitudes of Sir Marmaduke and his lady, but also from the machinations of Eliza's rival, the vapourish Miss Percival. As a novelist Fanny Burney found no difficulty in placing obstructions in the way of a marriage and removing them, but that is not her chief concern here. She was not writing a romantic comedy, but a comedy of manners, and her chief concern was to juxtapose conflicting elements of society in such a way as to make their foibles more conspicuous. Eccentricities of behaviour are often ridiculous, but Fanny Burney had always found the reaction of a third person to them infinitely more amusing. Thus to see Mrs. Vesey dart about with her cushions, ear-trumpet, and silver ears was laughable in spite of its pathos, but the vicar's amazement at her management of the cushions, the ear-trumpet, and the silver ears was irresistible. On one occasion at court Fanny Burney noted observers besides herself, who could scarcely keep their countenances when Colonel Wellbred (Greville) was assailed at the tea-table by a hardy and forward personage. "There is scarce any Scene that strikes the Eye & Mind with more comic Images," she remarked, "than a very elegant man surrounded with very inelegant companions, all aiming at his notice, & none finding out that they never obtain it, but at the expense of creating in his mind fresh disgust from every compelled attention."[42] As Fanny Burney understood the comedy of manners, her task was not only to exhibit the manners of the great and of the vulgar, but to exhibit the manners of the great as they appeared to the vulgar, and *vice versa*. Thus she not only shows us Mr. Tibbs, but Mr. Tibbs as he appeared to Sir Marmaduke and to Lady Wilhelmina; conversely, we see them through his eyes.

Some technical adroitness was required in devising situations in which these oddly assorted social groups meet.[43] Here Eliza is useful; for though, like Cecilia, she is an heiress despised by her lover's family for her birth, and though, like Evelina, she suffers painful embarrassments from the conduct of her vulgar relations, she is not herself an interesting figure, but serves chiefly as a means of bringing the conflicting parties together. The ease and skill with which in *The Busy Day* Fanny Burney arranges scene after scene in the gardens, inns, and

[42]Holograph scrap boxed with the MS. of the *Diary and Letters*, Box IV.

[43]Cf. Carlo Goldoni, *The Memoirs* (London, 2 vols., 1828), a work which Madame d'Arblay was reading around 1800: "That any character may be productive of effect on the stage, it has always appeared to me necessary to contrast it with characters of an opposite description."

drawing-rooms of the London she knew so well must earn her belated praise for the construction of a plot. By a lucky stroke she here omits scenes of "sensibility," which now read so much like melodrama, and which to modern taste mar *Cecilia* and even parts of *Evelina*. Even more than in *Evelina* the naturalness of the action and of the dialogue will carry a reader swiftly into a real eighteenth-century London. Act III will take one straight into Kensington Gardens to the figures that resorted there in that age.

Finally, "improving sentiments" are added but sparingly. The "good Moral" here depends not on noble precepts but on the satiric and corrective force of social *exposé* and ridicule. Reflected in Act V particularly are Fanny Burney's observations on London society of the seventies and eighties, and it would be difficult to find in the century a more devastating and comprehensive satire on the bad manners of high and low alike. Until the play is published an extract from the choric comment of Mr. Tibbs may serve as an example.

MR. TIBBS. Good lauk! Tom, look at them fine Gentlemen, as you call 'em! one's lying all along, as if he was sick abed; & t'other's gaping at Cousin Peg, as if he was going to take a nap full in her face![44]

"If this here behaviour's what they call the thing," Mr. Tibbs concludes, "it's none so difficult. I warrant I could do it as well as they." He then undertakes to "do after the manner" of Lord John Dervis and to carry on as genteel a conversation. He has only to say "over again their own last word" and follow that up with "O the deuce!" or the like.[44] Accordingly he stretches out on the sofa and is not to be dislodged by the comments of Sir Marmaduke, the sarcasms of Lady Wilhelmina, or by Mrs. Watts, who accosts him thus:

MRS. WATTS. Dears! what a sight is here! Joel Tibbs a lying upon this fine couch! Out upon you, Joel!
MR. TIBBS. Tol de rol. (*sings*) . . . .
MRS. WATTS. Why, Joel, I say, an't you ashamed?
MR. TIBBS. Hay?
MRS. WATTS. Lolloping so before company!
MR. TIBBS. What?
MRS. WATTS. Why don't you offer the seat to the lady?
MR. TIBBS. Umph?
MRS. WATTS. Lack a day, why are you turned deaf all o' the sudden?
MR. TIBBS. Deaf? O the doose!
MRS. WATTS. Yes, Deaf; can't you answer? Why don't you get up, I say & make your bow?
MR. TIBBS. My bow? O the Devil!
MRS. WATTS. Dear, if I don't believe you're out of your head! What do you say it all over agen for?

[44]Act V (p. 26).

MR. TIBBS. Over agen? O confounded!
MRS. WATTS. Yes; don't you know English, man?
MR. TIBBS. English? O consumed! . . .
SIR MARMADUKE. Pray, Madam, will you give me leave to ask—do you happen to know who that Gentleman is?
MISS WATTS. (*whispering*). Say no, ma'!
MRS. WATTS. Not in the least, Sir. Some poor low Cretur, I suppose.
MR. TIBBS. Some poor low cretur? Fegs, that's pretty high! Why I'm afeard, Cousin Alyce, it's you as has lost your wits!
MISS WATTS. Come this way, Ma'! *Exit hastily.*[45]

Love and Fashion, which Mr. Harris was willing to try out at Covent Garden in 1799-1800, was more ambitious in design than *The Busy Day,* but less entertaining.[46] In their relations to each other the characters often recall *As You Like It,* though the principal theme, the debate between fashion and love, springs from the eighteenth century. The younger of two brothers, in the role of the bad Duke, banishes the elder, the good Duke senior. A scene in which a Woodcutter and a Haymaker plight their troth crudely suggests rural love in the Forest of Arden. A faithful old servant, an eighteenth-century Adam, is praised not so much for his loyalty as for his utility, and the rural love scene is meant as an object lesson for the heroine, who debates riches in a castle against love in a cottage. The "Slaves of Fashion" tempt her at intervals with settlements, pin-money, jewels, domestics, equipages, a box at the opera, and a widow's jointure. Such devil's advocates include the wealthy old suitor, a wastrel and gambler, a fop, and a vapid and vain young lady. These stereotyped stage characters are here indicted for their extravagance and callousness or insensibility. In the end the heroine is persuaded that "mercenary ties are ultimately miserable" and that "virtuous love is as truly the principle of conjugal happiness as untainted integrity is of bosom repose."

Much subsidiary action arises from a subplot, which involves the servants, a ghost, a swaggering braggart, a mystery man at the gates, and a sycophant. The minor characters are mere aggregates of foibles. Apart from the valet and the servants of *Love and Fashion* in whom, as in those of *The Busy Day,* Madame d'Arblay seems to take some revenge on insolent court lackeys, the type of character which she liked to copy from contemporary society does not appear in this play. *Love and Fashion,* one is tempted to conclude, is a transcript not of life, but of the stage. The characterization is thin and hackneyed. The

[45]Act V (pp. 74-6).
[46]The play may be seen in a home-made *cahier* in the Berg Collection, and is transcribed with the usual care and legibility of a final draft.

plot is obvious, its solution and much of its conduct mawkish. Thus the brave new world:

> LORD EXBURY. Has a man hands, & shall he fear to work for the Wife of his choice? Has a woman a heart & shall she barter her person for Gold?
>
> HILARIA. O Valentine, you have drawn me forever from the vortex of dissipation and Fashion . . . .
>
> VALENTINE. To fold thee, my Hilaria, in the bosom of conjugal Love! . . .
>
> LORD EXBURY. While virtue will be the Guardian of your union, Felicity will be its recompense. (Act V)

In *The Woman-Hater* Madame d'Arblay economized by salvaging two of the characters from *The Witlings*. Mrs. Smatter here emerges as Lady Smatter. She is as heartless as ever, and as inaccurate in her quotations. Bob Sapling also reappears, and in the absence of Mrs. Voluble is allowed to give a better account of himself. He is much put upon by his sister Henny, who informs us that he is a "great dunce," unable to read either writing or printing hand.

The Woman-Hater combines the comedy of humours with the comedy of manners and of intrigue. The woman-hater himself, Sir Roderick, is a "humorous" character, labelled in preliminary sketches Sir Peppery. He is the terrible-tempered Mr. Bang, and his storms and tantrums are usually excited by the foibles and literary pretensions of the female sex, which he has despised since his rejection by Miss Wilmot, who deserted him for Lord Smatter on his appointed wedding day.

The intrigue arises among the groups who hope to inherit Sir Roderick's fortune. These include his sister Eleonora, whose unfortunate domestic history and situation seem to belong to novel, romance, or tragedy rather than to comedy; Sophia, Eleonora's daughter; a changeling, who is mistaken for her daughter; Old Waverly the sycophant and his son, who are distantly related to the rich man; and finally an old steward who schemes for a legacy for Bob Sapling.

The plot is complicated and the entertainment it affords very uneven. Yet the scenes which now seem to mar the work would have then been good theatre. Eleonora in her "Innocence & Injury," vainly imploring "compassion & assistance," seems to have strayed from her place in the she-tragedies. Her function is to "interest the heart," and in an age given to weeping, indeed to being "half-annihilated" by Mrs. Siddons as Belvidera, Jane Shore, and the rest, she could be counted on as a source of tears. Along with her daughter (and, in the end, her husband) she provides a dialogue of melting tenderness and

sensibility which amply fulfils Mrs. Thrale's requirement for comedy of a "scene or two of the pathetic kind." Pencilled notes on the list of *dramatis personae* ascribing characters to players give Eleonora to Mrs. Siddons. Despite allegations sometimes made to the contrary, Fanny Burney at least here knew what she was doing.

For "fun and humour" she relies mainly on three characters besides Lady Smatter: the choleric Sir Roderick, who belongs to the comedy of humours; Old Waverly, a decrepit beau and coxcomb from the comedy of manners and intrigue; and finally Miss Wilmot, who, like the Misses Branghton of *Evelina,* Miss Dennel of *Camilla,* or Miss Watts of *The Busy Day,* is a transcript from the comedy of contemporary life. Along with her old Nurse and Bob Sapling, Miss Wilmot enacts the scenes from "low life" which had gained Fanny Burney such fame in her age as an acute and relentless observer of the ridiculous. Miss Wilmot has been well brought up, but in spite of her education in the courtesy books and her deceptive silence before her elders, she soon discovers herself as a romp and a hoyden. Her "first best favourite of all," she assures Lady Smatter, is dancing; and the "second next best thing," singing; and after that, swinging, running, and jumping. She would like to be a ballad-singer, and her repertory of ballads from time to time enlivens the play. She would like to attend puppet-shows and wild beast shows, to eat all the tarts at pastry cooks', and to make a "huge gigantic Bonfire" of all "mopish old Books" and authors. Her obstreperousness finally goads her old Nurse into disclosures calculated to be somewhat subduing:

> Nurse. [When mistress ran away] she took her own Poppot with her, and . . . old Nick put it into my head to burn the Letter she left for Master, & pop you in young Missy's place, making believe you yourself died up the country. . . .
>
> Miss Wilmot. What, then, i'n't Papa Papa?
>
> Nurse. No Miss, your own Dad was a very good man, though he was a Journeyman Shoemaker.
>
> Miss Wilmot. A Journeyman Shoemaker?
>
> Nurse. Yes, my dear; & he's dead now. . . .[47]

The journeyman's daughter has few regrets for Mr. Wilmot, whom she has long considered "dismal dull."

> Miss Wilmot. How do you like Papa?
>
> Bob. Not a bit, Miss.
>
> Miss Wilmot. No more do I Bob, for I'm kept in such subjection, I've no comfort of my life . . . There's nothing but ordering, & tutoring, & scolding, & managing—and reading![48]

[47]Act IV, pp. 12-15 (draft I); pp. 13-14 (draft II).
[48]Act IV (p. 10).

A quite separate source of comedy is the vanity and self-deception of Old Waverly, a sycophant and aged coxcomb, constructed after the pattern of Lord Ogleby of *The Clandestine Marriage*.[49] When Sophia, mistaking him for the uncle she hopes to conciliate, addresses him in the park, his susceptibilities, wishes, and vanity lead him into a gratifying misconstruction:

A young girl coming after me! . . . I suppose she's poor, & so wants me to marry her. . . . But that mother must be a sad Jude! I'll go to her cottage directly on purpose to take her out of the hands of such a vile Baggage. [This is the pious and patient Eleonora.] I'll place her somewhere honestly to save her from bad ways. I'll take a round, that none of Sir Roderick's people may see me going after her. A young Girl! bless me! —they'd think—bless me![50]

With its well-tried stage tricks and characters *The Woman-Hater* must have succeeded, one would judge, and succeeded much better than *Love and Fashion,* which Mr. Harris was prepared to produce. Of Fanny Burney's plays, *The Woman-Hater* would have best pleased contemporary theatre-goers, but *The Busy Day* with its original scenes and its realistic and satiric comedy will now afford more amusement.

[49]Cf. Annie Raine Ellis (*Early Diary, I,* 68 n.): "We believe that no single play is so often quoted throughout the early and later Diaries, and letters, of Fanny Burney, as that highly successful comedy of Garrick and George Colman (the elder), 'The Clandestine Marriage.' "

[50]Act III (pp. 20-1).

REVIEWS

PROFESSOR LOVEJOY AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS*

A. S. P. Woodhouse

The volume under review is an unusual form of *Festschrift,* but an admirable one, and, in the circumstances, singularly appropriate. Professor Lovejoy's friends and disciples came together to present him with a collection, not of their writings, but of his own—that is, to sponsor the publication in book form of such of his essays in the history of ideas as he might select.

As conceived by Professor Lovejoy and his followers, the history of ideas is a "new discipline" in the humanities, or a new co-ordination of existing disciplines, which cuts across conventional departmental boundaries and effects a fruitful alliance of philosophy, history, and literature. Its concern is with the basic concepts which have made up the body of human thought: with the terminology in which they have been cast, with their mutual interplay, and with their pressure upon, and response to, developments in particular fields of knowledge and art. Its method is at once analytical and historical, and from the major literatures, as well as from philosophy, it derives an important part of its material, and on them it sheds a good deal of fresh light. Not that this exhausts the posssibilities of the new discipline. Professor Lovejoy (as he tells us in "The Historiography of Ideas") looks forward to the time when other disciplines, including "the history of science, . . . some parts of the history of language, especially semantics, the history of religious beliefs and theological doctrines, . . . what is unhappily called 'comparative literature' . . ., the history of the arts other than literature . . ., economic history and the history of economic theory . . . [and] political and social history," will be drawn much more fully than at present into the orbit of the history of ideas.

For the new discipline, Professor Lovejoy insists on the necessity of "a sound training in the history of philosophical ideas" (since among these are to be found "the greater number of the more fundamental and pervasive ideas, and especially of the controlling preconceptions, which manifest themselves in other regions of intellectual history"), "and—what is not less important—in the methods of philosophical analysis." But it is perfectly evident that the history of ideas is not simply the history of philosophy under a new name. It differs from that discipline in the range of its data and the focus of its attention: for it must give heed to "the repercussions of philosophic ideas *outside*

**Essays in the History of Ideas.* By Arthur O. Lovejoy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1948. Pp. xviii, 359. ($5.00)

the great technical systems," and it must draw upon other sources. Among these the importance of literature has been demonstrated by the work of Professor Lovejoy himself ever since, in 1916, he published his first essay on the meaning of the term "Romantic," henceforth dividing his time between his formal studies in philosophy and the shaping and illustration of the new discipline.

In *The Great Chain of Being* he furnished an example of the history of an idea on a large scale, commencing with some account of the discipline and its method, proceeding to a luminous distinction between two attitudes, recurrent in religious thought, the this-worldly and the other-worldly, to the former of which the concept of the Great Chain belonged, and then tracing its history from its beginnings in Plato and Aristotle to its final transformation in the years around 1800. Particularly impressive, both in themselves and in exhibiting the methods and results of the new discipline, were the chapters dealing with the eighteenth century. There Professor Lovejoy showed the affinity of the age for the concept of the Chain of Being as the instantaneous and static realization of all compossibles, and its bearing upon eighteenth-century conservatism and optimism, and incidentally threw new light upon, and derived new light from, Pope's *Essay on Man*. Turning finally to the temporalizing of the Chain, the conceiving of it no longer as instantaneous and static, but as developing in time, Professor Lovejoy showed how ideas, and especially implications of the principle of plentitude, were released, which harmonized no less perfectly with some of the distinguishing features of nascent Romanticism. *The Great Chain of Being* not only formulates with precision a dominant concept and traces its history, but makes us aware of its implications and of the way in which it accommodated itself to, and on occasion fostered, attitudes and assumptions with which we have been familiar in other contexts. *Essays in the History of Ideas* applies a similar technique to more restricted subjects, and rounds out our knowledge of the discipline and its methods as practised by Professor Lovejoy. And, like the longer work, the best of these short studies bring us a wealth of new documentation and a fresh insight into the ideas and the periods under examination.

As in *The Great Chain of Being* and the *Documentary History of Primitivism,* Professor Lovejoy is here much concerned with the term *nature,* one of the most influential and ambiguous in the history of Western thought—influential because it does not merely describe but also sanctions, ambiguous because of its multiplicity of meanings and connections. Thus morality has been widely held to be life in accordance with nature or the law of nature, and art to be an imitation of

nature. But what is the character of the nature which furnishes model or norm? It has been conceived in various ways, but almost always, and for the most diverse conceptions, the term has carried with it a weight of approval which can be roughly gauged by remembering the unqualified disapprobation implied in the adjective *unnatural.* Here is a rich field of exploration, in which Professor Lovejoy has blazed suggestive trails. An important preliminary task is a tentative classification of the principal recurrent meanings of the term *nature* in a given context. To this work of classification Professor Lovejoy has given special attention in an appendix to the *Documentary History of Primitivism,* and in his essay "Nature as an Aesthetic Norm," which place all future students in his debt both for valuable information and for a yet more valuable method. In the essays on St. Ambrose and Tertullian he is concerned with the meaning and the application of *nature* in a normative sense in the ethics of a single thinker; and in other essays he relates the concept of nature as an aesthetic norm to two particular subjects in the early history of English Romanticism: the cult of the Chinese, as it blended with and modified the new ideal of the English, garden ("The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism"), and the early enthusiasm for Gothic architecture ("The First Gothic Revival and the Return to Nature"). Of these two essays, among the most noteworthy in the volume, it may be remarked that they are perfect examples of the research paper: they explore subjects of real, if secondary importance, in such a way as to bring out their full significance; they supply an abundance of new and always relevant documentation; they establish relations which are real and unquestionable because they do not depend upon the problematical influence of one author on another, but on the demonstrable habits of thought of an age; they illuminate the English scene by carefully chosen quotations from Continental writers, introduced for comparison and contrast, and always they pursue their special inquiry with a sense of the larger issues which form its context.

Even when one demurs to Professor Lovejoy's conclusions, one learns much from the argument which leads to them. Thus one may think that "The Parallel of Classicism and Deism" represents rather what ought to have happened than what actually did, because in the inheritance of Neo-Classicism, and in its social environment, there were strong aristocratic elements which counteracted the levelling tendency of the ideas which Professor Lovejoy isolates and emphasizes; yet one must concede that the ideas are real, even if but partially operative, and that they deserve some, even if less, weight than Professor Lovejoy would give them. Or again, one may react strongly

against his conclusion in "On the Discrimination of Romanticisms," namely, that no single definition is possible, that what we call Romanticism actually embraces assumptions, attitudes, and ideals which are diametrically opposed to one another, and that one can legitimately speak not of "Romanticism" but only of "Romanticisms"; yet one must recognize that the evidence which Professor Lovejoy adduces is real and weighty and that no definition which ignores it can possibly be sound, and one is forced to a re-examination of the subject, and to a renewed and more cautious and better informed effort of synthesis.

Though Professor Lovejoy's knowledge of literature would put to shame that of most specialists, every one is subject to the limitations of his primary training and interest, to the defects of his virtues; and at times Professor Lovejoy seems to make insufficient allowance for the fact that the poet deals with ideas after a different fashion than the philosopher and puts them to a different use. Thus his discussion of the *Essay on Man,* in *The Great Chain of Being,* wholly ignores the strong aesthetic appeal of the concept for Pope, who was certainly not less impressed by the order and harmony of the Great Chain than by its plenitude: from the first, Pope had been engaged in the task of imposing on every subject which he handled a peculiarly symmetrical form of pattern,

> Where order in variety we see
> And where, though all things differ, all agree;

and by means of the concept of the Great Chain he was able to extend this pattern to take in the whole universe. Of poetry, Professor Lovejoy is apt to take a philosopher's view. But in an essay on the philosophy of Coleridge (in the present collection) he turns aside for a moment to consider his poetry and, incidentally, to correct by a combination of philosophical analysis and common sense a gross error of the literary critics in interpreting "Dejection"; and there he says:

> If that poem has any relevance to the question of the freedom of the will, it is not as a vindication of freedom. For what it records is the powerlessness of the poet's will to control even his own moods. He would recapture his accustomed joy in nature, he would feel as Wordsworth feels, but he cannot; and his inability to alter his inner state is caused by external circumstances not of his own choice. *It should be added, however, that as an artist he finds a certain triumph in defeat; for he is able to derive, and to impart, aesthetic pleasure from the very emotion aroused by his inability to experience aesthetic pleasure—or, at all events, from the poetic utterance of that emotion.*

This is to take into account something of the peculiarity of poetry: to recognize that it deals with ideas, but after its own special mode; that

it is indeed a "document" but one written in a language different from the language of philosophy or science or other forms of "prose," and that if one is to interpret aright the ideas which it embodies, much more if one is to understand the poem *qua* poem, one must never forget this fact.

In its larger aspects, as Professor Lovejoy suggests, the history of ideas must be a co-operative venture, drawing upon the knowledge and the techniques of specialists in a wide variety of fields. Such co-operation is not without its educative value for the specialist himself. And it is accompanied by another condition, difficult but also salutary: the necessity of presenting the results in a language which shall attain a degree of precision without sacrificing general intelligibility. The history of ideas can be addressed only to the general reader, for every specialist becomes the general reader so soon as he leaves the confines of his own subject. In nothing is Professor Lovejoy's example more useful than in the object-lesson which it gives of precision combined with general intelligibility.

Almost inevitably in this review, and indeed with some justification, we have spoken of the history of ideas as if it were the invention of Professor Lovejoy and his school. Actually, of course, it has been and is practised by many scholars who never came under his direct influence. To look no farther, one will find in the recent pages of the QUARTERLY two distinguished examples, in Dr. M. H. Abrams' "Archetypal Analogies in the Language of Criticism" and Dr. F. E. L. Priestley's "Newton and the Romantic Concept of Nature." But no one has done so much for the new discipline as has Professor Lovejoy, or so fully exemplified its possibilities. And even where he has not exploited certain of its resources (as he very clearly has not exploited the field of religious doctrine and terminology, with its juxtaposing of nature and grace, and its specifically Christian conception of liberty), he has, nevertheless, recognized fields which require to be drawn in. It is appropriate, then, that all who have the interests of the new discipline at heart should join with the faithful body of disciples in expressing their gratitude and felicitations to its leading exponent.

SCHOLARSHIP IN THE HUMANITIES* — H. S. WILSON

This book contains a thorough and valuable survey of the methods and materials for literary criticism at present available, a survey especially designed to meet the needs of scholars, and those who wish

Theory of Literature. By RENÉ WELLEK and AUSTIN WARREN. New York: Harcourt Brace [Toronto: McLeod]. 1949. Pp. x, 403. ($5.25)

to become scholars, concerned with the study of the modern literatures. Even more, however, it is an argument in favour of certain reforms in contemporary scholarly methods and in the programme of studies followed in our graduate schools of the humanities. The authors believe that the study of literature, as carried on by contemporary scholars, needs to become more literary and that the way to achieve this end is to practise literary criticism and to train students as critics of general and comparative literature rather than as antiquarians or specialists. We should aim, they argue, "to reconstitute literary scholarship on more critical lines: to give merely antiquarian learning its proper subsidiary position, to break down nationalistic and linguistic provincialisms, to bring scholarship into active relations with contemporary literature, to give scholarship theoretical and critical awareness" (p. 288).

With part of this programme, every thoughtful and liberal-minded scholar will heartily agree. Whatever serves to make scholarship more broadly humane and critically precise is to be cultivated; whatever makes it more narrow and pedantic, frivolous and inhumane, is to be shunned. Nevertheless, there is a curious and disturbing suggestion in the above-quoted passage, as it seems to this writer, which runs all through the book. The suggestion is contained in the phrase "to bring scholarship into active relations with contemporary literature." If this means simply that scholars should be familiar with the best contemporary writing and relate their study of the culture of the past to that of the present, one can of course only applaud such a purpose. But there is, I think, a further suggestion that the dinner should eat the guest rather than the other way round, which seems to be borne out by the following passage:

> History does not simply individualize general values (nor is it, of course, a discontinuous meaningless flux), but the historical process will produce ever new forms of value, hitherto unknown and unpredictable. The relativity of the individual work of art to a scale of values is thus nothing else than the necessary correlative of its individuality. The series of developments will be constructed in reference to a scheme of values or norms, but these values themselves emerge only from the contemplation of this process. There is, one must admit, a logical circle here: the historical process has to be judged by values, while the scale of values is itself derived from history. But this seems unavoidable, for otherwise we must either resign ourselves to the idea of a meaningless flux of change or apply some extra-literary standards—some Absolute, extraneous to the process of literature. (P. 269.)

If I understand the gist of this statement, which the authors engagingly describe as circular, it accounts for their apparent unwillingness to

admit a central and normative tradition in Western culture, and for the miscellaneous suggestions, in the concluding chapter, for acquiring encyclopaedic learning and a critical method which does not seem to commit itself to any norm apart from those supplied by the work critically examined. Thus, one might be asked to judge such a group of contemporary novelists as Graham Greene and Aldous Huxley, John Steinbeck and Thornton Wilder, not by any standard of "high seriousness" or "the best that has been said," but by the particular criteria which each writer yields in his particular novel or novels, as they unfold in the historical process (whatever that may be).

To this writer, the dreadful Absolute, extraneous though it may appear, seems preferable. If there is not a central and normative tradition of Christian humanism by which we may judge these and all other writers in English literature, then we may seem indeed to be floundering in a meaningless flux. Though it may seem almost superfluous to insist upon anything so obvious, it is nevertheless worth stating for the sake of clarity: the tradition to which I refer derives from two main sources, the classical and the Hebraic, as Matthew Arnold has sufficiently taught. This tradition is our heritage, and it is not yet clear that even in America it has been completely abandoned. To cultivate and teach this tradition requires the study of the ancient classics and the Bible. Both sources have been somewhat neglected in recent times, but it is premature to assume that the "historical process" has passed beyond them and that they are no longer fundamental in our culture. The book here reviewed does not, of course, make this suggestion; but one searches in vain through its pages for a clear emphasis upon Christian humanism as a critical norm.

A knowledge of Russian, or even of modern French or German or Italian literature, such as the authors recommend for would-be scholars in the humanities, is a poor substitute for a classical training. A student of good abilities who has endured the discipline of Greek and Latin will, in time, acquire a sufficient knowledge of other modern literatures besides his own without much difficulty. He will never read the *Iliad* in the only way it can properly be read—that is, in Greek—if his only linguistic training has been in Old and Middle English, in French, or Spanish, or Portuguese. To abandon the classics is to deprive ourselves of a principal inspiration and norm for all the greatest writers of modern times, from Dante to Matthew Arnold, from Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton to James Joyce and T. S. Eliot. More than that, it is to lose touch with what each generation before our own has considered one of the purest sources of beauty and truth.

To say that nowadays the cause of the classics is lost, if one admits the relevance of the foregoing argument, is to say that Philistinism has at last triumphed and that we may as well accept the fact. The next thing to go will be the Bible, and Christianity itself. After that, we may console ourselves with the advances of progressive education and the glories of atomic power.

But we who teach know that the vital appeal of our cultural tradition is still there; that young people may become just as enthusiastic about Chaucer or Spenser, Homer or Virgil (providing they are well taught) as they ever have been. It is not the young in our time who are timid of learning, but the middle-aged and elderly. To offer young students Russian or Spanish as a substitute for the foundations of their culture is no doubt fashionable and specious, but it is also a compromise and a betrayal. "The hungry sheep look up and are not fed." If we who teach do not tell them what they should study, nobody else will.

There is another fashion prevalent among some contemporary critics and teachers, of which the present book takes extended and eulogistic notice, a fashion of submitting particular poems and other works of literary art to a laborious analysis according to structure, imagery, metre, and the like—a ritual which may prove fruitful as it encourages more attentive reading of texts but which may easily be pushed to such pedantic extremes as the authors of this book profess to abhor and which constantly incurs the danger of overlooking the main consideration. The natural delight in an exercise of technical and somewhat esoteric virtuosity may lead to an actual neglect to consider how the work under scrutiny is related to the humane tradition in which it belongs, what its main significance is for its own generation and ours—in a word, its "delightful teaching," for the expression, if old-fashioned, is still current and may be defended. Of what the Renaissance called "doctrine," the "New Critics," for all their aesthetic earnestness, have precious little.

If the foregoing discussion has been somewhat warm and emphatic, it is perhaps excusable by reason of the seriousness of the subject, and as an antidote to the very emphatic critical and didactic tone of the authors here reviewed as they present their different views. It should, however, be said, in fairness, that their book is full of useful information, that it is often acute in critical analysis, well written and stimulating, serious and well intended throughout. Nevertheless, in the opinion of this writer, it is misguided in its main argument; inadvertently, one may say, it gives aid and comfort to the enemy in our midst and may seriously mislead the unwary.

BERKELEY*

ROBERT MCRAE

The urgent need for a new edition of the works of Berkeley is fortunately to be supplied now by Professors Luce and Jessop in Nelson's projected library of British philosophers. The first volume to appear contains the *Philosophical Commentaries,* or *Commonplace Book,* as they were called by Fraser, the *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision,* and the *Theory of Vision Vindicated.* Since Fraser's editions of 1871 and 1901, the corpus of Berkeley's writings has been altered and enlarged. The most important changes have occurred in the *Commonplace Book.* As the new editors point out, this "has had to be so drastically re-handled that it is virtually a new document to-day." The two note-books which received this title from Fraser have been renamed *Philosophical Commentaries* by Professor Luce, and the order in which they were originally bound together has been reversed. "The structure of the volume," Professor Luce says, "was not understood in Fraser's day, and reading the notes in the wrong order, he could make little or nothing of them, and he took the volume to be a literary scrap-book. Hence his misleading name for it. The note-books, however, are not a Commonplace Book; they are commentaries on the arguments for immaterialism which Berkeley had in his mind, and probably on paper also, before he began to make the entries." Professor Luce has added an immensely useful set of notes on the entries, taken from the larger set which he supplied for his *editio diplomatica* of 1944.

In the *Commentaries* students of Berkeley can observe the progress of his thought and the scrupulous enumeration of difficulties through which he worked his way to the doctrine as it is given finally in the *New Theory* and the *Principles.* To take one example, we find Berkeley beginning with a modified Lockean correspondence theory of ideas and powers, the ideas in our minds corresponding to powers outside our minds—the difference from Locke's theory being that the powers exist in God rather than in matter (entry 41). This theory undergoes transformation until we read in one of the late entries, "Not to mention the Combinations of Powers but to say the things the effects themselves to really exist even w^n not actually perceiv'd but still with relation to perception" (entry 802). The correspondence

**The Works of George Berkeley,* edited by T. E. JESSOP and A. A. LUCE. Volume I, edited by A. A. LUCE. Edinburgh and Toronto: Nelson. 1948. Pp. 279. ($5.50)

Life of George Berkeley. By A. A. LUCE. Edinburgh and Toronto: Nelson. 1949. Pp. 272. ($6.25)

Vol. II of *The Works of George Berkeley,* edited by T. E. Jessop, 1949, was not received until too late for the present number. It will be reviewed later.

theory thus vanishes. Similarly it is instructive to follow the stages in Berkeley's treatment of the self. There is a prevalent theory that Hume took over where Berkeley left off, applying the arguments which Berkeley had used against material substance to spiritual substance. Readers of the *Commentaries* will find, however, that Berkeley had anticipated just the sort of thing which Hume was to say (entries 576-82).

We have today Part I of the *Principles*. There were to have been a Part II on psychology and ethics and a Part III on natural philosophy. At least a portion of Part II was written but lost in Italy, and Berkeley never completed it. Our clues to what he would have said in these remaining parts are to be found in the *Commentaries*. Not the least interesting are the ethical entries, which show sensation to have had the same importance in his moral theory as in the rest of his philosophy. There is one striking entry which reads: "Sensual Pleasure is the Summum Bonum. This is the Great Principle of Morality. . . ." (Entry 769.) But whether Part II would have been so great an achievement as Part I may perhaps be decided from the fact that Berkeley showed a disinclination to bother with it again after it was lost, while he did recast the argument of Part I in the *Three Dialogues*.

The *New Theory of Vision,* which is included in the present volume, is not only, of course, of great interest in itself, but is an excellent preparation for the doctrine of immaterialism as given in the *Principles;* for there is a remarkable dramatic skill revealed in Berkeley's setting of the stage for his immaterialism, using first the *New Theory of Vision,* then the attack on abstract ideas in the Introduction to the *Principles,* without as yet a word about the immaterialism, then in the six short opening sections of the *Principles* suddenly presenting the full doctrine with its climax in "all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth. . . ."

The *Theory of Vision Vindicated,* the third piece in this volume, was published after Berkeley returned from America. It is, Professor Luce says, "more than a Vindication. . . . For it brings in from the *Principles* tenets which were missing in the original Essay, grafts full immaterialism upon 'the *ad interim* metaphysic' of the Essay, and thus 'explains' his theory of vision by bringing it explicitly into line with his final philosophy."

As a companion volume to the edition of the works, Professor Luce has written a biography of Berkeley. It is a story of the life without a study of the thought, for the author does not believe that "those two things mix well." Without doubt it takes its place as the

most authoritative account we have now of the facts of Berkeley's life. The personality, however, remains provokingly elusive—partly, perhaps, because the author is out to defend Berkeley, and is thus preoccupied with too narrow an aspect of his character. "On the stage and in popular tradition," Professor Luce says, "he is an eccentric, an oddity, and people smile at the mention of his name. Even well-informed biographies convey the impression that he was an amiable fool, with 'every virtue under heaven,' save commonsense." The caricature created in Grub Street has stuck, and Professor Luce is much concerned to destroy it. The tar-water project, for example, is one of the standing jokes about Berkeley. Professor Luce places the affair in correct perspective, so that there is little in it that does not do as much credit to Berkeley's head as to his heart, and certainly nothing is left to smile at. Professor Luce's "man of affairs, sane, shrewd, efficient," is firmly delineated—but there are many such men. That Berkeley was an unusual man, even if not an eccentric or an oddity, hardly appears in these pages. Perhaps he emerges most clearly as a person in the charming descriptions supplied by Professor Luce of the domestic life of the saintly hedonist in his later years at Cloyne.

FOLKTALES AND SAINTS' LIVES* — CHARLES W. DUNN

Folktales are among the most universal of human possessions. Although depending for their survival primarily upon circulation by word of mouth, they have been recorded in the earliest literatures of the world, and presumably they circulated at periods long prior to the invention of writing. Readers unacquainted with folklore study will be surprised to learn from Stith Thompson's *The Folktale* how thoroughly they have been catalogued and examined.

Professor Thompson, who has made Indiana University one of the chief centres of folklore study in the United States, is certainly qualified to write on the subject. In 1928 he published *The Types of the Folktale,* a translation, considerably augmented, of the index prepared by the Finnish folklorist Antti Aarne; and between 1932 and 1936 he published his six-volume *Motif-Index of Folk Literature.* A summary of the scope of these useful, though relatively unfamiliar, works must be included in any reviewer's introduction of Thompson's latest study to its many potential readers.

**The Folktale.* By STITH THOMPSON. New York: Dryden Press [Toronto: Ryerson]. 1946. Pp. x, 510. ($6.75)

White Magic: An Introduction to the Folklore of Christian Legend. By C. GRANT LOOMIS. Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America. 1948. Pp. 250. ($5.00)

The first index lists distinctive folktale types or plots under identifying numbers, such as Type 510, *Cinderella;* and it provides bibliographical references by means of which, in the case of *Cinderella,* for instance, the investigator may locate literally hundreds of cognate versions of the tale circulating at various dates in various parts of Asia and Europe, and innumerable derivative versions borrowed by remote ethnic groups in Africa and America. (For purposes of cultural history, the distinction between cognates and derivatives is just as crucial in folklore as in etymology, a fact which might profitably have been enlarged upon in the book under review. Disregard of the principle leads to the fallacy exhibited even in this century by some classicists, unnamed unshamed, who have automatically assumed that the Roman legend of Romulus and Remus *must* be derived from Greece simply because Herodotus narrates a cognate legend which he heard told in Persia about Cyrus.) On the basis of Thompson's classification numerous exhaustive inventories of the folktales circulating in certain areas, such as R. S. Boggs's *Index of Spanish Folktales,* have subsequently been published.

Thompson's *Motif-Index* carries analysis still further. The distinctive motifs or incidents customarily appearing within the folktale types are listed, with copious bibliographical references, under individual headings, such as Motif S31, *Cruel stepmother,* which appears in many versions of the Cinderella story and in scores of other folktales. (Stepmothers have a very bad international reputation, worse in fact than that attached to any other sub-division of the heading S, *Unnatural Cruelty.*)

In his most recent book, now under discussion, after a brief description of the folktale's nature, Stith Thompson recounts the plots of all the more widely distributed Old World folktales and summarizes the latest results of the investigations into their history and diffusion. This large section of the book serves as a useful commentary on his *Type-Index* and contains a wealth of significant information. The story of *Red Riding Hood,* for instance, unlike *Cinderella,* is not widely distributed in oral tradition and is familiar today chiefly through Perrault (1697) and the brothers Grimm (1812-15).

In a briefer section Professor Thompson then deals in the same manner with North American Indian folktales. Since it was impracticable to deal with the repertoire of the entire world, the author's choice is fortunate. The area selected presents a living example of the circulation of oral literature among so-called primitive people. Thanks to anthropologists like the industrious Franz Boas, North America, as Thompson points out, has been thoroughly sampled, relatively more

thoroughly, in fact, than the Old World, and incomparably more so than other areas such as South America. Moreover, the author is particularly well acquainted with the available records, having published an anthology, *Tales of the American Indians,* in 1929, in which he lists extensive cross-references to motifs and types embodied in analogous Indian tales not included among the typical examples printed in the collection.

In the concluding section of *The Folktale* he evaluates the results of the various folklore methodologies and theories and does so with such thoroughness that his work supplants any previous summary known to the present reviewer, although E. J. Lindgren's article in *The Study of Society* (1939) is still useful. Students of literature will find that these matters of theory raise questions important to both literary history and literary criticism. A random example may be mentioned. The literary historian often has to assess the degree of an author's originality. Folkloristic investigations of the spread of particular folktales confirm the literary historian's findings, for while they repeatedly reveal the paucity of human inventiveness, they demonstrate equally the ingenuity displayed by man in his reworking of borrowed material. Again, the literary critic faces a question such as the following: What is the difference in depth of meaning and applicability between a folktale such as *Snow White,* a literary short story based on a folktale type such as Tolstoy's *The Three Hermits,* and a highly sophisticated short story not derived from folk material such as Thomas Mann's *Mario and the Magician?* Answers have not been plentiful. Contrasting a *True Confessions* story with Hemingway's *Farewell to Arms,* Hayakawa has recently (in *Language in Thought and Action,* 1949) suggested that the difference between the two levels of writing is determined by the author's "reliance upon the affectiveness of facts—that is, upon the reader's ability to arrive at the judgment we want him to arrive at." Critical appraisals of the literary value of folktales have been far from adequate, but any folklorist could find parallels to Hemingway's technique, and perhaps Tolstoy's, in folktales drawn from primitive cultures, indeed even from what Toynbee would call an "arrested culture" such as that of the Greenland Eskimo. Thompson's silence concerning this problem in his chapter on "The Folktale as Living Art" does not suggest any limitation on his part but simply reveals one of the gaps in contemporary folklore study as a whole.

On the positive side, Thompson offers the literary critic some useful appraisals. The excesses of the school of literary psychology are firmly rebuked. Concerning Tegethoff's explanation of the dream origin of

the Cupid and Psyche tale, Thompson tersely remarks: "Even in the search for the ultimate origins of a folktale, there is no reason to be absurd." Readers may amuse themselves by thinking of other psychologists, such as Otto Rank, perhaps, who deserve a similar rebuke. Adherents of the cult of universal and archetypal symbolism such as Coomaraswamy are similarly censured. Frazer's *Golden Bough* is assessed in a way which may present a new insight to its unqualified admirers. (One hesitates to call them readers. When T. S. Eliot wrote *The Waste Land,* how far had he read through the twelve volumes?)

Readers whose main interest in the folktale is anthropological (and whose respect for the validity of folklorists' researches may not be very great) will presumably approve of Thompson's summary of the work of such men as Malinowski and Boas. They may also find the description of Kaarle Krohn's pioneering work in the historical-geographical method of folktale study reassuring. Thompson says of Krohn:

> . . . he acquainted himself with folktales from all parts of the world and he became convinced that an adequate investigation of tales must have a world-wide scope. Moreover, his experience with the historical-geographical technique . . . convinced him that there was no short road to the truth about the origin and history of the folktale as a whole. Only by special studies of each story, based always on as large a number of versions as possible, could one hope to approach a real knowledge of the facts.

So far, folktale study has not completely achieved this ambition, and it may not yet have progressed very far in other directions, but readers of Thompson's book will come to realize the magnitude of Krohn's programme. Even Wilhelm Schmidt, who in his *Cultural Historical Method of Ethnology* demands the most rigorous anthropological procedure, has devised a methodology no more strict than that embraced by the disciples of Krohn.

C. Grant Loomis's *White Magic* is a useful specialized supplement to the folklore indexes already published. Saints' lives have not been extensively catalogued in Thompson's *Motif-Index*. Loomis has gone through all the important collections such as the Bollandists' monumental *Acta Sanctorum* and described the various motifs under a logical system of headings, with voluminous references to the sources. Although he explains that his scheme is representative rather than exhaustive, a saint so obscure as Josse or Judoc (inadvertently dichotomized in the text and index) appears in no less than six different entries; and the miracle of the saint's staff which sprouts leaves when planted in the ground is documented by a footnote almost half a

page in length. Loomis might well have provided the reader with cross-references to the *Motif-Index*. The above-mentioned miracle, for instance, is Motif F971.1, *Dry rod blossoms,* under which Thompson cites invaluable secondary sources. But inexplicably and most regrettably Thompson's work is not even mentioned at any point.

Loomis quite justifiably does not attempt to deal with the notoriously uncertain chronology of hagiographic legends except by way of a generalization that they flourished in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; but the specialist, although left to determine for himself the elusive date of origin for each legend, will be grateful for the copious lists of analogues; and the non-specialist interested in the Middle Ages will discover the wide potentialities of a genre so peculiarly characteristic of medieval culture.

EXISTENTIALISM*

L. E. M. LYNCH

For some years now Existentialism has proven a lively topic of discussion both in academic and in non-academic circles. But the meanings attributed to the term have been so varied that one of the doctrine's more famous exponents, Jean-Paul Sartre, has said that the name really means very little. Any attempt by the ordinary reader to bring some semblance of order out of the existing confusion might well start with the present volumes of Jean Wahl and Jacques Maritain. Both authors have been intimately connected with the various phases of Existentialism for many years, and their observations are of unique value in cutting a path through the maze of conflicting opinions.

M. Wahl charts the course very well in his *Short History of Existentialism*. He indicates that the source of the contemporary philosophical interest in *existence* is in Kierkegaard's religious reaction to the ideal of rationality so dear to the heart of Hegel. "The existent must always feel himself in the presence of God and reintegrate into Christian thought this notion of being in front of God" (p. 5). Attempting to do this in his own life, Kierkegaard opposed the individual's subjectivity to the notion of totality demanded by reason, and that subjectivity being quite individual, existential, and non-con-

**A Short History of Existentialism.* By JEAN WAHL. Translated from the French by FORREST WILLIAMS and STANLEY MARON. New York: Philosophical Library [Toronto: McLeod]. 1949. Pp. vi, 58. ($3.75)

Existence and the Existent. By JACQUES MARITAIN. English version by LEWIS GALANTIÈRE and GERALD B. PHELAN. New York: Pantheon. 1948. Pp. x, 149. ($3.00)

ceptual he thereby raised the problem of reason's ability or inability to apprehend existence without destroying it. That problem, passing from a religious to a philosophical context, has provided the intellectual challenge to Jaspers, Heidegger, and their present-day existentialist disciples.

Jaspers is treated quite briefly by Jean Wahl; he confines himself to indicating Jaspers' secularization (p. 9) of Kierkegaard's thought, the importance he attaches to communication, and the role of human historicity in his thought. Heidegger, on the other hand, is considered at much greater length, and, for purposes of understanding "the Philosophical School of Paris" (Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, Merleau-Ponty), it is only proper that such should be the case. Heidegger's "problem is the ancient problem of being" (p. 11), and it is because he is interested in developing an ontology or theory of being based on the only existence of which we can speak, human existence, that Heidegger rejects the title "Existential" for his thought. His phenomenological analysis of that *existence* indicates to Heidegger that "we are, without our finding any reason for our being; hence, we are existence without essence" (p. 13). It is in just such terms that Sartre has summarized his own view, and from that position all the familiar themes of Existentialism are developed: the absurdity of existence, the anguish that is the experience of our liberty amid such existence, the nothingness at the heart of existence, its temporality, etc.

Such a straightforward exposition is undoubtedly quite familiar to those who have followed existential literature at all closely. The value of the present works, however, is much more in the criticism, both destructive and constructive, they offer. M. Wahl's criticism is more incidental to his main purpose—an avowedly historical one; M. Maritain's comment is more integral to the work he is presenting, *Existence and the Existent* being expressly philosophical in aim. In general, says M. Wahl, the great problem for the existentialist must always be: does not an *existentialist* threaten the very existence for which he is so concerned? And in a totally different context M. Maritain observes: "Here we touch upon the original error that underlies all the modern existential philosophies. Ignorant of or neglecting the warning of the old scholastic wisdom, that 'the *act of existing* cannot be the object of a perfect abstraction,' these philosophies presuppose that existence can be isolated. They contend that existence alone is the nourishing soil of philosophy. They treat of existence without treating of being." (P. 24.)

Both writers, however, add very specific criticisms of Kierkegaard and Heidegger as well. Kierkegaard appears to M. Wahl to be ration-

alizing the paradox when he makes it a meeting of infinite and finite, and is that not to diminish the scandal existence presents to reason? And to M. Maritain, Kierkegaard's "great error" (p. 56) was to separate and oppose as two heterogeneous worlds the world of generality, of law, and the world of the unique witness; it was to dissolve the unity of moral life by separating law from prudence. Actually, he tells us, Kierkegaard did not examine the case deeply enough when he said Abraham suspended ethics and law in his decision to sacrifice Isaac as he had been commanded to do; he did not suspend the law; he was obeying its highest command: "Thou shalt worship God, the Incomprehensible, and shalt obey him" (p. 57). Moreover, he continues, in the three areas of existential knowledge distinguished by Kierkegaard—practical or moral knowledge, poetic, and mystical knowledge —there is never any question of philosophical knowledge. "Subjectivity marks the frontier which separates the world of philosophy from the world of religion" (p. 72); and subjectivity, in marking that break, does not indicate a chasm between the rational and irrational, for it is not so much revealed in dreams or movements of the unconscious as by "self-mastery for the purpose of self-giving" (p. 82).

Curiously enough, both authors express quite similar criticisms of Heidegger, criticisms of the religious overtones in his atheistic thought. Why, says Jean Wahl, should there be forlornness in a world where there is no God? Could it be that if Heidegger were completely free of his religious presuppositions, he would cease to be Heidegger? Actually, in M. Maritain's opinion, the divorce between theology and philosophy is only seemingly complete in Heidegger: it is more correct to say that his philosophy develops in the light of an *a-theology* of which it is the *ancilla!* And in the excellent symposium that brings *A Short History of Existentialism* to a close, Maurice de Gondillac echoes the same view: Heidegger's perspective is essentially a religious one. Further thoughtful and provocative criticisms are proffered by Georges Gurvitch, Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel Levinas, Nicolas Berdiaev, and Alexandre Koyré.

The bulk of M. Maritain's work, however, is constructive in character. It constitutes an attempt to show, on the principles of Thomas Aquinas and his commentators (especially John of St. Thomas), that answers to the main questions raised by Kierkegaard need not lead to an anti-rational philosophy: "the existentialism of Thomas Aquinas differs from modern existentialism, both because it is rational in type and because, being founded upon the intuitiveness of the senses and intellect, it associates and identifies being and intelligibility at every point" (p. 142). It is with that perspective in mind that he discusses the primacy of the act of existing in metaphysics, the apprehension of that act in judgment and the concept of being, the existential char-

acter of judgments of conscience and prudence, the stress on the act of existing in the subject or *suppositum* and its importance for any understanding of the free existent's liberty. And yet, vital though it may be, the act of existing is never divorced from or opposed to intelligence: it is, indeed, the very root of intelligibility. Such an existentialism leaves intelligence, both speculative and practical, intact.

The two works, then, provide an historical and philosophical review of most of the main existential positions. In so doing they prove to be handy guides through a very difficult area of speculation. In both cases the translations are quite good, a job made doubly difficult by the necessity for creating adequate English terminology to convey ideas newly fashioned or long forgotten. Expressing Heidegger in English is a thankless task at best, and it is difficult to couch the metaphysical nuances of Thomistic thought in our own tongue. Considerable success has, however, been achieved in the present instances.

SHORTER NOTICES

Philosophy for the Future: The Quest of Modern Materialism. Edited by Roy Wood Sellars, V. J. McGill, and Marvin Farber. New York: Macmillan Co. [Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada]. 1949. Pp. xiv, 657. ($9.00)

This book is a phenomenon of rather rare occurrence in philosophy nowadays—a defence of metaphysical materialism. It argues that no other doctrine is compatible with the existing scientific account of man and the cosmos, and that future developments in the sciences will continue to validate a materialistic *Weltanschauung*. Twenty-seven scientists and philosophers have collaborated to produce the book, each one contributing an essay on some aspect of the main theme. Almost half the essays are devoted to a review of current trends in the physical and social sciences, since these are held to provide the evidence on which materialism rests. An editorial foreword outlines the philosophical position implied thereby.

The form of materialism advocated professes to be "more subtle and adequate" than anything in the classical tradition of Democritus, Hobbes, and LaMettrie. No attempt is made to explain phenomena mechanistically by reducing them to the motion of atoms or bodies obeying rigid laws. Matter is treated in genetic terms as that which is involved in a continual evolution, where from time to time new patterns and processes emerge. These patterns of matter are organized in a hierarchy of "levels"—inorganic, organic, psychical—each with its distinctive and irreducible characteristics. Man as an evolutionary emergent is not a creature whose material body houses an immaterial soul. He is a "psychobiological individual," profoundly affected by

the social and historical environment of his time. The values he seeks do not have some transcendental source, but spring from his unique nature as a human being. Thus, apart from "the higher reaches of the phylogenetic scale," the universe is devoid of both value and purpose. Yet this fact, suggested with overwhelming force by scientific evidence, does not destroy man's capacity to mould the world closer to his heart's desire. Nor does it prevent him from obtaining an ever deeper knowledge of its structure.

The chief doctrine attacked throughout the book is "idealism"—a term applied rather indiscriminately to a wide variety of positions. Under this heading, pragmatism, positivism, and existentialism come in for particularly hostile criticism. The influence of Marxism is evident here. A number of well-known members of that school are included among the contributors, though dialectical materialism as such is kept on the periphery of the discussion.

Since the volume is offered as a serious philosophical work, it will be judged by professional rather than popular standards. Such an appraisal must lead to the conclusion that while many of the essays are forceful and suggestive, the work as a whole is deficient in careful analysis. This can be seen in the case of such basic ideas as "matter," "levels," "emergence," etc. A precise formulation of what these ideas mean for "modern materialism" is never given; and long-standing difficulties are too quickly passed over. The reader may well wonder whether the plausibility of the general doctrine does not vary inversely with its vagueness. In the present anti-metaphysical atmosphere of philosophy, materialism will not achieve even the status of a possible world-hypothesis, let alone an established doctrine, unless it can be stated with much more rigour and clarity than is to be found in this book.

THOMAS A. GOUDGE

Slavonic Encyclopaedia. Edited by JOSEPH S. ROUCEK. New York: Philosophical Library. 1949. Pp. xiv, 1445. ($18.00)

With the Slavic world looming ever more importantly in the affairs of men, not only politically but culturally as well, an ever increasing number of studies dealing with it have appeared both during and since the war. Most of them, with the exception of *A Handbook of Slavic Studies,* edited by this reviewer, were confined either to Russia and the Soviet Union or to one or another of the Slavic states. There was certainly a need for an over-all reference book covering the entire Slavic field. Such an ambitious undertaking has been attempted by Professor Roucek in the *Slavonic Encyclopaedia.* Unfortunately the result of his efforts falls far short of the mark.

The book is not only full of misprints, but also of mistakes. It is more remarkable for its omissions than for its content. The work of editing shows a certain amount of negligence and a lack of co-ordination, regrettable in such an undertaking, and it suffers from an obvious pro-Soviet and pro-Ukrainian slant. Here are a few examples.

In the field of literature, Pushkin, Krylov, Turgenev, Goncharov, Bryusov, Blok, Gumilyov are not even mentioned, while Djambul, the Kazakh poet (not a Slav), who sings paeans to Stalin, receives one and a half columns of space. In the field of music, Alexandrov, leader of the Red Army song and dance ensemble, is described as a great composer, while Borodin is omitted (incidentally, Borodin, the bolshevik emissary to China, rates one and a half columns). More astonishing still one finds Chaikovsky first listed as a Ukrainian composer; he appears later as a Russian under the spelling Tschaikovsky. The marine painter Aivazovsky is first listed as a Ukrainian, then as a Russian under the spelling Ayvazovski. A similar fate is meted out to Tugan-Baranovsky, who appears first as "the most scholarly and objective of Russian revolutionists," and later as a Ukrainian economist under Tuhan-Baranovsky. Mussorgsky (luckily not transformed into a Ukrainian) has two biographical sketches under two different spellings of his name as does the contemporary Soviet composer Miaskowsky.

Some of the entries are grossly misleading. Theophan Procopovich, a great churchman, orator, and moulder of the Russian literary language at the beginning of the eighteenth century, is identified merely as having "lived among a library of 30,000 volumes." Trotsky appears as "leader of Red Army against anti-Communist and anti-Allied forces" (he must have been fighting himself!). Trudovikists are derived from the word *trodzver*—toiler; there is no such word with any meaning in the Russian language. The article on the theatre in Russia devotes exactly seven lines to the pre-revolutionary period and nine columns to the Soviet era.

Turning now to outstanding Slavs in the United States and Canada one finds such luminaries as Dr. Angeluscheff, a New York physician, Dr. Barkan, assistant professor of biochemistry at Boston University, and Isaac Gilman (not a Slav), paper-mill owner in Vermont, while such outstanding scholars as Karpovich of Harvard, Lednicki of the University of California, Lobanov-Rostovsky of the University of Michigan, such writers as Nabokov, such scientists as Ipatiev and Sikorsky, are absent. On the other hand, such world-renowned scholars as Rostovtzev of Yale and Vassiliev of Wisconsin get three and two lines, respectively, while Professor Roucek himself rates sixty-two lines.

This list could grow almost *ad infinitum*. Suffice it to say that the mistakes, errors, confusions, and omissions in this *Slavonic Encyclo-*

paedia make one approach with doubting mind even the true information therein contained.

LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY

Planning the University Library Building: A Summary of Discussions by Librarians, Architects, and Engineers. Edited by JOHN E. BURCHARD, CHARLES W. DAVID, and JULIAN P. BOYD, with the assistance of LEROY C. MERRITT. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press [Toronto: Saunders]. 1949. Pp. xviii, 145. ($3.75)

This is an important book. It is the result of discussions which have taken place over several years among some of the outstanding university librarians in the United States, as well as some library architects and engineers, in regard to the planning of the university library building of the future. It was in 1944 that President Harold W. Dodds of Princeton University had the happy idea of inviting the heads of fifteen universities and colleges in the United States to join in setting up a committee that would examine the whole problem of university library architecture; and in consequence the "Cooperative Committee on Library Building Plans" came into being. The Committee held a number of meetings between 1944 and 1948, and the present volume may be regarded as its report.

Though the committee has avoided "the temptation to plan an ideal or model library building," it is clear that they have rejected all the traditional types of library building, and have been won over to the new idea of "modular" library architecture—that is to say, "a library in which the building is the stack, and the stack is the building, and in which all possible space is free and easily adaptable to use as stack, reading, or administrative area." "Few contemporary librarians," they assert, "are willing to accept a building which imposes on the future the past or present pattern of book use and management. Almost every building now being planned seeks flexibility in some way. As a building concept flexibility is not new. Office and warehouse buildings have, for example, long been constructed so that interior space can be rearranged more or less at will. Such possibilities . . . seem well adapted to the indubitable need of flexibility in libraries."

Although the committee is apparently unanimous in recommending the "modular" type of library architecture, there are other fundamental questions on which there has been disagreement—notably, on the problem of free access to books. Its members seem, in general, to favour this idea; but they appear to approve the idea of a turnstile at the entrance to the library, at which the patrons of the library are "frisked"—something that seems out of place in an academic community. Yet they admit that "first-rate opinions still differ as to whether it is preferable to suffer numerous losses and make the library

psychologically more approachable, or to stop some of the losses and impose a disagreeable barrier," and that "no general agreement seems possible, on the question of whether the 'open-stack' or the 'closed-stack' library is preferred."

One could wish that the book had contained an authoritative discussion of this vital problem, on which certain phases of library architecture undoubtedly turn. There is, for example, no suggestion that the problem has a moral side. The open-access system not only leads to heavy (and sometimes irreplaceable) losses, but it also gives an unfair advantage to the dishonest and unscrupulous student. It has always seemed to the present reviewer essential that the library should protect the honest student from the depredations of the book-thief, and under this heading one may include the student who appropriates a book to himself or herself before an examination.

In general, this book is rather a symposium of opinions than a *pronunciamento*. But no one who is concerned with the problem—the almost insoluble problem—of the university library building of the future, whether he be the president of a university or a first-year undergraduate, can fail to derive a great deal of illumination from this report.

W. S. WALLACE

Essays in Criticism, 1920-1948: Representing the Achievement of Modern British and American Critics. Selected by ROBERT WOOSTER STALLMAN. With a Foreword by CLEANTH BROOKS. New York: Ronald Press Co. 1949. Pp. xxii, 571. ($5.00)

Poetry is made with words not with emotions, feelings, or ideas—it is that perception of Mallarmé that has changed first poetic and then critical practice in the past seventy years. Readers of this volume will find that the tools of the "new criticism" were sharpened on the new poetry. Poems such as Mallarmé's *Igitur* or *Un Coup de Dés* are great symbolist structures which made possible the metapoetic orchestration of *Ulysses, The Cantos, Finnegan's Wake,* and *Four Quartets.* It is plain fact that nobody has ever made a successful entry into these structures by means of the aesthetic assumptions and reading habits that were prevalent thirty years ago. Yet the very presence of these works has fostered an intensive reading discipline which has drawn its nourishment simultaneously from many fields of study.

Beginning with Mallarmé, poetry once more embraced the entire diversity of civilized interests. Criticism could do no less. Superficially, the first Romantics had rejected the formal methods and content of the encyclopaedic arts and sciences. But the last Romantics, such as Mallarmé, Joyce, Yeats, Rilke, and Eliot, have joined poetry once more to theology, metaphysics, history, and anthropology.

This is the sort of paradox which is a veritable signature on any intense page of intellectual history. It is like the paradoxical truism that poetry is made with words and not ideas. Far from banishing ideas from poetry this formula insists that they should be incarnate and dramatically active. That is why the new criticism is hard on those poets who have left many of their conceptions in the form of mere statements and avoided the hard technical work of digesting them into vital forms. And it explains why that criticism must on the one hand be minutely textual and on the other extremely erudite.

Professor Stallman, therefore, has done well to represent the range of current critical interests rather than to reprint only examples of the best practical criticism. Much of this last kind is covered in his useful bibliography. However, his selection does represent a definite bias in favour of theoretic discussion which is a pronounced characteristic of the greatest number, though not the most influential, of American critics. And non-representation of the critical work of Pound and Wyndham Lewis is hard to understand since both have made major impact at top levels of art and criticism in this century.

The art and criticism of Yeats, Joyce, Eliot, Pound, and Lewis stem directly from deep absorption in and development of the French painting and poetry of the later nineteenth century. The two groups make a single vortex. So that it is not surprising to detect in the work of those who derive only from Eliot, Yeats, and Joyce, a certain loss of focus, a somewhat peripheral and even provincial quality which is entirely absent from Eliot, Yeats, and Joyce themselves. These writers have not yet had criticism on their own terms because they do not have their full meaning apart from the French, from Flaubert to Mallarmé.

Thus Helen Gardner's commentary on *Four Quartets* has a kind of preliminary usefulness which yet falls far below the level of the action of that poem, in a way which would have been impossible had she understood *Un Coup de Dés*.

Professor Stallman has been generous in the scope of his selection which makes available in one volume what is, quite evidently, a body of critical writing from T. E. Hulme to Kenneth Burke, which is unmatched in any earlier period of our literature. This is the radical claim staked by Professor Stallman himself, and a careful check of the record he presents establishes it quite sufficiently.

If the present is inevitably the only door to *any* past, it should be plain from these essays that it is today possible to apprehend our literature from Langland to Eliot with a variety of grasp and relevance of effect that will establish its position as a university discipline in new and impressive ways.

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

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